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Abstract 
This research sets to understand the intricacies of modern Empire and in particular the United 
States of America as the central agent of neoliberal imperialism. This is done with the 
objective of assessing the accuracy of Empire theory as an international relations tool of 
analysis. Empire theory has gained rising academic attention since the early 2000s, this 
research sought to assess its place and use when analysing the United States as Empire. In 
particular, the study focused on Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin’s version of informal Empire 
and Empire by invitation. These notions were understood in the relations existing between the 
United States and its client states, Mexico and South Korea, via the medium of international 
financial institutions and trade agreements, namely the International Monetary Fund and the 
North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement. Mexico and South Korea were clearly described as 
neoliberal states operating within Empire. Yet, this study sought to challenge the concept and 
the theory of Empire by investigating these client states’ political voices. Their agenda-
setting abilities were analysed within the G20 context, thanks to its rotational presidency 
within the forum. The researcher sought to uncover whether Mexico and South Korea had the 
ability to shape discussions and break away from the neoliberal discourse, and therefore 
Empire. The findings were of mixed results as it was established that while Mexico steps 
further away than South Korea from neoliberal perspectives, both client states still formulate 
their policies within a neoliberal framework, as the United States does not oppose or contest 
their agendas. While a fundamental conclusion was not reached, it was settled that Empire 
theory is still accurate in describing inter-capitalist state relations however it does not 
analytically grasp the rising opportunities existing for states, internal or external to the 
neoliberal context, to confront Empire. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
A. Background to the study 
Since the end of the Second World War, the United States of America (US) took centre stage 
as a world superpower. Alongside the Soviet Union, a bipolar global order emerged in the 
context of the Cold War. The major actors in this ideological war strived to spread their 
system of norms, ideologies and politico-financial processes. In its aftermath, the West and 
the United States emerged as the victorious bloc, enrooting a unipolar world order. The 
American nation became then a clear agent for globalisation, the managing force behind 
global capitalism, economic globalisation and neoliberalism as promoted by Ronald Reagan 
and Margaret Thatcher. The superpower obtained an opportunity to spread its liberal 
democratic ideals based on capitalist neoliberal undertakings. This role was concretised 
through the US’ new pillars of strength: its multi-dimensional and unrivalled power, the 
Western-shaped organisations and institutions created in the World War aftermath, namely 
the United Nations, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and 
finally the dense network built with fellow capitalist states. A certainty emerged, the US 
would remain an engaged actor, with or without the Soviet Union. It would not retreat back 
into isolationism as it had done prior to World War II. 
Yet the engagement displayed by the US demonstrated a particularity within the superpower. 
Not only were trade exchanges increased and relations with other states multiplied, the very 
nature of the latter exposed specific underlying dynamics. In effect, while the US was 
spearheading the neoliberal global enterprise, it was also reshaping the world to its own 
image. The might of US power developed through the harnessing and controlling of global 
capital through financial systems, multinational corporations or US led international 
institutions. However, this surge in power was not an overthrow of a previous system or a 
radical take over. Rather, the rise of US neoliberal power came in as a seemingly rational 
process. Other states were not forced into the system but joined in, based on rational 
calculations. The US way was the only way, because it was presented as the most beneficial 
and logical option for others. Herein lays the US’ greatest power, the rallying of state 
economic political allies and clients, not through coercion but through persuasion and organic 
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processes. Perceptions of the United States as a new form of Empire started to emerge rapidly 
in this changing framework. 
Since the early 2000s, Empire theory has gained significant attention in academic circles. In 
their early formulations, theories of imperialism were based on traditional understandings of 
time and space. In this sense, imperial spread was to be observed through complete political 
and economic coercion, alongside territorial conquest and economic (and at times social) 
exploitation. The discourses involved were numerous ranging from physical violence, race, 
resource abuse and political domination. Examples of traditional Empires are the Roman and 
Ottoman Empire or more recently, the British Empire. However, the end of colonial times 
saw the rise of a new form of “world conquest”, a conquest not through physical violence, 
colonisation and resource pillage, but rather through the spread and voluntary acceptance of 
ideology, ideals and economic processes. This, termed as ‘Empire by invitation’ by Panitch 
and Gindin (2012), is essential in grasping the process of how the United States accessed the 
role of world agent and capitalist managing force today. 
However, the unipolar world under US imperial control order has been questioned. Claims 
have been made that the United States may not have an all-encompassing power over its 
“realm”. The rise of the political voice of its own client states has shown the possibility for 
state mobility within the current world order. While neoliberal institutions are controlling 
agents in the current world system, the upsurge of alternative political blocs has shown the 
opportunities for alternative functioning and possible replication of the later within the US’ 
hubs and spokes. This emergence sparks the need for a re-assessment of the United States as 
an imperial power and more specifically of Empire theory itself. Is there a clear break away 
from the American neoliberal narrative within the Empire’s networks? 
B. Rationale and Aim of Research 
This research aims to examine the effectiveness and viability of Empire Theory as an 
analytical theoretical tool. This will be conducted through the assessment of the role played 
by the United States in the international arena. This study, while investigating the rise of the 
United States as Empire, seeks to evaluate the accuracy of Empire Theory through the 
analysis of the financial and political interactions between neoliberal institutions and US 
client states. More specifically, this research will focus on the political and financial 
relationships of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the IMF with 
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respectively, Mexico and South Korea. This study aims to look at the patterns of dominance 
exercised by the neoliberal processes on these states. In effect, it will be determined that these 
processes are a mere reflection of US Empire on its client states. The latter have been chosen 
as referential points; as although they are within the capitalist system, they cannot be 
compared to the United States’ leading competing capitalist regions such as Europe or Japan, 
where deviation from Empire would be almost inexistent. 
Furthermore, this study does not focus on coalitions such as BRICS (Brazil Russia India 
China South Africa) or IBSA (India Brazil South Africa), as their alternative world views do 
not offer the nuances needed to test Empire Theory. Indeed, it is within the intricacies of the 
least probable cases that a theory can be thoroughly examined.  For the purpose of this 
research, a client state will be defined as a state that is economically and politically 
subordinate to a more powerful state as well as engaging in commercial exchanges, in this 
instance the United States. This research aims to unpack the notion of two of the US’ client 
states, Mexico and South Korea, their financial and political relationship with Empire and 
whether they have room to manoeuvre in this imperial process. Although financial 
domination remains apparent, this study will attempt to uncover whether these states have the 
ability to formulate and shape agendas independently of US neoliberal influence. This 
research seeks to understand whether Mexico and South Korea can dissociate themselves 
from Empire thus showing a break in US imperial domination as well as unexplained gaps in 
Empire Theory. 
C. Research Questions 
Does Empire Theory adequately explain the United States’ relationship with states within its 
sphere of influence? In other words, are these ‘client states’ mere passive instruments or 
‘spokes linked to the hub’? 
- Are these states capable of acting beyond the disciplinary boundaries and control of 
US Empire? Can they deviate from the US standard? Does this support the underlying 
assumptions of Empire theory? 
- What does Empire Theory entail? In what ways is the US imperial? How does 
imperialism manifest itself in a post-colonial, post-Cold War and market centred 
world order?                             
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- Are neoliberal institutions and processes instruments of the US Empire? Does their 
implementation within the US’ client states confirm or disprove the position of the US as 
an Empire? 
 
D. Theory Component 
This research utilises Empire theory as its theoretical paradigm. Furthermore, it is also one of 
the variables analysed. In effect, through the investigation of case studies, Empire theory will 
be tested in order to determine its accuracy as an international relations theory. This study 
locates itself in a critical analysis of the state and more specifically a neo-marxist study of 
international relations. This can also be referred to as a structuralist approach within 
Marxism. Structuralism claims that it is the function of the state to protect and reproduce the 
social structure of capitalist societies in as much as this is not attained by the instinctive 
processes of the economy (Barrow 1993, 51). Therefore, structuralist theory argues that state 
policies and state institutions are best defined by their maintaining of the capitalist system. 
The key objective of institutional and policy analyses informed by a structuralist approach is 
to investigate how the effects of state institutions and state policies function to achieve this 
general maintenance function (Barrow 1993, 51). In this particular study, the state in question 
is the United States of America as the globalising and neoliberal agent maintaining its control 
over its fellow capitalist states and international financial institutions. The researcher selected 
Empire theory as defined by Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin from The Making of Global 
Capitalism – The Political Economy of American Empire (2012). While this choice will be 
further explained in Chapter 2, it is important to note that it is one of the only interpretations 
of Empire theory which focuses specifically on the United States as an imperial force rather 
than just the concept of Empire itself.  
E. Chapter Outline – Structure of the Study 
Chapter 2 will outline the core theory of this study, Empire Theory, investigating its origins, 
history and contemporary interpretations. It will also be providing an overview of academic 
works relevant to the research by the means of a literature review. The latter will also focus 
on two major themes of this study, US dominance and neoliberalism. This section will 
attempt to provide an overview of the literature as well as contextualisations. Chapter 3 will 
present a discussion of the implementation of the methodology used, the justification for a 
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case study approach, the challenges faced as well as the lessons learned during the process. 
Chapter 4 will be looking at the United States as an informal Empire. The functioning and 
spread of the US imperial processes will be observed and critically discussed after an 
elaborate discussion on Panitch and Gindin’s approach to Empire theory. 
Chapter 5 will provide case studies to support the perspective of the US as Empire through 
its influence on its client states as symbols of the US neoliberal project. In this instance, the 
impact of NAFTA in Mexico and of the IMF in South Korea will be assessed. These cases 
will allow the researcher to determine the nature of inter-state relations within Empire and 
demonstrate the usefulness of Empire theory as an accurate theoretical tool. 
Chapter 6 will investigate the G20 as a neoliberal forum but also as a context where 
capitalist states can formulate agendas. In particular, the researcher will focus on the 
membership of Mexico and South Korea and whether the latter have been able to shape 
consistent discussions within the framework. This will lead to a critical analysis of their G20 
projects, within their own domestic environment, as well as in relation to the US neoliberal 
conversation. The result of this investigation will determine whether Empire theory is still an 
exact theoretical paradigm to apply to the United States and fellow capitalist states. Chapter 
7 will provide a summary of the findings and their contribution to the academic field. A final 
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Chapter 2: Theory and Literature Review 
This chapter will provide a contextualisation of the study. In order to understand Empire, the 
researcher will present the theories which have helped Empire theory gain theoretical 
soundness within international relations. The theory section will focus on the evolution of 
Empire theory, and the justification for using Panitch and Gindin’s realm of understanding. 
The literature review of this chapter will identify and elaborate on two major themes within 
this paper, US influence and power, and neoliberalism as an economic model essential to US 
control. First, the theoretical paradigm of this paper will be divided into two sections, the old 
theories of imperialism and second, the modern understanding of Empire. For this purpose, 
the researcher focused on the following authors: Hilferding, Luxemburg, Kautsky, Bucharin 
and Lenin for the old theories of imperialism; and Amin, Hardt and Negri and finally Panitch 
and Gindin for the modern notions of Empire. All authors were critically addressed and the 
choice of Panitch and Gindin, justified. A literature review will be conducted and focused on 
US power and neoliberalism. Here, the researcher will seek to provide a broader 
understanding of the terms and definitions to help contextualise the research. 
A. The Traditional Theories of Imperialism  
The amalgamation of imperialism in the Marxist paradigm brought about five major works 
by Hilferding (1981, orig. 1910), Luxemburg (1913), Kautsky (1914), Bucharin (1917) and 
Lenin (1917). Hilferding’s work took imperialism and inter-imperialist rivalry within the 
Marxist framework. However, it was Bucharin that reorganized Hilferding’s concepts into a 
more intelligible outline. Lenin mostly promoted these ideas, instead of adding original ones. 
Luxemburg’s work differs as it is attempting to scrutinize the relation of capitalist and non-
capitalist modes of production. Finally, Kautsky’s notion of ultra-imperialism comes in 
against the inclination of inter-imperialist rivalry.  
Hilferding (1910) believed that capitalism had altered since Marx’s time therefore new 
theories should accommodate these changes. He focused on the treatment of money and 
follows the analysis of the joint stock company as the main form of capitalist firm, which 
facilitated the centralization of capital. This led to the rise of a very small group of capitalists 
with vast wealth and an extensive choice of business interests extended to countless sectors, 
as well as banking. Hilferding (1910) also emphasised the fusion of the banking and 
industrial capital and their common support for monopoly capitalism.  Hilferding (1910) 
 Page 
11    
The United States of America: An Imperial Manifestation? A Study of the Strengths and Weaknesses 
of Empire Theory 
May 28, 2015 
 
maintained that domestically, finance capital necessitates the full support of the state. Unlike 
British capitalism with its stress on competition and political liberalism, in Europe capitalism 
was shaped through the dynamic support of the state, including protectionism, a strong state 
was needed for a dominant financial capital. Imperialism is the outcome of the political 
control exercised by finance capital. Thus, Hilferding’s (1910) analysis speaks of a specific 
model of capitalist development with emphasis on the state, the regulated internal 
monopolistic markets and the intended drive to exports of capital and goods. Hilferding’s 
(1910) study of the relation between monopolies in industry and banking and the state and the 
combination of national protectionism and geographical expansion, through trade and export, 
remained the main themes in later theoretical foundations. 
Luxemburg (1913) emphasises the incorporation of pre-capitalist formations inside the 
capitalist production as a perpetual process of disabling consecutive waves of under 
consumption crisis. In all spheres of an under consumption crisis, capitalism was supposed to 
try to find non-capitalist formations where surplus products could be absorbed and non-
capitalist production would produce new surpluses. This endless process would come to an 
end when the incorporation of pre-capitalist formations would be final, implying a state of 
stagnation or collapse of capitalism. Luxemburg (1913) believed that Marx undervalued the 
problem of realization of the surplus value. Wages and the consumption of capitalists let a 
significant part of value produced, non-realized and investment had to engross this surplus. 
An ever-augmenting mass of commodities has to be produced through this investment 
procedure. In this sense, production just for the purpose of production makes the whole 
process almost unattainable. Therefore, external buyers from the non-capitalist world have to 
absorb these surpluses. Luxemburg (1913) views the system in this contrast of the capitalist 
and non-capitalist sectors, the internal and the external, and inspects how this has functioned. 
Luxembourg’s (1913) process is the first methodical effort to scrutinize the movement of 
capitalism in search of new geographical space, the incorporation of the pre-capitalist 
formations as a necessary parallel aspect in the accumulation process and the identification of 
primitive accumulation as a perpetual characteristic of capitalist accumulation.  
Kautsky’s (1914) idea was that national bourgeoisie was very much in a process of synergy 
with other national bourgeoisies fitting in with the notion of common interest. In effect, he 
argues that the major powers would have an interest to exploit the world together, rather than 
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struggle over the division of this world. Kautsky’s (1914) ultra-imperialism recognizes 
imperialism and militarism as the work of finance, and he feels that the industry would find 
an interest in the peaceful exploitation of the world with other national capitals. The rise of 
monopolies did not prevent competition as competition generates monopoly and monopoly 
generates, at a different level, competition. In effect, Kautsky (1914) indicated that even the 
First World War would not prevent the common interest of capital to exploit the rest of the 
world and this process would produce peace among the industrial nations in the long run.  
Bucharin’s (1917) work trails the line of arguments found in the Communist Manifesto, 
where the movement to global capitalism is well-matched with the strengthening of the 
nation state. His perception of globalization indicates that while inter-capitalist rivalry may 
lead to war and the national domination of one or more powers over the others, globalization 
and international competition will return in the future to challenge current systems of national 
domination. For Bucharin (1917), the movement towards global capitalism is the complete 
imperative of capitalism. As national capital and the state merge as Hilferding (1910) had 
indicated, national blocks are formed which compete at the international level, and as there is 
no international state, the formation of giant national blocks may lead to the common 
exploitation of the periphery of underdeveloped countries, but also to the amplified 
competition among dominant national blocks. The anarchy of capitalist production may be 
controlled at the national level only to be reproduced at the international level. For Bucharin 
(1917), imperialism, as both policy and ideology, expresses this important concentration and 
centralization of capital that engulfs states. 
Most of Lenin’s (1917) work fights Kautksy’s ideas that capitalism may be compatible with 
peace, rather than be in a state of crisis and war. His theory of imperialism lies with the rise 
of monopolies, the formation of finance capital, the export of capital as distinct from the 
export of commodities, the formation of international monopolistic combinations sharing the 
world and the completion of the territorial division of the world. All these conclusions took 
form from the previous literature on imperialism from Hilferding and Bucharin, with the rise 
of monopoly and the uneven development of world capitalism at the centre of the latter. For 
the revolutionary movement, the urgency should be to locate the weak link in the world 
hierarchical structures and gain power wherever such a possibility is feasible. Fragmentation 
and the split of the world into scopes of influence of national capitalisms seem to weaken the 
 Page 
13    
The United States of America: An Imperial Manifestation? A Study of the Strengths and Weaknesses 
of Empire Theory 
May 28, 2015 
 
globalization process of capitalism. This process can be inverted by the formation of world 
monopolies in certain sectors, which reflects Bucharin and Kautsky’s work. However, 
Lenin’s (1917) work became the most influential. This had a negative consequence as the 
preceding works with sounder theoretical undertakings had been forgotten. Imperialism was 
reduced to an expected phenomenon, which common political action could properly fight. 
Imperialism lost in this respect, the theoretical momentum it gained from the classic works. 
B. New Theories of Imperialism  
Until the early 1970s the term of imperialism was widely in use, but in a new background. 
The basic idea was that development and underdevelopment are factually the result of a joint 
process, the formation of world capitalism from the 16th century onwards. Accumulation was 
always taking place in the world system. Surplus from the periphery was shifted to the centre 
through unequal exchange, the relocation of profits and incomes in the centre and financial 
dependency, producing polarization and increasing the gap between the industrial centre and 
the rural periphery. In fact, imperialism is the continuation of colonialism. Then during the 
1980s and the 1990s the term imperialism was left aside. However, it started being used 
again, either through the term new imperialism, or through its traditional understanding but 
again in a diverse context. Among the many works that attempt to define the concept is the 
work of Amin (2001). as well as the theory of Empire as presented by Hardt and Negri (2000) 
and Panitch and Gindin (2012). 
Amin (2001) developed the notion of collective imperialism, referring to the US, Western 
Europe and Japan coalition. The shared interest rises from a different perception of the new 
oligopolistic formations. Multinational companies, regardless of their national background, 
have to be able to have a strong international position in large markets in order to ensure their 
domestic competitiveness concurrently. These oligopolistic structures have common interest 
not only in globalized markets, but also in the constant support of American hegemony, the 
only force that can keep the world under control, as claimed by Amin (2001). However, the 
American hegemony sits on a colossal irregularity. Because of the loss of its economic 
competitive advantage, the US seems to attempt to utilise its military power and political 
supremacy, to turn to its own advantage the common provisions of collective imperialism, 
supposedly to be shared by all. The militarism of the US and the shift to extreme policies by 
the Bush administration at the time of Amin’s (2001) analysis brought forward a number of 
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questions with regards to the viability of the “collective imperialism” arrangements. 
Furthermore, Amin (2001) raises the question over development within the debate of 
imperialism. Amin (2001) states that polarisation on a world scale is inevitable in the process 
of globalisation and increases the phenomenon of pauperisation, described as inherent to 
‘real-existing capitalism’, leading the academic to call it as “imperialist by nature”.  
Hardt and Negri (2000) have taken the theory of imperialism further and helped 
conceptualise the theory of Empire. They have posed a challenge to the connection between 
the state and imperialism. They contend that imperialism, as it was, is over. No state today 
can be the centre of an imperialist project, as sovereignty lies beyond the nation state. One of 
their most fundamental points is the organisation of capitalism along transnational lines. In 
this sense, the notion of the state has become obsolete. In this instance, the US is not an 
imperial power in itself but rather part of a decentred Empire acting as the main agent for 
global capitalism. Hardt and Negri (2000) maintain that a form of global sovereignty has 
emerged, stemming from crises within the legitimising project of modernity such as industrial 
unrest among the labouring classes in developed world, anti-imperial pressure from 
unpopular wars and the failure of planned socialist economies to provide liberty. There is no 
competition or emerging between capitalist states as they all form part of the global 
transnational state acting in the best interest of the transnational capitalist class, or global elite 
(Hardt and Negri 2000). This has apparently now resulted in the evolution of a form of global 
governance that is contested, but which is seen as hegemonic. Hardt and Negri’s (2000) 
understanding can be described as post-modern. Yet, this perception of Empire has its 
limitations. The post-modern understanding appears as too abstract and lacks applicable 
evidence of their assumptions. In effect, in their view, states have become obsolete in the 
agency of the imperial project and claim the existence of a transnational state. However, the 
role of the United States is here clearly undermined. This research will attempt to 
demonstrate that the superpower, as a state, is the sole driver behind the imperial project and 
the valorisation of US interests over global interests. 
Panitch and Gindin (2012) suggest a different approach bringing back the idea of state and 
class, two concepts that previous theorists had undermined. Panitch and Gindin (2012) 
critique all theories of imperialism that try to interpret the phenomenon simply in economic 
terms. They shift the importance to politics, identifying imperialism as a political project 
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conjoining elements of formal and informal Empire. It is thus about the state making “free 
markets” possible and then to make them work, through the unique state agent: the American 
imperial state. The US managed to reconstruct the world through “informal imperial rule” in 
order to open the world in cultural, political and economic terms. Through this active process 
the American state was internationalised, preparing itself through the transitional “golden 
age” of the 1950s and the 1960s, for the constitution of American Empire in the neo-liberal 
era. Neoliberalism is viewed as a political project, changing the capital-labour relation in 
favour of the former. It was done in the US and was followed by most of the rest of the 
world. 
Hence this study will be using Panitch and Gindin’s (2009) approach to Empire identified by 
the spread of an informal Empire with the United States as its central agent, focusing on the 
idea of supremacy. As so, the US proceeds to imperial violence to ensure order and legitimise 
its practices through the control of finance, the economy and the markets. The informality of 
Empire is central to Panitch and Gindin’s (2009) argument. A formal Empire suggests that 
economic and political control is coupled, yet in an informal Empire, these entities are 
decoupled. This means that the US informal Empire is a form of political rule, not based on 
the expansion of territorial acquisitions, but rather on the removal of barriers to US and 
global capital by the promotion of free trade and deregulation, thus echoing notions of global 
capitalism, or neoliberalism. Unlike Hardt and Negri (2000), Panitch and Gindin (2009) 
emphasise the importance of the state system for capitalism to be spread. The authors claim 
that free trade is what has made the US Empire come to existence, as the latter took the 
opportunity to re-shape world politics and economy to its own image, taking responsibility 
for the spread of capitalism, and more specifically neoliberalism. The 2008 economic crisis 
stands as a demonstration of US imperial stretch (Panitch and Gindin 2009). While this 
research acknowledges the importance of territory and the spread of US cultural norms as 
imperial factors, it will rather be the informal financial and political aspect of US Empire, as 
outlined by Panitch and Gindin (2009) which will be used to undertake this research. 
C. Contextualising American Power 
Hormats (1991) credits American achievements domestically and internationally over the last 
decades for the important foundations constructed by past generations. Their vital savings 
and immense investments in schools, factories, farms, infrastructure and technology, in 
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addition to their leadership in forming market-oriented international institutions, provided the 
support for America's existing strengths. After the Second World War, America produced 
tens of millions of new jobs, significantly raised living standards, engrossed large numbers of 
immigrants, spear-headed the world in medicine, science and technology and aided in the 
reconstruction of Europe and Japan. This context is a testimonial to many years of 
anticipating policies by private enterprise as well as government that amplified and improved 
the quality of America's human and physical capital. During much of the 1980s, the US 
economy constructed on this strong foundation and continued to prove remarkable strength in 
spite of deplorable financial excesses (Hormats 1991, 134). 
Nederveen Pieterse (2004) sees US dominance more critically. Important earlier Empires 
claimed legal status. The Roman and British Empires conveyed the rule of law as the 
foundation of their perceived entitlement to constitute a ‘Pax’. Yet, neoliberal globalization is 
rules-based, and the new Empire is formed on the rule of power, and not the rule of law. The 
United States does not sanction the International Criminal Court. The superpower claims 
exemption from its mandate for American nationals and utilises the latter in trade and aid 
negotiations. The US exists in a state of ‘international legal nihilism’ with an increasingly 
rising record of breaches of international law (Nederveen Pieterse 2004). 
 
For Wade (2013), with the US dollar as the international reserve currency, the United States 
fully controls the global capital market along with fellow capitalist states such as the United 
Kingdom, Europe, and Japan. The rest of the world wants to hold the dollar, approximately 
three-quarters of world foreign currency reserves are held in US dollars (Wade 2011).  This 
provides the US central bank and the US government unlimited influence over other 
governments, especially in crisis circumstances as was experienced in 1997 or more recently 
in 2008. Furthermore, the fact that the US government’s success in holding the presidency of 
the World Bank proves the institutional apparatuses that allows it to guard its monopoly even 
whilst facing a normative consensus that such situations should not be limited to specific 
nationalities. The US has the largest and most liquid capital markets globally, continuously 
refilled by American deficit financing, this has been accompanied by a constant drive to get 
other states to open their capital accounts and remove any obstacles to the input and output of 
capital (Wade 2013). In effect, free capital is a vital part of the architecture underlying US 
dominance and ultimately, Empire. When the dominant powerful state, namely the United 
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States, opens capital markets and in relation to the other prosperous capitalist states, with the 
least regulation of business, the lowest taxes, and the most stringent social security system, 
the aptitude of other states to form social controls on markets is abridged (Wade 2011). Their 
capacity to do so is even more reduced when they are prohibited by the rules of the world 
economic order to implement limitations on the inflow or outflow of financial capital, and 
their own prudential regulations of banks and other financial organisations are not enough to 
keep inflows and outflows within safe limits. All states then see it as more problematic to 
establish and keep a national capitalism embedded in social controls (Wade 2011). 
 
D. Neoliberalism: The US Political Economy 
This literature review seeks to provide an overview of the various understandings of 
neoliberalism. For the purpose of this research, neoliberalism is here referred to as the 
economic or political process rather the international relations neoliberal theory (i.e. 
neoliberal vs. neorealist debate). This research maintains that Empire, although viewed as a 
political project, has been associated with neoliberalism as a greater capitalist undertaking. In 
effect, the case studies in this research focus on the influence exerted by neoliberal 
institutions over client states of the United States, and finally the conclusion of this paper 
relies on the compatibility of these states agendas with the neoliberal paradigm. A thorough 
understanding of the project is thus needed. 
Smith (1776) laid the fundamentals of neo-liberalism with his notion that free exchange was a 
transaction from which both parties inevitably benefited, since no one would willingly 
engage in an interchange from which they would come out as worse off. Any constraint on 
the freedom of trade will lessen well-being by negating individuals the occasion to advance 
their situation. Furthermore, Smith (1776) argued, the growth of the market allowed for 
growing specialisation and therefore the expansion of the division of labour. The benefits 
attained through exchange were not benefits gained by one party at the expense of another. 
Exchange was the means by which the compensations increased through the augmented 
division of labour were shared between the two sides to the exchange. The immediate 
insinuation of Smith’s argument is that any obstacles to the freedom of exchange infringe on 
the development of the division of labour and then on the development of the wealth of the 
nation and the affluence of its citizens (Smith 1776).  
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According to Harvey (2003), imperialism is intrinsically linked to capitalist crises, as he 
detects connections between the new imperialism and the overaccumulation crisis that 
capitalism has found itself in since the 1970s. Harvey states that there are two possible exits 
from this outcome, the first enabling capitalism to survive through ‘a series of spatio-
temporal fixes that absorb the capitalist surpluses in productive and constructive ways’ 
(Harvey 2003, 135). The second route would instruct the use of political, military and 
financial instruments to change the international competition to the advantage of the more 
powerful states in order ‘to rid the system of overaccumulation by the visitation of crises of 
devaluation upon vulnerable territories’ (Harvey 2003, 136). Owing to the lack of any other 
solution, the new imperialism is what emerges from the second exit in the escape from 
capitalism’s declining profitability. In effect, Harvey (2003) states that in moments of crises, 
capitalism must continuously have support outside of its own boundaries in order to maintain 
its own stability. 
Harvey (2005) furthers his views by emphasising the links existing between the state and 
neoliberalism. The neoliberal state ought to support durable individual private property 
rights, the rule of law, and the institutions of freely operative markets and free trade. These 
are the institutional provisions considered vital to assure individual liberties. The inviolability 
of contracts and the individual right to freedom of action, expression, and choice must be 
secured (Harvey 2005). The state must consequently use its monopoly of violence to maintain 
these freedoms by all means. In addition, the freedom of businesses and corporations to 
function within this institutional structure of free markets and free trade is viewed as central. 
Private enterprise and entrepreneurial initiative are perceived as the solutions to innovation 
and wealth creation. The lack of clear private property rights is seen as one of the utmost 
institutional obstructions to economic development and the upgrading of human welfare 
(Harvey 2005). Sectors previously run or controlled by the state need to be shifted to the 
private sphere and be liberalized. Competition is seen as the principal virtue (Harvey 2005). 
Therefore, it is claimed that privatization and deregulation along with competition, eradicate 
bureaucratic red tape, upturn efficiency and productivity, advance quality, and decrease costs, 
both directly to the consumer via cheaper commodities and services and indirectly thanks to 
reducing the tax burden. The neoliberal state should determinedly look for internal 
reorganizations and new institutional provisions that expand its competitive situation in 
relation to other states in the global market (Harvey 2005). 
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For Radice (2008), in the 1990s the denial of class to vanish from the lives and consciousness 
of citizens led to a greater reformulation of liberal ideology: neoliberalism. Notions such as 
governance and civil society were positioned in ways that refracted the citizen from class 
identification in favour of a contractual relationship with the state. In reality, this relationship 
has gradually become one of individual consumption of services organised through the state, 
but delivered by private-sector capitalists. The representative-politics element of the 
relationship has been mostly abridged to a circulation of political elites over a commonplace 
and diminished electoral formula of democracy. Effectively current neoliberalism pursues the 
commoditisation of the state–citizen relationship in a way that lessens that relationship 
completely to individual economic self-interest (Radice 2008). 
 
Nederveen Pieterse (2004) studies neoliberalism in relation to power. He claims  that the 
combination of business and coercion is not a new phenomenon. In effect, the Cold War also 
brought together military power and free enterprise. But the form of neoliberalism that has 
risen during past decades is more distinct than the Cold War free market paradigm, and 
economic deregulation since the Reagan years is increasingly more developed. The neoliberal 
regime and the imperial turn share their doctrine-like values and involve vast military 
spending and marketing. From the perspective of the United States, permanencies between 
neoliberal globalization and neoliberal Empire comprise: 
• State intervention in favour of corporations 
• Free market ideology conceals corporate redistribution 
• Conservative ideology of authoritarian moralism 
• Defunding social government 
• Funding punitive government 
• Privatizing government functions 
• Threat inflation, massive defence contracts, militarism 
• Marketing and spin 
• Internationally: structural adjustment and aggressive trade policies (Nederveen 
Pieterse 2004, 123). 
The International Initiative for Promoting Political Economy (IIPPE 2014), a School of 
Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) University of London initiative comprising Patrick 
Bond and Susanne Soederberg as members, offers a critical definition of neoliberalism. 
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Neoliberalism is defined as a contemporary form of globalisation, closely associated with the 
inception of new modalities of imperialism (IIPPE 2014). The neoliberal transition leads to 
the transformation of conditions of economic and social reproduction in diverse countries and 
regions as well as consequent changes in the modes of exploitation and domination (IIPPE 
2014). The Initiative concluded that neoliberalism is based on the systematic use of power to 
impose a hegemonic project of capital domination, through the appearance of no intervention, 
in other words free markets, deregulation and reduced state spending. Global power is 
exercised by the drive for the reproduction of capital through financial markets and the 
interests of US capital itself. Neoliberalism is not about the promotion of rapid growth, but 
rather the subordination of domestic accumulation and workers to international constraints 
(IIPPE 2014). 
Soederberg (2006), through Marx’s historical materialist perspective, attempts to show how 
global governance institutions relate to one another as well as to global capital. Soederberg 
(2006) sees the emergence of the US, as a leading and controlling forced in the reproduction 
of capital after World War II, as being enforced by the establishment of the neoliberal 
international financial institutions, the World Bank, the IMF and the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO – first created as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT). 
These post-War institutions were founded with the intention of a new financial world, 
contributing to the rebuilding of Europe in the aftermath of war. Yet, this reconstruction took 
place under specific auspices, those of US interests and neoliberal policies. Hence, as 
financial institutions, conditions for reconstruction and investment loans were embedded in 
neoliberalism, via privatisation, market deregulation and the reduction of governmental social 
spending (Soederberg 2006). This undertaking did not, and still does not take into account 
national specificities leading to a ‘wrong fit’ of policies, thus demonstrating the imperial 
processes of these US-led institutions. 
Soederberg (2006) maintains that the state continues to play a vital role in the mediation of 
neoliberalism; for instance, the US’ expanding control over global governance through 
various strategies of exploitation (i.e. neoliberal institutions and projects). New imperialism, 
as coined by Soederberg (2006), displays the increasing dependence and loss of sovereignty 
of developing nations. This view is also echoed by Craig Murphy (2002) identifying post-
War regimes such as the IMF and the World Bank as causes for this loss. Murphy (2002) 
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maintains that neoliberalism is triumphant through these very institutions as well as powerful 
clubs of states, the US and its leading capitalist states. 
When many of the Left did not fully grasp an understanding of the spread and impact of 
neoliberalism, Stephen Gill (1995) brought forward a critical insight into the project as early 
as the 1990s, still applicable today. Although being inspired by Gramsci, Gill (1995) did not 
identify the neoliberal system in a Gramscian understanding, as a hegemony, but rather 
through the concept of supremacy. While hegemony absorbs and undermines opposition 
movements to the system, supremacy simply seeks to dominate and create a non-cohesive 
opposition, thus reducing the opportunities for contest (Gill 1995). Neoliberalism is about the 
class power of capital and the extension of markets and commoditisation through 
privatisation, deregulation and competitiveness (Gill 2003; Harvey 2005). As highlighted 
both by Gill (2003) and Harvey (2005), neoliberalism epitomises the polarisation of income 
and life chances, in other words it is not about the increase of wealth, but rather its 
redistribution in the favour of the capitalist elite. However, Gill (1995) notes that neoliberal 
dominance is temporary because of its reliance on short-term supremacy rather than a long-
term hegemonic strategy. In effect, echoing Karl Polanyi’s concept of ‘double movement’, 
Gill (1995) claims neoliberal control relies on the imposition of market values even in 
instances of incompatibility. This process then leads to a backlash by social forces fighting 
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Chapter 3 : Methodology 
This research took on a theoretically-grounded approach in its entirety. Not only did the 
researcher select the Marxist-rooted Empire theory as the lens of the work, but it is also one 
of the crucial variables. In this sense, Empire theory was the object of analysis of this paper, 
the interrogation being on its accuracy as an applicable theoretical tool in contemporary 
international relations. The methodology of the paper is straightforward, first unpacking the 
notion of Empire and its relation to the United States, more particularly based on Panitch and 
Gindin’s understanding. Empire theory is then put against case studies, which seek to provide 
a solution to the paper’s queries. Within this methodology chapter, the researcher will prove 
the importance of a theoretical variable and the contributions to the field which should ensue, 
followed by the justification of the use of case studies, concluding with the problems 
encountered and the limitations to the study. 
A. Variables and Resources Used 
The dependent variable of this research was Empire theory. The study sought to explain how 
and to what extent the United States’ client states Mexico and South Korea can deviate from 
the control of informal Empire. Independent variables were the financial and political impact 
of the United States through neoliberal institutions and agreements, the IMF and NAFTA. It 
is important to note that this research was theory-oriented, and not content-focused. Rather 
than verifying a factual variable, this research assessed theoretical precision, following a 
theory-testing method of inquiry. Hence these variables were intrinsically linked to Empire 
theory itself. 
This study relied on qualitative research using secondary sources extensively such as books, 
journal articles and media clippings. The crux of this research, its theoretical approach, was 
essentially based on seminal books, journal articles and reviews. In particular, the research 
used a collection of Panitch and Gindin’s writings on Empire ranging from their book The 
Making of Global Capitalism to articles such as “Finance and American Power”, 
“Superintending Global Capital” among others, published in journal and information 
websites. With regards to case study applications, the researcher sourced data and 
information from journal articles, academic papers and media clippings. It is important to 
note that considering the nature of case studies, the researcher had to expand beyond peer 
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reviewed primary sources and use secondary open sources and opinion pieces. In effect, the 
researcher used documentation from alternate sources as to provide a non-mainstream-
controlled perspective. 
B. Case Study Approach 
A case study approach was chosen for this research as the study of the spread of US power 
can be observed through its impact identified in various contexts. This study did not select 
coalitions such as BRICS (Brazil Russia India China South Africa) or IBSA (India Brazil 
South Africa) as case studies. These groups often demonstrate a clear alter-American stance 
and thus, their alternative world views do not offer the nuances needed to test Empire Theory. 
Indeed, it is within the intricacies of the least probable cases that a theory can be thoroughly 
examined. Mexico and South Korea represent such cases and do not offer an apparent answer 
to this paper’s query without prior investigation. As was demonstrated in this research, the 
mentioned client states are very much part of the neoliberal paradigm, they are part of 
Empire. It is of greater value to this paper to question the theory within its own realm, as it 
will provide more depth to the final conclusions. 
The research took on a case study methodology. Within this section the choice of this 
instance will be justified and a breakdown of the various case studies undertaken will be 
provided. The case study is often described as the most flexible of research methods, bringing 
through a holistic approach and integrating many characteristics of general truths while 
focusing on specific empirical events (Schell 1992). As Schell (1992, 2) defined it, a case 
study is an empirical inquiry which ‘investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-
life context: when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident 
and in which multiple sources of evidence are used’. 
Case studies are one of numerous techniques within social science research, with 
experimentation and observation matched to a research problem, a degree of experimenter 
control over events and historical perspective and focus. Case studies usually take as their 
principal subject selected examples of a social entity within its normal context (Schell 1992). 
In this instance, the case study provides descriptive accounts of one or more cases, yet it can 
also be used in an intellectually rigorous manner to achieve experimental isolation of one or 
more selected social factors within a real-life context. Despite the popular misconception that 
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case studies are limited to qualitative analysis they can use both qualitative and quantitative 
information (Schell 1992). In this research however, case studies were used solely for 
qualitative purposes. The researcher not only has the historian's primary and secondary 
documentation as resources, but also can add direct observation and systematic interviewing. 
The case study's strength is thus its ability to deal with a full range of evidence such as 
documentation, artefacts, interviews and observations. Schell (1992) classified case studies 
into three categories: exploratory (traditional form), descriptive and explanatory. There is no 
exclusivity between exploratory, descriptive and explanatory case studies, in fact some of the 
best case studies are either exploratory and descriptive or descriptive and explanatory (Schell 
1992). In this study the researcher attempted to accomplish the latter, descriptive and 
explanatory, answering the questions of “how” and “why”. 
a. Case Study 1 
The first case study focused on Mexico, client state of the US. Central and Latin America 
have often been described as the ‘backyard’ of the United States. Therefore, in testing US 
imperialism, the study of US-Central American relation comes to the fore. The dominance of 
US Empire over Mexico will be assessed through the investigation of US financial and 
political influence over the latter, through the neoliberal project NAFTA. The research aims 
to analyse how this neoliberal project is part of the imperium and has constricted the financial 
role played by Mexico domestically and in its international relations. 
b. Case Study 2: 
The second case study looked at South Korea, a second US client state. The latter has become 
the US’ closest ally in the South East Asian region, an area gaining significant interest for the 
United States. Since the IMF bailout of 1997, following the Asian financial crisis, the US has 
forged even more resilient ties with the Asian nation. This case study aims to unpack how the 
IMF bailout is part of the imperial network project and is a symbol of US domination. The 
researcher will attempt to prove that the US, through the IMF intervention, has financial and 
political domination over South Korea. 
A clarification is needed as to the choice of these two case studies. While it may seem as 
redundant to study the well-established dominance of the United States and its global 
institutions over its client states, the aim is precisely this. In order to consider questioning 
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Empire theory, it appears logical to provide case studies which can potentially prove and 
disprove respectively the theory. To understand the possibility of a breakaway from imperial 
neoliberal paradigm, it is essential to first describe and explain it in its context.  
c. Case Study 3: 
The third case study was the crux of the research process as after contextualising Empire, this 
background was essential in determining whether Empire theory is a valid tool of analysis. It 
is important to note that this paper did not seek to proceed to a judgment of said theory but 
simply attempted to identify loopholes which may persist. In this sense, while Mexico and 
South Korea are part of and engulfed in the US neoliberal imperium, one needs to understand 
whether they bring forward any challenges to Empire theory. Although a process of a 
neoliberal undertaking, the G20 theoretically offers a platform for states to shape discourses 
and consensus in G20 actions and discussions. The case focused on the policies put forward 
on the agenda by both client states during their rotational presidency respectively. These 
policies were also assessed on a domestic level and finally contrasted with the US neoliberal 
paradigm in order to formulate a firm conclusion to this study’s interrogations. 
C. Problems and Limitations of the Study 
The major problem that the researcher faced in this study was the theoretical nature of this 
paper. Not only was Empire theory the paradigm of research but it was also a variable of 
analysis. In this sense, it was challenging to keep in mind that the case studies related back 
not just to the United States, Mexico and South Korea but ultimately to Empire theory. 
Furthermore, the researcher did not have any consolidated prior knowledge of the theory and 
this required additional research and understanding. While the field of neo-Marxism was not 
an unknown matter, the specificities of Empire needed to be further explored. 
Although, the study relied on primary and secondary resources, the latter could have been 
completed by interviews of key policy individuals within the respective institutions. 
However, considering the critical nature of this research, it is noted that these may not have 
been as fruitful as suggested. In effect, the researcher was investigating the controlling nature 
of the United States and neoliberal institutions, obtaining a similar statement from officials 
would have been unrealistic to expect. This study could have been applied to further case 
studies of client states, in addition to Mexico and South Korea, however, time and space 
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constraints limited this possibility. If more space and time were allocated to this study, the 
evidence could have been pushed further with a cross-analysis of United Nations Security 
Council voting patterns and the similarities or disparities existing between the United States, 
Mexico and South Korea. 
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Chapter 4: Panitch and Gindin – US Empire 
Empire theory gained greater academic attention in the early 2000s following the publishing 
of Hardt and Negri’s (2000) Empire. From then  stemmed a multitude of interpretations of 
Empire theory, all focusing on different aspects of the framework such as the state, 
globalisation, neo-colonialism, the loss of state sovereignty, economic institutions or even 
neoliberalism. Panitch and Gindin locate themselves in this succession of writings on Empire 
theory, offering a distinct perspective of the concept shaped of the American neoliberal 
Empire. This chapter is the theoretical crux of this paper as it attempts to offer a thorough 
understanding of Empire. This section will historically contextualise the rise of American 
Empire and will focus on the factors and events which led to its position in the world today. 
The particularities of Panitch and Gindin’s view of Empire such as the ‘informal Empire’ or 
the ‘Empire by invitation’ will be explained. Finally, this section will explore further the 
connections existing between Empire, neoliberal and the institutions guiding its process 
globally. 
A. Historicising America: Post WWII 
The essential position the United States holds within global capitalism relies on a singular 
junction of structure and history. The important part in the rebuilding of global capitalism, 
following previous failures, took place during and after World War Two. A new wave of 
global capitalism was only reached after the Great Depression of 1929 and the Second World 
War. However, this relied heavily on the rise of an irregular historical development of a 
group of structures brought about under the direction of a specific and exclusive conductor, 
namely the American imperial state (Panitch and Gindin 2009, 15). The liberal-democratic 
legitimacy of the informal US Empire has led to the common usage of the term ‘hegemony’, 
rather than imperialism. But it is dubious whether the full measure of the nature of American 
power since World War II can be adequately grasped by the concept of hegemony alone. 
Such a displacement has often led to the underestimation of the scope and breadth of 
American structural power and its capacity to reproduce its imperial status (Panitch and 
Gindin 2005). 
The part played by the United States in world capitalism was not unavoidable as Panitch and 
Gindin (2009) claim, but neither was it unintentional, it was a section of capitalist history. 
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The ability with which the US groomed to marry its singular form of control with a general 
managerial task of coordination founded on the attractive US model of production and culture 
created a greater unification in world consumption. In effect, the continuous activity of 
American capitalism and its global attractiveness underlined the future of an informal 
Empire, extending far beyond the one the British Empire had attempted to construct. 
Furthermore, through the hyper development of the modern understanding of multinational 
corporation, that is thriving on foreign direct investments in production and services 
expanding beyond the primary and secondary sectors of activity (resource exploitation and 
manufacturing), the American informal Empire was an extensive penetrative force in relation 
to any other previous social force (Panitch and Gindin 2009, 16). 
Panitch and Gindin (2009) highlight that it was not only the economic and cultural 
specificities of American capitalism that contributed to the new informal Empire but also the 
formation of the American state itself. Unlike traditional notions of Empire which were based 
on mercantilism and territorialism among other characteristics, the American state embodied 
itself in a Republican ideal of liberty closely linked to the idea of ‘extensive Empire and self-
government’ which had been enshrined in the American federal constitution (Panitch and 
Gindin 2009, 17). As Panitch and Gindin state, an essential characteristic was that America 
was not to perceive or reduce the West to colonies, but the latter should remain states.  
This was confirmed during the New Deal, in the midst of the crisis of global capitalism and 
following the grand domestic working class mobilisations, when the US state really began to 
develop the modern development abilities that would transform and vastly spread America’s 
informal imperialism. This was the final stage set for a massively protracted and much more 
powerful informal US Empire outside its own hemisphere (Panitch and Gindin 2009, 20). 
The change of objectives within the US, shifting from domestic-focused to internationally-
interventionist, was key to the revitalisation of capitalism’s globalizing inclinations after the 
Second World War. This did not just unfold through the wartime reconstruction of the 
American state itself, but also through the post-war reconstruction of all the states at the 
centre of the old inter-imperial rivalry. This also led to the formation of new states out of 
their old colonial Empires. Among the various scopes of this new relationship between 
capitalism and imperialism, the most significant was that the densest imperial networks and 
institutional connections, which had previously gone north-south between imperial states and 
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their colonies, now existed between the US and the other major capitalist states (Panitch and 
Gindin 2009, 20). 
What the British Empire had not been able to accomplish in the 19th century now was 
managed by the American informal Empire, which thrived in integrating all the other 
capitalist powers into one effective organisation of coordination under its guidance. The 
devastation of the European and Japanese economies and the feeble political legitimacy of 
their ruling classes at the war’s end shaped a historically unparalleled opportunity which the 
American state was now prepared and eager to exploit (Panitch and Gindin 2009). Moreover, 
the enlargement of the informal American Empire after the Second World War was barely a 
one-way or coercive imposition; it was often more appropriately described by ‘imperialism 
by invitation’. Imperialism by invitation is the notion that capitalist states have indirectly, or 
even directly at times, asked the United States to step in first and take responsibility for the 
current political economy. Therefore this emphasises the apparent ‘non-coerciveness’ of the 
US and highlights the conscious choice made by fellow capitalist states. 
While the development of national security and the military were important in the framework 
of the Cold War environment, the role played by the Treasury and State Department during 
the war to plan the launching of a synchronized liberal trading regime and a rule-based 
financial order was of no less importance. This was achieved by manipulating its key allies’ 
debtor status, the total domination of the dollar as the world currency and the fact that the 
50% of world production was now taken credit for by the American economy (Panitch and 
Gindin 2009). The American state had learned from its previous mistakes of its post-First 
World War incapacity to combine liberal internationalist rhetoric with an institutional pledge 
to manage an international capitalist order. Through the complex mutual planning by the 
British and American Treasuries during the war, the same process that led to Bretton Woods, 
the Americans guaranteed that the British were not only  
‘accepting some obligation to modify their domestic policy in light of its international 
effects on stability, but also the liquidation of the British Empire by throwing Britain 
into the arms of America as a supplicant, and therefore subordinate; a subordination 
masked by the illusion of a “special relationship” which continues to this day’ 
(Panitch and Gindin 2009, 22). 
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Following the New Deal, mutual trust was then promoted between businesses and the state so 
that government could implement its responsibilities to use its fiscal policy as a balance 
wheel, and to use its legislative and administrative power to promote and foster private 
enterprise, by removing obstacles to its growth (Panitch and Gindin 2009). This would create 
an expansionist background where tariffs, subsidies, monopolies, restrictive labour rules, 
plantation feudalism, poll taxes, technological backwardness, obsolete tax laws, and all other 
impediments to greater development can be eliminated. After all global free trade is the final 
goal of a rational world. Therefore a new American imperialism is quite dissimilar from the 
British imperial background (Panitch and Gindin 2009). 
American imperialism does not necessitate extraterritoriality, nor is the United States afraid 
to help shape industrial competitors to its own power, the reason being is that 
industrialization stimulates rather than confines international trade. The Bretton Woods 
conference towards the end of war established as nothing else had yet achieved, the vast 
managerial capacity the American state had developed. The Commission entitled in 
establishing the IMF was chaired and firmly controlled by Harry Dexter White for the 
American Treasury, and even though Keynes chaired the Commission, which was 
accountable for the World Bank, and although the other committees were also chaired by 
non-Americans 
‘they had American rapporteurs and secretaries, appointed and briefed by White’ 
who arranged for a conference journal to be produced every day to keep everyone 
informed of the main decisions’ (Panitch and Gindin 2009, 24). 
As the IMF and the World Bank set up their headquarters in Washington D.C. as per US 
insistence, the trajectory for international economic management was set. This is ongoing and 
it is a pattern in which European or Japanese finance ministries and central banks propose 
and the US Treasury and Federal Reserve that dispose (Panitch and Gindin 2009). The dense 
institutional connections linking these states to the American Empire were also 
institutionalized through various institutions such as NATO and importantly as well through 
the hub-and-spokes networks binding all leading capitalist states to the intelligence and 
security mechanisms of the US as part of the strategy of containment of Communism during 
the Cold War. 
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B. Defining Empire: Post-Boom 
Though the new informal Empire still allowed for other leading states to act as autonomous 
organizing centres of capital accumulation, the imitation of US technological and managerial 
Fordist procedures was enormously reinforced by the penetration of these countries by US 
foreign direct investment. And here, the majority of the American imperial network shifted 
towards to the advanced capitalist countries, which resulted from 1950 to 1970 a fall in 
American FDI from 40 to under 20 percent, whereas Western Europe’s more than doubled 
(Panitch and Gindin 2009). 
This did not mean that the North-South perspective of imperialism became inconsequential. 
But it indicated that the other principal capitalist countries’ relationships with the Third 
World and their former colonies were swaddled in American informal imperial rule. In effect, 
the North-South political divide could continue to provide advantages for leading capital 
states, but any involvements had to be either American-initiated or have American 
endorsement. Alongside this fact, Panitch and Gindin (2009, 27) state that  
‘only the American state could appropriate to itself the right to intervene against the 
sovereignty of other states and only the American state reserved for itself the 
‘sovereign’ right to reject international rules and norms when necessary’.  
It is in this sense that the American state was actively ‘imperialist’. 
The new informal imperial rule, not just in the advanced capitalist world but also in the Third 
World was characterized by the penetration of borders, not their dissolution. The global 
capitalist order was organized and regulated not through the territorial expansion of 
traditional Empire but rather via the reconstitution of states as being entirely part of the 
informal American Empire (Panitch and Gindin 2009). States continued to be the main means 
through which the social relations and institutions of class, property, currency, contract and 
markets were created and replicated and the international accumulation of capital was 
conducted. Capital as an effective social force in a state now was inclined to include foreign 
and domestic capital with international connections and drives. Their interpenetration made 
the concept of separate national bourgeoisies ever more outdated (Panitch and Gindin 2009). 
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Another dimension of the new association between capitalism and Empire was the 
internationalisation of the state, viewed in terms of any given state’s degree of internalisation 
of the responsibility to control its domestic capitalist order so it may contribute to managing 
the global capitalist order. Yet, for the American imperial state, the internationalisation of the 
state had an unusual quality (Panitch and Gindin 2005). It involved defining the American 
national interest in terms of acting not only in the best interests of its domestic capitalist class 
but also on behalf of the expansion and reproduction of global capitalism. The purpose of 
what this required continued to demonstrate the singularity of the American state and social 
formation, but it was gradually more changed towards a vision of the United States’ role as 
that of guaranteeing the survival of free enterprise in the US itself through its promotion of 
free enterprise and free trade internationally (Panitch and Gindin 2005). The saturation and 
incorporation by US multinationals as well as the state meant that American capital was now 
a material social force inside numerous other social formations. This had greater 
consequences on social relations, property rights and labour relations than what financial 
flows would have done. Furthermore, the integrated production processes that transnational 
corporations reproduced had the outcome of preventing protectionist measures and 
strengthening pressures for free trade (Panitch and Gindin 2005). 
The strains between the United States and the other leading capitalist states that arose in the 
context of international competition at the end of the 1950s were about renegotiating the 
strategies and instruments of the post-war measures, and not contesting American dominance 
((Panitch and Gindin 2005). In addition, the resolving of the economic crisis of the 1970s 
depended on the conclusive stages taken by the American state to reconstruct the material 
basis of its imperial role. This was accomplished through neoliberalism. While the 
technicalities of neoliberalism, such as an anti-inflationary discipline and the liberalization 
and expansion of markets, may have been economic, it was essentially a political strategy to 
alter the balance of class forces. Reforms which had been reached by secondary classes in the 
1960s were now showcased as obstacles to accumulation (Panitch and Gindin 2005). 
Neoliberalism did not just include the reversal of earlier gains, but it also weakened their 
institutional foundations, here a change in the hierarchy of state institutions in America 
towards the Treasury and Federal Reserve, at the expense of the old New Deal agencies 
domestically and internationally. Capitalism would function under a new system of social 
rule that undertook not only a renewal of the productive base for American power but also a 
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juridical agenda for integrating global capitalism. This resulted in the ‘constitutionalisation of 
disciplinary neoliberalism through the IMF and World Bank restructuring programmes and 
the increasing Americanization of commercial law’ (Panitch and Gindin 2005). American 
industrial and financial capital extended its diffusion in Europe and Asia, while European and 
Japanese capital largely involved the competitive environment defined by neoliberalism. 
Indicating further integration, Panitch and Gindin give the example of General Motors’ 
restructuring of the South Korean automobile industry in a way no chaebols (South Korea 
industrial hubs) could have achieved (Panitch and Gindin 2005). It is in the context of this 
integration that the Federal Reserve began to emerge as the world’s central bank, in terms of 
bringing in liquidity and maintaining the baseline for global interest-rate changes. In a way, 
the ‘mutual embeddedness’ of Wall Street and the US state confirmed further more imperial 
capacities (Panitch and Gindin 2005).  
As the domestic divide of the economic and political is expanded on an international level, it 
is feasible to understand the notion of an informal Empire. As other states take on liberal-
democratic forms, and the United States comes to supervise global capitalism through these 
countries, a single type of imperial political rule develops. Panitch and Gindin (2005) identify 
four features of this specific political rule. First, instead of the earlier disintegration of 
international capitalism, the post-war growth of the American Empire characterised an 
incremental political project leaning towards the goal of an inclusivist liberal world of unified 
accumulation. The United States is the first Empire completely oriented to the constitution of 
a global capitalism. New international institutions were formed and constituted by national 
states as well as being entrenched in the new American Empire (Panitch and Gindin 2005). 
Second, the US state was more than just a representative American capital interests, it also 
took on the responsibilities for the creation and management of global capitalism. American 
transnational corporations reinforced state capacities, and American imperial power was 
dispersed through them. At the same time, the interpenetration of capital at an international 
level diluted the autonomy of national bourgeoisies and made them hostile to plans that 
would profoundly challenge the American informal Empire (Panitch and Gindin 2005). 
Thirdly, the American imperial form of rule consisted of the structuring of the options of 
other state elites in a manner that they would see the reproducing of conditions for global 
capital accumulation as essential for their own reproduction. The densest institutional and 
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economic connections in the new Empire were built among the developed capitalist states. 
They continued to profit from the reproduction of Third World dependency, but their position 
within the informal American Empire restricted their autonomy in initiating imperial 
measures. The neoliberal turn in the US and its almost-universalisation, comprised the 
rearrangement and liberalisation of the world’s states to economic competition, the free 
movement of capital and the extending of capitalist social relations. Both financial markets 
and international financial institutions acted vitally in enabling this and in strengthening 
American imperial power (Panitch and Gindin 2005).  
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Chapter 5: US Client States and Neoliberal Processes 
This chapter seeks to investigate the existing relationship between the US-controlled North 
Atlantic Free Trade Agreement and Mexico and the International Monetary Fund and South 
Korea. The objective of the study within this chapter is to establish and demonstrate the status 
of client states in relation to the US. These case studies seek to come as a support to Empire 
theory by demonstrating the spread of informal Empire. The concept of Empire by invitation 
will be clearly demonstrated as both nations took on neoliberal reforms voluntarily, although 
many critics have argued that no other alternatives presented themselves and these states 
found themselves locked into this process in order to facilitate and promote growth.  
As it has been established, neoliberal institutions and agreements form the basis of American 
Empire, they can be considered as the instruments of the latter, spreading the US-led 
neoliberal consensus. This chapter will provide an assessment of the US-client state relation, 
but also provide a critical reading of the role of these institutions and the consequences they 
have had on domestic economies keeping in mind that although an import, neoliberal 
processes were internally accepted. First, this chapter will focus on the involvement of 
Mexico within NAFTA. An understanding of NAFTA will be provided as well as a critical 
analysis of its consequence on the state of Mexico. This will be concluded by demonstrating 
how Mexico is very much part of Empire. Second, the study will investigate South Korea 
following the 1997 Asian crisis and the IMF bailout loan. The section will scrutinise in 
particular the transition from a developmental state to a neoliberal one, following the 
conditionalities imposed by the IMF, and accepted by South Korea. As with Mexico, this will 
utilised in order to demonstrate South Korea’s place within US Empire. 
A. Mexico – United States relations: A contextualisation 
a. NAFTA as seen by the US 
The North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement took effect on January 1st 1994 and regrouped the 
three North American trade partners, the United States, Canada and Mexico (North Atlantic 
Free Trade Agreement 1994). The principles and objectives were established in line with the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (now known as the World Trade Organisation). The 
objectives were outlined as such: 
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a) eliminate barriers to trade in, and facilitate the cross-border movement of, goods 
and services between the territories of the Parties; 
b) promote conditions of fair competition in the free trade area; 
c) increase substantially investment opportunities in the territories of the Parties; 
d) provide adequate and effective protection and enforcement of intellectual property 
rights in each Party's territory; 
e) create effective procedures for the implementation and application of this 
Agreement, for its joint administration and for the resolution of disputes; and 
f) establish a framework for further trilateral, regional and multilateral cooperation 
to expand and enhance the benefits of this Agreement. (North Atlantic Free Trade 
Agreement 1994). 
 
The bilateral economic relationship with Mexico is of crucial interest to the United States 
because of Mexico’s closeness and of durable cultural and economic links between the two 
countries. The economic relationship between the United States and Mexico has strengthened 
significantly under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), with trade between 
the two countries more than tripling ever since the agreement was signed (Villarreal 2010). 
With NAFTA, the United States, Mexico, and Canada form the world’s largest free trade 
area, with about one-third the world’s total gross domestic product (GDP). The United States 
and Mexico share numerous mutual interests related to trade, investment, and regulatory 
cooperation and are closely linked in other areas. The two countries share a 2,000 mile border 
and have wide interconnections via the Gulf of Mexico. There are relations through 
migration, tourism, environment issues, health concerns, and family and cultural relationships 
(Villarreal 2010). 
 
Some studies have established that NAFTA has brought economic and social advantages to 
the Mexican economy all together, yet the distribution of these benefits has not been done 
evenly throughout the country. It is said that the effects on the Mexican economy inclined to 
be uncertain at most. Although its net economic consequences may have been constructive, 
the agreement has not been sufficient to lesser income inequalities within Mexico, or between 
Mexico and the United States or Canada (Villarreal 2010). Several economists have noted 
that it is probable that NAFTA helped Mexico’s economic recovery directly and indirectly 
after the 1995 currency crisis. Mexico responded to the crisis by implementing a strong 
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economic adjustment program but also by observing its NAFTA responsibilities to liberalize 
trade with the United States and Canada. The World Bank study assesses that Foreign Direct 
Investments (FDIs) in Mexico would have been about 40% less without NAFTA. One of the 
key opinions supporting NAFTA at the time it was being presented by policymakers was that 
the agreement would progress economic conditions in Mexico and narrow the income break 
between Mexico and the United States (Villarreal 2010). It has been argued that NAFTA is 
not sufficient to help reduce the gap in economic conditions between Mexico and the United 
States and that Mexico should invest further in education; innovation and infrastructure; and 
in the quality of national institutions and adding that Mexican institutions did not advance 
significantly further than in other Latin American states during the post-NAFTA period 
(Villarreal 2010). Parenthetically, one can here observe how the blame is put on Mexico for 
not following a ‘one size fits all’ model of development, blaming internal factors rather than 
external impositions. 
b. Negative consequences for Mexico 
In order to better comprehend the consequences of NAFTA over Mexico, it is essential to 
briefly contextualise the state in which Mexico found itself in following the 1982 debt crisis 
and 1995 peso crisis. In August 1982, Mexico was not able to service its sovereign debt 
obligations, marking the start of the Latin American debt crisis, sixteen other states followed 
suit shortly (Sims and Romero, 2013). After many years of external debt accumlulation, the 
increasing world interest rates, the global recession and the abrupt devaluation of the peso 
prompted external debt payments to rise steeply (Sims and Romero, 2013). After November 
1982, various debt restricting measures were put in place such as the Baker plan and Brady 
plan, sponsored by US banks which assumed the losses on Mexican debt. The IMF provided 
assistance with three financial packages, as well as much contested financial reforms (Sims 
and Romero, 2013). A few years later in 1995, Mexico entered its peso crisis, also referred to 
as the ‘Tequila crisis’ (Musacchio 2012, 3). The latter started after the Mexican government 
devaluated the peso in December 1994. This provoked the worst banking crisis in the 
country’s history, the largest depreciation of the peso in a single year (the peso plummeted 
down from 5.3 to 10 pesos per dollar) as well as the most austere recession in more than ten 
years, with GDP decreasing by more than 6% in 1995 (Musacchio 2012). 
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Just over two decades ago, the North American Free Trade Agreement between the US, 
Canada, and Mexico was implemented. NAFTA was a far-reaching experiment, never before 
had a fusion of three nations with such fundamentally different levels of development been 
endeavoured (Weisbrot 2014). Furthermore, up until NAFTA, the sole purpose of so-called 
trade agreements was only to cut tariffs and lift quotas to set the terms of trade in 
goods amongst countries. However, NAFTA was set on a 900-page document of one-size-
fits-all rules to which the three states were obligated to conform all of their domestic laws 
accordingly, regardless of whether voters and their democratically-elected representatives had 
previously rejected the identical rules in Congress, state legislatures or city councils (Public 
Citizen’s Global Trade Watch 2014). In fact, it is said that calling NAFTA a trade agreement 
is deceptive; NAFTA is rather an investment agreement. Its essential requirements award 
foreign investors an outstanding set of new rights and privileges that endorse overseas 
relocation of factories and jobs and the privatization and deregulation of vital amenities, such 
as water, energy and health care. Oddly, many of NAFTA's most fervent promoters in 
Congress never read the agreement. They made their far-fetched promises of NAFTA 
advantages based on trade theory and ideological bias for everything with the term free trade 
enclosed in it (Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch 2014). 
The most rudimentary ratio of economic progress, particularly for a developing country such 
as Mexico, is the GDP per capita. Weisbrot (2014) states that out of twenty Latin American 
countries (South and Central America plus Mexico), Mexico ranks itself in 18th position, with 
growth of less than 1% per annum since 1994. From 1960 to 1980 Mexico's GDP per capita 
almost doubled. This resulted in consequent increases in living standards for the most of 
Mexicans. If the country had pursued this growth rate, it would currently have European 
living standards (Weisbrot 2014). Parenthetically, this is what took place in South Korea, for 
example. Nonetheless Mexico, like the rest of the region, instigated a lengthy period of 
neoliberal policy changes that got eliminated industrial and development policies, provided a 
larger role to deregulated international trade and investment, and prioritized tighter fiscal and 
monetary policies (Weisbrot 2014). These policies brought to an end the preceding period of 
growth and development. The region grew just 6% per capita from 1980 to 2000; and Mexico 
grew by 16% , nothing in the likes of the 99% of the previous 20 years. In Mexico, NAFTA 
facilitated the consolidation of the neoliberal, antidevelopment economic policies that had 
started been instigated in the previous years, protecting them in an international treaty. It also 
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brought Mexico closer to the US economy, which was particularly unfortunate considering 
that the Federal Reserve’s interest rate increased in 1994, the US stock market bust from 
2000 to 2002 and a recession hit in 2001, and furthermore, the housing bubble collapse and 
Great Recession of 2008 and 2009 had a greater impact on Mexico than almost anywhere else 
in the region (Weisbrot 2014). 
Since 2000, the Latin American region has improved its growth rate to about 1.9% per annum 
and capita and showed improvement over the previous twenty years when it was just 0.3%. 
Following this growth recover, and also the antipoverty policies applied by the left 
governments that were elected in South America in the last 15 years, the poverty rate in the 
region has dropped substantially (Weisbrot 2014). In effect, it fell from 43.9% in 2002 to 
27.9% in 2013. But Mexico has not been part of this recovery. Since 2000, its growth has 
persisted under 1%, less than half the regional norm. And Mexico's national poverty rate 
stayed constant between 1994 and 2012, as it was 52.4% and 52.3% respectively (Weisbrot 
2014). It is important to note that had the large migration not taken place, the statistics would 
have been even worse. Indeed, millions of Mexicans were displaced from their farms after 
being forced into competition with subsidized and high productivity agribusiness in the 
United States, following the implementation of NAFTA. Remarkably, when economists who 
have endorsed NAFTA from the start are asked to support the agreement, the best that they 
can propose is that it amplified trade, “but trade is not, to most humans, an end in itself. And 
neither are the blatantly misnamed free trade agreements" (Weisbrot 2014). 
c. Imperialism and Mexico 
 
From the viewpoint of the ruling class, NAFTA is the crucial legal structure for future United 
States economic relations with the remainder of South America. NAFTA assimilates the 
economies of Mexico, the United States and Canada by removing most trade and investment 
controls over 10 years, with some agricultural tariffs spread over 15 years (Lotta 2001). 
NAFTA was built on the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement signed in 1988. Prior to NAFTA, 
Mexico could appraise all foreign investment offers to decide whether they were in the 
national interest, yet the agreement prohibits the practice. It stops governments giving 
preference to obtainment from local suppliers or promoting local content necessities. Under 
Chapter 11 provisions, NAFTA authorises investors to prosecute host governments in front of 
undisclosed boards of trade experts, who are forbidden from taking into account national laws 
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or traditions in making their decisions (Lotta 2001). Deliberations are made in secret and civil 
society is banned from giving testimony. The Mexican Solidarity Front (2004) maintains that 
in preparation for signing NAFTA, the US insisted on over 300 alterations in Mexico's 
constitution and legal structure, the most significant being the reform of Article 27 of the 
Mexican Constitution, stopping land distribution to campesinos (peasants) as established 
under previous programs. 
Mexico is systemically penetrated by U.S. imperialism (Lotta 2001). This can be observed 
through the accession of US multinational corporation and banks exerting crucial influence 
within important sectors. But it is not only economic penetration. Politically, US imperialism 
can be observed within the Mexican state. The American power is responsible for economic 
aid and assistance, supplying training, equipment, and services to Mexico's military (Lotta 
2011). Parenthetically, some main government Mexican ministers have been qualified in the 
United States. The leading business clusters and banks in Mexico have close associations and 
connections with the Mexican state and with US capital. Imperial domination does not solely 
refer to American corporations which are within Mexico, but it also refers to that Mexico is 
inside the imperialist world economy itself, unified in the exploitative world capitalist system 
(Lotta 2001).  
The US-Mexico relationship has been a clear proof for the everyday truths of the Washington 
consensus: production for export replacing production for internal consumption, the use of 
debt as a lever to force structural adjustment programs, loose investment rules that allow hot 
money to cross borders in seconds, and a trade agreement that is the example for a new legal 
framework that extends the rights of corporations at the expense of civil society (Mexico 
Solidarity Network 2004). Processes which function from the perspective of transnational 
capital are exported to other countries. This is perfectly illustrated by the US-led financial 
institutions loans in exchange of conditionalities, or even free trade agreements. This infers a 
comprehensive reshuffling of the economies, politics and cultures in question to make them 
constant with the neoliberal ideal. Most of society’s aspects are up for change such as 
economic policy, public subsidies, social programs, industrial policy, government 
procurement, intellectual property rights, patents, banking and financial services, agricultural 
policy, foreign direct investment, energy policy, labour regulations, environmental protection, 
public education and health care among others. This demonstrates that, “twenty-first century 
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neoliberalism is a project for world domination, and the US and Mexico are at the centre of 
the vortex” (Mexico Solidarity Network 2004, 1). 
The results of NAFTA are unequivocal for corporations as they have benefited substantially 
while the working class has suffered declining living standards (Mexico Solidarity Network 
2004). In the Chiapas, an agricultural region in Mexico, most peasants used to grow corn and 
beans. But over the years many substituted to growing coffee. This was because the Mexican 
government was no longer committed to giving them financial assistance for growing food 
crops (Lotta 2001). Beans are not profitable on the world market even though people need 
them to sustain themselves. The Mexican government had been endorsing crops that could be 
sold on the world market to pay off its debt, coffee being one of those. But in 1990, the price 
of coffee on the world market plummeted. Many peasants in Chiapas were financially ruined 
and they had less beans and corn to eat (Lotta 2011). This is informal Empire in action. 
Mexico’s economy has been formed, shaped, and remoulded neither to serve the needs of 
independent national economic development, and neither to meet the needs of the people but 
rather to attend to the requirements of imperialism and its local partners, all accomplished 
under “non-coercive” means as such. Mexico was a self-sufficient nation in food production, 
yet it is now one of the four largest importers of grain globally (Lotta 2001). The most 
important alteration caused by imperialism is what it has done to the Mexican rural areas. The 
agrarian question and the peasant struggle for land are central to the neoliberal debate in 
Mexico (Lotta 2001). 
Neoliberal advocates assured that NAFTA would grow trade between the United States and 
Mexico and would upturn foreign investment in Mexico, and this has been verified. A critical 
analysis though reveals considerable downturns. In 2003, Mexico's foreign debt was of 
US$140 billion, corresponding to 21.6% of total GNP (Gross National Product), and interest 
payments amounted to US$37 billion per annum (Mexico Solidarity Network 2004). The 
totality this debt is dollar-denominated, giving Mexico no choice but to increase exports just 
to provision for the debt (Mexico Solidarity Network 2004). Foreign investment expects legal 
structures that protect the "rights" of investors, and gradually these structures are 
transnational, becoming international trade agreements instead of national laws (Mexico 
Solidarity Network 2004).  
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B. South Korea and the IMF 
a. The International Monetary Fund 
The idea of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) came to the fore at the Bretton Woods 
conference in July 1944 (Sanford and Weiss 2004, 2). It has since then become the pivotal 
centre of today’s international monetary system. Formed in 1946 with 46 members, it has 
developed to comprise 188 countries.  The IMF set itself six main purposes: the promotion of 
international monetary cooperation, the expansion and balanced growth of international trade, 
exchange rate stability, the elimination of restrictions on the international flow of capital, 
insuring confidence by making the general resources of the Fund temporarily available to 
members and the orderly adjustment of balance of payment imbalances (Sanford and Weiss 
2004, 2). At the Bretton Woods conference, the IMF was given the task of managing the 
system of fixed exchange rates to assist the international economy in its recovery from two 
world wars and the instability in the interwar period triggered by competitive devaluations 
and protectionist trade policies. From 1946 until 1973, the US dollar was fixed to gold at $35 
per ounce, and all other member countries’ currencies were fixed to the dollar at differing 
rates (Sanford and Weiss 2004, 2). This system of fixed rates terminated in 1973 when the 
United States detached itself from the gold standard. 
In the 1990s, floating exchange rates and more exposed capital markets brought about a new 
goal for the IMF, the resolution of recurrent and unstable international financial crises. The 
Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the consecutive crises in Russia and Latin America in 1998 
exposed many flaws within the world monetary system (Sanford and Weiss 2004, 2). 
Originally created to offer short-term balance of payments loans and observe the 
macroeconomic policies of its member states, the IMF has since gradually combined 
microeconomic factors such as institutional and structural reforms into its mandate, which 
had previously been solely attached to the World Bank and development agencies (Sanford 
and Weiss 2004, 2). IMF member countries agreed on a quota increase in 1997. The US 
Congress consequently allocated added funding to the IMF in October 1998 in the midst of 
the Asian financial crises, an action that provoked significant debate considering the growing 
criticism of the IMF and its lending practices. Although allocations of new funds for the IMF 
are not in waiting, Congress still exercises oversight control over US policy at the IMF and 
over its lending practices (Sanford and Weiss 2004, 2). 
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b. The IMF in South Korea – Post-1997 Crisis 
‘The Fund’s hidden purpose [in the South Korea bailout] is to open doors for American 
business’ (Geier 2000, 1). 
The IMF intervention in the 1997 Asian crisis demonstrated the hidden interests which lay 
within structural adjustment policies. The crisis raised many questions about the international 
monetary system’s sustainability and objectivity to act on problems of global finance. 
Throughout this case study, the objective was not to blame the IMF as responsible for the 
Asian crisis directly, but rather to observe how it created the conditions for the crisis to 
develop as well as how it took advantage of a developing nation’s financial low in order to 
impose US foreign policy objectives, thus once again contributing to the enforcement of an 
American financial Empire. 
The Asian Financial Crisis originated in Thailand in 1997 on 2nd July after the Bhat was 
devalued by the government. A lack of confidence in the economy led international investors 
to remove their money, fearing a loss of profit. The speed and volume with which capital can 
be withdrawn in the global economy created an excess supply of the Baht on the international 
currency exchange markets. This resulted in a rapid and continuous devaluation of the Baht 
(Ping 2007, 1-2). The collapse can also be attributed in large part to South Korea, Thailand, 
the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia’s heavy reliance on short-term foreign loans and 
overtness to short-term easily accessible capital. This dependence was spawned by US 
Treasury and IMF “expert” advice (Essential Action). International investors did not perceive 
the variations and differences between the labelled miracle economies and as a result, they 
were identified as all the same and lost confidence in all of them (Ping 2007). In August 
1997, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines were impacted by the identical process of 
capital withdrawal, in turn leading to a collapsing exchange rate. Singapore, Taiwan and 
Hong Kong were put under pressure in September and October 1997, followed by South 
Korea in November. These devaluations were also echoed in 1998 in states such as Russia 
and Brazil (Ping 2007). 
When it became clear in 1997 that private enterprises would not be able to meet their 
payment obligations, international currency markets panicked. Currency traders sought to 
convert their Asian money into dollars, and the Asian currencies plunged. That made it harder 
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for the Asian countries to pay their loans, and it made imports suddenly very expensive (Ping 
2007, 2). The depreciated exchange rates spread a deep recession as previously viable 
ventures became unprofitable. For example, loans made in US dollars for projects in 
Indonesia preceding the depreciation would need to become 350% more profitable in order to 
be repaid at the same rate. The consequences of this were inflation, bankruptcies, falling real 
wages, unemployment, poverty and social unrest (Ping 2007, 2). 
The receipt of IMF assistance is often as a last resort, taken on in fear of political and cultural 
interference. Indonesia, Thailand and South Korea all accepted IMF-supported programs 
(Ping 2007, 2). Yet, ‘by opting for the Fund’s resources the countries in distress seemed to 
have become turkeys voting for Xmas[sic]’ (Khatkhate 1998, 963). The crisis prompted an 
increasing sense of nationalism with Koreans boycotting imported goods and angrily 
criticising IMF intervention in their economy (Corning 2000). In effect, having contributed in 
many aspects to the expansion of the crisis, the IMF proceeded to make it worse. The Fund 
made loan arrangements to enable countries to meet foreign debt payments, largely to private 
banks, on the condition that the crisis-red countries adopt structural adjustment policies 
(Essential Action). These policies have three key elements – financing packages, structural 
reforms and macroeconomic policies. These are grouped into an IMF-supported programme 
(Ping 2007, 3). These elements follow a chronological order of implementation, as when 
financing packages are accepted in order to reverse the consequences of currency 
devaluation, structural reforms and macroeconomic policies must be carried out (Ping 2007, 
3). With the financial bail-out settled by the IMF, supplementary package programs which 
were envisioned for not only stabilization but also far-reaching restructuring of the domestic 
economy involved the cessation of bankrupt financial institutions, the closure of bank loans 
to financially troubled firms, the fostering of trade and capital-account liberalization, the 
formation of the flexible labour-market, and enhancement in transparency and the debt-to-
equity ratio in the corporate sector. The Fund also pressed for government budget-cut, higher 
interest rates, and reduced growth. Under the crisis-ridden conditions after 1997, the South 
Korea government completed the final blows with the IMF’s adjustment programs against the 
developmental state that had already started being undone since the 1980s inconsistently. 
With the goal of reforms in four key sectors, namely, the financial, corporate, labour and 
public sectors, the government in some ways forced strict reform-standards and processes on 
those sectors. 
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The ability of the IMF to deal with the consequences was hindered by a lack of understanding 
about the causes of the collapse. Unlike previous recipients of IMF assistance, these Asian 
states had high private savings rates, low inflation and good fiscal surpluses (Ping 2007, 2). 
Through structural adjustment policies, the Fund instructed them to cut spending, a 
recessionary policy that deepened the economic slowdown (Essential Action). In effect, the 
programmes applied in Asia were the same which were instrumented in Mexico in the mid-
1990s, despite the fact that Asia’s crisis emanated from the private sector, while Mexico’s 
meltdown emanated from the failure of state measures. Here, the IMF applied a ‘one size fits 
all’ policy, leading to the questioning of its objectivity (Ping 2007, 2). 
The foundations for this questioning were grounded in the close involvement of the US 
Treasury functionaries at all stages of programme negotiations with the countries, at a point 
that it appeared to be a joint operation (Khatkhate 1998, 967). It had been claimed that the US 
and other OECD countries had been pressing the East Asian countries to open their markets 
for foreign ownership in financial services as well as other facets of the corporate sector. For 
instance, in South Korea’s case, such measures had been stipulated as preconditions for entry 
into OECD (Khatkhate 1998, 967). These speculations led former chairman of the Council of 
Economic Advisors, Martin Feldstein, to doubt the Fund’s neutrality within the process: 
‘Several features of the IMF plans are a replay of the policies that Japan and the 
United States have long been trying to get Korea to adopt… Others saw this aspect of 
the plan as an abuse of IMF power to force Korea at a time of weakness to accept 
trade and investment policies it had previously rejected’ (Feldstein, as quoted in 
Khatkhate 1998, 967). 
 
c. South Korea in Neoliberal Empire 
South Korea dropped from being ranked the world’s eleventh largest economy to seventeenth 
in just a few weeks (Corning 2000). Yet, the crisis was not the demise of Korea as a centre of 
capitalist accumulation. In fact, it marked the end of the era of state-led capitalist 
development. Korea must now be seen as an unmistakably neo-liberal state and that the 
state’s interferences in the economy since the crisis have been prompted by openly neo-
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liberal motivations (Pirie 2008). The crucial mechanisms of a neo-liberal regulatory regime 
have been put in place. Systems of corporate governance and financial regulation have been 
entirely reshaped so as to bring them in line with global expectations of best practice as 
defined by top neo-liberal states and supranational institutions. The institutional arrangements 
of the state and legally defined policymaking procedures have been overhauled since 1998 
(Pirie 2008). This transformation has served to maintain the neo-liberal alterations that have 
already been passed and sequester economic policy from political burdens. Important features 
of economic policy, comprising financial and monetary policies, have been distributed out to 
independent agencies that have clear mandates to pursue market compliant objectives (Pirie 
2008). Moreover, policymaking measures have been reformed so as to place a great set of 
difficulties in the way of any effort to revive the dirigiste policies of the past. Hence, and 
notwithstanding both the stunted progress in marketising the state itself and the persistence of 
fundamentally dirigiste structures of power, it is correct to describe the current Korean state 
as a neo-liberal competition US client state (Pirie 2008). 
It is important to understand that neo-liberal reform cannot be described as something that 
external political mediators have imposed upon unwilling domestic elites. In effect, the direct 
controlling role of external political agents in the reform course should not be overstated. The 
suggestion that the IMF, acting for US financial elites, made the Korean government 
participate in neoliberal restructuring following the 1997 crisis, is just erroneous. The 
intricacy of Empire, as demonstrated by Panitch and Gindin (2012), lies in its apparent non-
coercive process. If anything, coercion can be found in the fact that neoliberal capital has 
eliminated the possibility of any other alternative. Empire by invitation as a concept 
emphasises the delegation of managerial duties to the United States and therefore accepting 
the accompanying neoliberal reforms. Market-based reform has unfailingly gone beyond 
what the IMF initially required and there has been no effort to disengage with prior reform 
following the reimbursement of the original IMF loans (Pirie 2008). 
While it is significant to acknowledge the significance of the Korean state in the progress of 
neo-liberal reform it is as important to comprehend how the state’s actions and decisions 
were shaped by, and to a degree even influenced by shifts in the composition of global 
markets (Pirie 2008). There is an easy escape in exaggerating the levels of agency the Korean 
state has truly implemented in the complete course of events. In effect, on one hand, the 
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Korean state evidently decided to follow neo-liberal reform. On the other hand, however, it is 
to be questioned whether other possible alternatives were in place for South Korea. Pirie 
(2008) argued the only plausible alternative to constructing a programme of neo-liberal 
restructuring was to consent to a long-term decline of the Korean economy as a place of 
accumulation in the global economy. 
In conclusion, it is doubtful that the global neo-liberal project can be correctly understood as 
being a triumph when evaluated on its own terms. It is incorrect to understand the neo-liberal 
scheme as just being about implementing a redistribution of wealth from the working and 
middle classes to the haute bourgeoisie (Pirie 2008). Instead, the project must be seen as 
having established in response to structural problems in the global economy, in other words 
the weakening in profitability in the most vital capitalist economies. It is not apparent that 
global restructuring has prospered in making adequate occasions for profitable investment to 
solve the crisis of over-accumulation that came about in the late 1960s. These contradictions 
render the future of the Korean political economy and the global political economy extremely 
unclear (Pirie 2008). The neoliberal restructuring in South Korea may have thrived in 
addressing the structural problems which were part of the crisis but it does not do much to 
guard the economy against harms emanating from an uneven global economy. In conclusion, 
it is not possible to analyse the progress of South Korea and the stability of its political 
economy, without concurrently analysing the changing configuration of the global market. In 
order to understand the development of the current South Korean economy we must refer 
back to tools such as Empire theory. 
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Chapter 6: Client States within the G20: Room to Manoeuvre?  
As it has been illustrated throughout this research, there is no doubt as to how the United 
States formulates and spreads informal Empire. Institutions have been key instruments in 
ensuring American dominance over financial, and to some extent, political issues worldwide. 
More specifically, this paper focused on the particular relationship existing between the 
United States and its client states, namely Mexico and South Korea, via American-led 
neoliberal institutions. The previous two case studies have confirmed that the connection 
between these institutions, the IMF and NAFTA, and these American client-states has been 
representative of the informal Empire, and at times ‘Empire by invitation’ process to which 
Panitch and Gindin refer. Thus, seemingly confirming the notion that Empire theory, as 
viewed by these academics, remains a relevant tool of analysis in the study of the United 
States as an informal Empire. 
This following case study seeks to investigate in even more depth the intricacies of Empire. 
The aim of this chapter is to understand whether there is in fact room to manoeuvre for 
Mexico and South Korea, as American client states. Questions which will be asked are: How 
are US client states engaging outside the theoretical neoliberal paradigm within a neoliberal 
institution such as the G20? Are these client states actually deviating from US neoliberal 
imperialism or are they simply perpetuating the system? This case study is specifically 
framed within a neoliberal institution, as once again, the nuances of deviation are 
theoretically more valuable than shifts within an explicitly alternative organisation. The G20 
was chosen as a framework as both client states which have been studied so far are members 
of the groups and have had their opportunity respectively to chair the G20 since its inception 
thus offering greater research material. 
First, this chapter will seek to provide an in depth understanding of the G20 as an 
international political group, from its inception to its current agendas. The role played by 
non-leading capitalist states within the forum will be unpacked and discussed. It is within this 
context, that the research will seek to look more specifically at Mexico and South Korea and 
their experiences within the G20. In particular, this chapter will look at their policies and 
agendas as G20 chairs and attempt to identify whether the latter can be seen as a clear 
breakaway from the US neoliberal imperialist influence. An insight into the client states’ 
domestic realities will also be provided. In this sense, the researcher will see if the global 
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dialogue is similar to the domestic one. Ultimately, this chapter seeks to establish whether 
client states can really break away from the US paradigm and thus argue against Empire 
theory as an up-to-date theoretical tool. 
A. The G20 as a neoliberal forum: Contextualisation 
The Asian crisis of 1997 and its spread to major states such as Brazil and Russia in 1998 
created much freneticism and questioning within the leadership of world finance. This 
prompted many proposals for a revisited, new financial world architecture. In this instance, 
the G7 extended their circle of discussion to a larger forum of deliberation, a more 
representative one. Behind the normative flag of “more representation,” the United States 
wanted to bring in more US allies to counter the overrepresented Europeans, as part of a 
broader effort to de-Europeanize the governing boards of the IMF, the World Bank, and 
many other multilateral organizations (Wade 2011, 354). 
The initiative of creating a larger forum group came from then Canadian Prime Minister Paul 
Martin and U.S. Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers. The selection of the new state 
members was made by Timothy Geithner then in charge of international economic affairs and 
Ciao Koch-Weser, former managing director at the World Bank (Wade 2011 354). Having 
acknowledged the visible impact emerging nations could have on the global economy, they 
proceeded to invite counterparts deemed ‘systemically important’ from different regions 
around the globe (Vestergaard 2011, 13).  Wade recounts the process of selection which took 
place, 
“they had several transatlantic telephone calls, each equipped with a list of the 
world’s countries and their GDP, population, trade, and the like. They proceeded 
down the list, ticking some countries and crossing others: Canada in, Spain out, 
South Africa in, Nigeria and Egypt out, Argentina in, Colombia out, and so on” 
(Wade 2011, 354). 
The manner in which Wade describes the process gives the impression of a biased selection 
over G20 members and raises many questions as to the forum’s legitimacy in relation to these 
choices. This will be elaborated on shortly. Once the list was approved by G7 members, 
invitations were sent to the first congregation of G20 central bankers and finance ministers. 
The forum then comprised nineteen states and the European Union. The 12 new joiners were 
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said to be selected owing to their large GDP or population, although as Wade (2011) remarks, 
none are the largest of either category. Furthermore, the United States did push for the 
inclusion of some of its relatively small allies such as Australia, Argentina, Saudi Arabia and 
South Korea (Wade 2011, 354). The Asian crisis now in the past, the G20 was concretised in 
1999 ready to take on an ever evolving financial context (Vestergaard 2011, 13). 
The forum was established to provide a new mechanism for informal dialogue in the 
framework of the Bretton Woods institutional system, broadening dialogue on policy and 
central economic issues and promoting cooperation to achieve a stable and sustainable world 
economy that benefits all (Vestergaard 2011, 13). The forum is described as informal as it has 
no charter, no secretariat, no staff, no headquarters and no legal system with incentives and 
sanctions. Unlike the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, 
the G20 does not comprise state contributions, votes or veto power (Oxfam Mexico 2012, 3). 
The G20 relies on decision-making through consensus of its members. 
Member states to the G20 include Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, 
Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, the Russian 
Federation, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the UK, the USA as well as the European 
Union (Vestergaard 2011, 13). The forum is supported by international organisations such as 
the Financial Stability Board, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the United Nations and the 
World Trade Organization (G20 2014, 1). These and several other organisations are invited to 
attend key G20 meetings. Furthermore, guest countries are invited to the summits each year. 
Guests typically include Spain as an agreed permanent guest, the Chair of the Association of 
South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the head of the African Union and the head of the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) as well as countries invited by the 
incumbent G20 President reflecting its regional relationships (G20 2014a, 1). In an attempt of 
implementing fairness, the G20 changes presidential leadership each year which leaves all 
members the opportunity to shape global dialogs and agendas, “what the G20 says and does 
depends heavily on the chair, or on the ability of others to manipulate and incentivize the 
chair” (Wade 2011, 354). 
While the first meeting took place in December 1999, the forum attracted little attention until 
2008. Following the global economic crisis, G20 meetings, which used to only be conducted 
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by finance ministers and central bank governors were now a matter relying on Heads of State 
and Government. Leaders of great powers started to make use of the G20 as a forum to 
discuss and coordinate responses to the crises. It became a key platform for the most 
important industrialised and emerging economies to discuss major issues of international 
currency, financial policy and important global challenges. The G20 emerged from obscurity 
to hit the centre stage of world politics (Vestergaard 2011, 14).  
a. How does the G20 function? 
Following the 2008 crisis, it was agreed that financial stability was just one of many elements 
and that the recovery and growth of the world economy was incomplete without considering 
the issues of development, food security, employment, social security, global trade, and the 
fight against corruption. Thus, other than just focusing on what is termed as the Finance 
Track, the G20 incorporated the Sherpa Track. The term Sherpa refers to members of the 
Himalayan people who are efficient guides (Biswas 2012, 1). Sherpa are assigned to 
represent each head of state and are responsible for conducting preparatory work to guide 
their leaders prior to the annual G20 Summits. Sherpa focus on political, non-financial issues 
such as employment, agriculture, energy, the fight against corruption and development, 
among others. Under both Tracks of the G20, come the working and experts groups. These 
groups are generally co-chaired by one advanced and one emerging economy (Biswas 2012, 
1). 
 
The Finance track of the G20 includes the annual meetings of the G20 finance ministers and 
central bank governors which started from 1999. These meetings since 2008 have primarily 
focused on the recovery of the global financial markets and reforming them in order to avoid 
future crisis. Numerous working groups and experts groups have been assigned the duty of 
assessing the global financial market conditions and submitting reports for the finance 
ministers and the leaders at the Summits. These groups hold their meetings prior to the 
leaders’ summits to prepare reports to be presented and discussed at the summits (Biswas 
2012, 1).  The working and experts’ groups under the Finance Track have been focusing on 
issues such as enhancing financial regulations and transparency, establishing financial safety 
nets, increasing trade finance, facing the curbing the volatility of commodity prices, creating 
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channels of green growth, and promoting climate finance (Biswas 2012, 1). 
  
On the other hand, Sherpas shift their focus on non-financial political affairs and organizes 
reports and assessments via its working groups who meet throughout the year prior to the 
summit. For instance, Sherpa Track under the Mexican Presidency of the G20 in 2012 has 
working groups on Employment, Anti-Corruption, Development and Multilateral Trade. 
Many have claimed that it is this informal structure of summits and working groups which 
have allowed world powers and emerging nations to sit and discuss issues that cannot be 
addressed in other less flexible forums (Biswas 2012, 1). 
 
b. Problems of inclusiveness and legitimacy 
Despite the G20 having set itself as a central forum for financial and global issues, some 
structural elements need to be addressed. Representing approximately two-thirds of the world 
population, the G20 has considerable weight in the global economy, as its member countries 
produce about 90% of the global economic output and have a share of around 80% of world 
trade (Berensmann, Fues, Volz 2011, 2). The G20 members do not question the legitimacy of 
the group, while sitting at the summit of global governance. As quoted by the G20, its 
“economic weight and broad membership gives it a high degree of legitimacy and influence 
over the management of the global economy and financial system”. Yet the G20’s legitimacy 
is not unquestioned by other states which do not belong to the group. 
As stated by Wade (2011), the G20 members do not differentiate between legitimacy and 
efficiency. It is said that within their environment, legitimacy is often confused with 
representativeness or efficiency. Questions are rarely answered with regards to the selection 
process of members, the lack of clear criteria for membership, the idea of exclusive 
membership and finally the narrow regional representation. In effect, critics of the forum 
highlight that its membership meets no criteria that would justify the accession of Argentina, 
with 40 million population, rather than Columbia, with 46 million population, or even more 
noticeable South Africa, 50 million population, rather than Nigeria’s 158 million population 
(Wade 2011). The then Norwegian foreign minister described the project as “one of the 
greatest setbacks since World War II”. Furthermore, the United Nations, symbol of inclusive 
multilateralism, resisted for a very long time the upgrading of the G20 from finance ministers 
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to heads of states on the principle that the organisation described the G20 as self-selecting, 
exclusive and non-rotating, going against the foundations of universality (Wade 2011). 
Since the first two summits of November 2008 and April 2009, regional organisations have 
demanded for greater inclusion. The African Union has stated that Africa is truly 
underrepresented, having only one African state (South Africa) and that a seat for the 
organisation would contribute to greater representation. The Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) has echoed similar ideas which led the G20 to invite ASEAN to nominate 
a country to represent it and the African Union to send representatives from two of its 
member states (Wade 2011). At the 2011 Seoul Summit, twenty countries represented 
themselves alone, along with Spain which by then had become a permanent guest four 
countries represented groupings, two from the African Union, one from ASEAN and 
Singapore which represented the Global Governance Group, covering 28 small states, and 
finally the EU occupied one seat. In effect, the G20 had shifted to the G20 + 5. However, the 
complaints have not dissipated as the G20 permanently excludes 168 countries of the World 
Bank and IMF and 172 countries of the UN. It remains difficult to call it a non-biased forum 
representative of multiple interests. 
B. Client States in the G20: Agenda-Setting? 
Having reviewed the G20, it is now of importance to locate the client states of this study 
within the forum. In simple terms, this case study seeks to establish whether South Korea and 
Mexico have room to manoeuvre, formulate policies and shape agendas outside of the US 
neoliberal context, and more particularly within the G20 forum. The role played by South 
Korea during the 2010 Seoul Summit and the impact of Mexico during the 2012 Los Cabos 
Summit will be examined to uncover their potential agenda-setting opportunities. This will be 
substantiated by contrasting with their domestic policies in the matter. In effect, questions 
asked will be: are these states maintaining a consistent dialog domestically and 
internationally? Are the agendas formulated a breakaway from neoliberal Empire? 
a. A growing G20 Development Agenda: Success for South Korea 
As host of the G20 summit on November 11 and 12, 2010, the country wanted to be 
recognized as “a new linchpin of global politics and not just a peripheral state in East Asia” 
(Durkop and Ratzer 2010, 70). As the first country outside the G8 to host a G20 summit, 
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South Korea sought to demonstrate that the G20 format really does make it possible to make 
more progress on the big issues. The central question of the imbalance in trade and the 
movement of capital is a particular topic that threatens to result in differences of opinion 
between Asian nations and industrialized nations of the West, these inconsistencies in world 
trade are claimed to be one of the critical reasons for the economic crisis (Durkop and Ratzer 
2010, 72). The G20 presidency was opportunity for the Asian state to demonstrate this 
potential. 
South Korea took the responsibility to make the summit in November a success, also in terms 
of the credibility of the G20 proceedings themselves. The country had travelled a tumultuous 
economic path over the past decade, facing devastation during the Asian financial crisis and 
an unexpectedly quick recovery after the crisis passed (Borst 2009, 137). South Korea at that 
point occupied a unique position. The current global economic crisis had overturned old 
models of economic growth and led to a resurgence of interest in South Korea’s development 
model. This change had occurred simultaneously with the rise of the G20 and of emerging 
nations as politically influential entities (Borst 2009, 137). South Korea’s position as both a 
member of the G20 and the host of the fall 2010 Summit gave it a unique opportunity at a 
pivotal moment to help reform the global economic system (Borst 2009, 137). South Korea 
seized this opportunity and assumed a global leadership role unprecedented in its national 
history. The hosting of the fall 2010 G20 summit was a critical test of South Korea’s ability 
to act on the world stage and take a role in international economic leadership. This is 
illustrated through the implementation of the Development Working Group. 
By 2010, it had become apparent that the economy was running on two different speeds. Core 
countries had already become stagnant or shrinking while smaller nations had quickly 
resumed growth. South Korea, which was to be the first emerging nation to host a G20 
summit successfully pressured G20 leaders to take on broader and a more cautious agenda for 
international development (Brodie 2013, 1). Since, leaders have claimed that boosting global 
economic growth requires reducing poverty and narrowing the development gap. A 
Development Working Group of officials was founded to set an international development 
agenda which would eventually propose Seoul summit multi-year action plans. In effect, by 
the time of the Seoul Summit G20 and under South Korea leadership, G20 members were 
collectively able to draft a development strategy that included the objectives of the core and 
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of semi-peripheries, leading the effort to learn from the United Nation’s Millenium 
Development Goals and present a post-2015 global development agenda (Brodie 2013, 1). 
The Seoul Development Consensus set out six principles for the G20 development agenda 
(Appendix A): 
• Economic growth was to be the primary goal, rather than social development. 
• The G20 would forge new partnerships with peripheries rather than imposing a certain 
model of development. 
• Regional or systemic issues would take priority over domestic concerns. 
• Encouraging the private sector to become a partner. 
• The G20 would draft its agenda as a complement of the work of other institutions, 
rather than merely replicating their actions. 
• Finally, the concern of outcomes and results over rhetoric would dominate. 
 
These principles were to be applied in nine areas of work in order to achieve aspirations 
namely, infrastructure, human resources, trade, private investment, food security, growth with 
resilience, financial inclusion, domestic resource mobilisation and knowledge sharing (Brodie 
2013, 1). Its agenda was to help other countries attain economic development as this enables 
the continued growth of the world economy, and reinforces developing countries which are 
critical to North-South cooperation. 
 
Strengthening development still remains central to the G20’s objective of achieving strong, 
sustainable and balanced growth and ensuring a more robust and resilient global economy 
(G20 2014, 1). As G20 host and chair of the Development Working Group in 2014, Australia 
pursues South Korea’s legacy along with other G20 members, and focuses on practical, high-
impact development outcomes in areas that support the G20’s broader growth agenda, 
including in infrastructure, domestic resource mobilisation and financial inclusion (G20 2014, 
1). South Korea’s Presidency over the forum showed a clear contrast in G20 agenda. Global 
growth, including that of low income countries, had become central to the G20 discourse 
thanks to South Korean leadership. South Korea has shown improved leadership in 
development cooperation. The South Korea–initiated development agenda is currently one of 
the most esteemed priorities of the G20 and one of the few with undivided support from all 
members. Parenthetically, Mexico’s inclusive green growth conversation is another issue on 
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the G20 agenda that has produced tangible outcomes and that still has the avid support of 
many G20 members, such as Australia. Furthermore, outside the G20 framework South 
Korea took the initiative in creating a "global development cooperation partnership" by 
effectively hosting the Busan High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2011 (Kim 2013). 
However, South Korea’s narrative of an effective development seems to crumble when 
looking at its domestic policies. 
b. Mexico in the G20 
Mexico has had a significant participation in the G20 due to its efforts to promote economic 
issues, to increase the representation of emerging economies in the most important economic 
and financial organisations and to push the development agenda, in addition to its focus on 
the fight against climate change (Oxfam Mexico 2012, 6). Mexico is the world’s 11th largest 
economy, it has a population of 113 million and it is the second largest trading partner of the 
United States. It has good reputation in international diplomatic circles due to its wide 
experience in foreign policy, its long-standing tradition in the field of international 
cooperation and its engagement in international organisations such as the United Nations, the 
World Health Organisation and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (Oxfam Mexico 2012, 6). Not only was Mexico emerging as an economic 
powerhouse, it has become a significant political power with a responsible and enlightened 
global attitude, ‘Mexico is now a player rather than an observer of global changes’ (Mexico’s 
Economy Secretary Bruno Ferrari, as cited in Glickhouse 2012, 1).  
Furthermore and rightly a full member of the G20 and the OECD, Mexico offers strong and 
energetic leadership. For instance, its role on climate change in Cancun, followed by South 
Africa's leadership in Durban, shows that it has earned its place at the top table (Browne 
2012, 1). The Mexican government considers itself in the vanguard with regards to green 
growth, social programs and free trade, which it pushed forwards during its G20 leadership. 
Mexico, as the chair of the G20 during 2012, had to steer the other members to get the global 
economy on to a sustainable footing. The huge economic growth and advances in health, 
education and social welfare in Mexico demonstrated its capability to effectively lead 
discussions. Mexico had captured the spirit of what the G20 is about: mutual co-operation on 
issues of mutual importance, as equals, away from old divisions based on geographical 
politics and historic labels (Browne 2012, 1). That is why Mexico's Minister for Foreign 
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Affairs called foreign ministers from the G20 together for the first time to talk about a wider 
set of challenges we face as a global community. 
Traditionally, the G-20 yearly summit host country adds issues to the agenda beyond the core 
topics. As previously discussed, the 2010 Seoul Summit gave priority to shared development 
and closing the development gap between advanced and developing countries. Mexico took 
on a new topic that had not been selected by former hosts (Appendix B): 
Climate change will continue to have a significant impact on the world economy, and 
costs will be higher to the extent we delay additional action. We reiterate our 
commitment to fight climate change and welcome the outcome of the 17th Conference 
of the Parties to the UN climate change conferences. We emphasize the need to 
structurally transform economies towards a climate-friendly path over the medium 
term. 
Following the 2010 UN Climate Change Conference which was held in Mexico, the issue of 
a greener economy gathered much international attention. Mexico seemed honoured of 
playing a leading role in international talks on such a global issue (Xinquan 2013, 8). 
Therefore, it was natural for the President Calderon to focus his attention on the green 
economy at the 2012 Los Cabos Summit. Mexico established five priorities before the 
conference:  
• economic stabilisation and structural reforms as foundations for growth and 
employment 
• strengthening the financial system and fostering financial inclusion to promote 
economic growth 
• improving the international financial architecture in an interconnected world 
• enhancing food security and addressing commodity price volatility 
• promoting sustainable development, green growth and the fight against climate 
change (Xinquan 2013, 8). 
Only the fifth issue about sustainable development and the green economy had not been 
mentioned previously at G-20 summits which led Mexico to set high expectations for 
sustainable development. Sustainable development has three pillars: economic, 
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environmental, and social sustainability. Green growth policy had to be carefully designed to 
maximize benefits for, and minimize costs to, the poor and most vulnerable (Xinquan 2013, 
8). In effect, Mexico emphasised the idea of sustainable development for all. The Latin 
American nation saw itself as a representative of emerging and developing countries by 
ensuring that the work conducted on a global issue would trickle down globally and not 
simply remain beneficial to some. 
Literature on the concept of green growth and more specifically, green capitalism, has gained 
recognition in contemporary academic debates. Following the issuing of a United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) report in 2011 on green economy and sustainability, 
Edgardo Lande (2011) sought to reject the premise that there is a contradiction between 
economic progress and environmental sustainability. One should not question the notions of 
economic growth and progress, but rather focus on the reorientation of investments and 
technological innovation towards the green economy. Lange (2011) states that the various 
crises which have emerged (climate crisis, crisis in biodiversity, water crisis and financial 
crisis among others), all share one core fundamental cause, ‘the gross misallocation of 
capital’ (Lange 2011, 5). For the past two decades, capital has been streamed  into property, 
fossil fuels and structured financial assets with embedded derivatives, yet in comparison 
minimal amounts has been invested in renewable energy, energy efficiency, public 
transportation, sustainable agriculture, ecosystem and biodiversity protection, and land and 
water conservation (Lange 2011). Indeed, most economic development and growth strategies 
promoted rapid accumulation of physical, financial and human capital, but at the cost of 
excessive dissipation and destruction of natural capital, namely natural resources and 
ecosystems. Lange (2011) offers a critical response to the UNEP report by concluding that 
the agency does not consider these crises and market failures as a possible consequence of 
‘the growing power of the financial markets, of the increasing subjugation of any other social 
logic, be that democracy, equality, solidarity, or even the preservation of life, to a single 
criteria: the maximisation of short-term profits for capital’ (Lange 2011, 6). 
Inclusive green growth does not only comprise the green economy, sustainable development 
and the fight against climate change, topics which were initially identified by Mexico and 
valued by the core countries. Inclusive green growth also includes social and economic 
development dimensions, which are in turn crucial to emerging and developing nations 
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(Xinquan 2013, 9). This justifies the rearticulation of green growth to inclusive green growth 
by Mexico during its G20 summit. The green economy and sustainable development are 
generally considered to be of advantage to developed countries, since they have higher 
developmental and technological levels in this respect. However, the concept of inclusive 
green growth was finally assimilated into structural reform agendas. In the G20 Leaders’ 
Declaration of the Los Cabos Summit, all members put forward reform pledges, including to 
‘promote inclusive green growth and sustainable development as appropriate to country 
circumstances’ (Appendix B). Members also committed to upholding a focus on inclusive 
green growth as part of the G20 agenda encouraging investment, capacity-building and 
continual reforms. While the contrast between the G20 leaders’ inspiring announcements and 
the imperceptible policy actions by some members showed that the idea of inclusive green 
growth was not necessarily converted into tangible measures, it was a success on the part of 
Mexico to have had the idea accepted by G20 members (Xinquan 2013, 8). 
c. Mexico Domestically 
Faced with the growing threat of extreme weather, droughts, hurricanes and rising coastal 
waters, Mexico has positioned itself as a leader in the fight against climate change. It pledges 
to curb the rise in emissions significantly by 2020 and to produce one third of its energy from 
clean sources by 2024 (Burnett 2014, 1). Mexico, the world’s 13th biggest emitter of carbon 
dioxide, has passed a stack of federal and state laws that regulate emissions, promote 
sustainable forest management and establish funds for renewable energy and energy 
efficiency. In 2012, it became one of the first countries in the world to pass a climate change 
law (Burnett 2014, 1). 
 
In effect, the Federal Government of Mexico published in 2013 a 60-page strong National 
Climate Change Strategy document. It is an instrument that will guide Mexico's actions 
against the irresponsible exploitation of natural resources, aiming at a climate friendly path of 
green growth. The strategy poses feasible goals that go beyond reducing greenhouse gases. It 
sets a long term route to improve the health and quality of life of the population, while also 
turning Mexico into a more resilient society. As a result, it will help to guide the national 
climate change policy over the next 40 years. Mexico's Climate Change Strategy is an 
outcome of the joint participation of citizens, enterprises, academics and the Government. It 
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takes advantage of Mexico's potential to develop clean energies; to correct inefficiencies in 
the use of energy; to generate jobs within a green economy; to promote sustainable territorial 
development; to increase competitiveness, and to improve public health and quality of life. 
The document focuses mainly on cross-sectoral climate policy, adaptation to climate change 
and reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. However some analysts disagree as to whether 
Mexico is really up for the climate change challenge,  
Mexico put on the climate change Tshirt because it was in vogue. We are the 
champions of the climate change fight - the good boy who does his homework - but 
the resources dedicated to climate change are few (Tornel, as cited in Burnett 2014, 
1). 
In January 2014, the government introduced a carbon tax in that charges $3 in average per 
ton of carbon emitted, and in 2013 Mexico’s stock exchange launched a platform to trade 
carbon credits. Mexico has also been among the most industrious of developing nations in 
submitting its record of greenhouse gas emissions under the United Nations convention, an 
organization that promotes sustainable development laws. Yet it is important to remember 
that there are no penalties for missing emissions goals, and some experts claim that initiatives 
are falling short. In effect, while there is a comprehensive strategy for federal entities to 
decrease emissions, targeting to cut down 83 million tons of carbon dioxide between 2014 
and 2018, there is no such plan established for the private sector, state and municipal 
institutions. Furthermore, Burnett (2014, 1) adds that a fund established in 2012 to finance 
climate initiatives was given $78,000 to launch and start their work but has yet to obtain any 
other financial contribution and support. While the Mexican government wants to pursue a 
set of initiatives including cutting pollutants like methane, shifting from diesel and gasoline 
to natural gas in cars and public transportation, and developing climate change programs with 
state governments. However, critics have argued that measures passed in August 2014, which 
opened Mexico’s oil and gas reserves to foreign investors, have reduced incentives for 
renewable energy. Miguel Soto, a spokesman for Greenpeace Mexico’s renewable energy 
program said, “There is a very strong perception that oil is part of our culture, and that 
renewables aren’t viable” (Soto, as cited by Burnett 2014, 1). There is blame towards the 
Mexican government’s inefficiency and the power of entrenched interests for a lack of 
progress toward the country’s haughty climate goals. It is said that climate change does exist 
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within the minds of the ruling class “but there is a lack of political will, and a lack of 
institutional coordination at the state and municipal levels to design initiatives and take 
action” (Burnette 2014, 1). 
 
C. Deviation From Neoliberal Imperial Terms? 
As it has been shown client states such as Mexico and South Korea have made significant 
progress in raising their voices within the international community. They have shown a clear 
commitment to bringing forwards non-main stream, at the time, economic issues such as 
development and climate change. The G20 was initiated to endorse multilateral cooperation, 
but in the background of a system still mainly dominated by the United States.  The question 
now lies as to whether this illustrates a clear break away from Empire, the influence of the 
United States and neoliberal institutions. In order to investigate, each client state and their 
agenda will be looked at consecutively starting with South Korea and its Development 
Agenda and ending with Mexico and climate change.  
a. South Korea: Playing it safe 
South Korea was the first non-leading capitalist nation to take up the presidential seat of the 
G20. It put at the forefront the issue of global development and spear headed the G20 
congregation towards new conversations and debates. It cannot be debated that South Korea 
does have an increasing political voice within international fora and demonstrates clear 
leadership skills. Yet it is more difficult to affirm whether these policies and agendas deviate 
from the imperial neoliberal discourse. The following statements are issued from the G20 
Seoul Summit Document (Appendix A): 
• “Significant steps have been taken to strengthen the capacity of international 
financial institutions (IFIs) in support of development.” 
• “We committed to modernize the institutions fundamentally so that they better reflect 
changes in the world economy and can more effectively play their roles in promoting 
global financial stability, fostering development and improving the lives of the 
poorest.”  
Seoul’s Development priority is consistently maintained throughout its G20 document. 
However, this is always done in relation to the international financial institutions. In effect, 
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Seoul closely identifies the possibility for growth and development in association with the 
IMF for instance. It appears that Seoul’s developmental goals are closely intertwined with the 
current neoliberal dialogue. Following a wave of critic of neoliberal rising in the early 2000s, 
neoliberal institutions have associated themselves with development programmes in the 
attempt to demonstrate a new face of capitalism. While this is merely a veil, it appears that 
South Korea stays very much in the same dynamic. In effect, following the end of the 
developmental state post-1997 crisis, South Korea has been a neoliberal example of success. 
Its policies have been very much influenced and engulfed in the American way. Although 
heeding the title of emerging nation, South Korea has proved itself as a vocal and influential 
nation, it still executes so within the context of Empire. 
In addition, Wade (2011) adds that the G20 has functioned toward the hegemonic 
amalgamation end of the spectrum. It is claimed that it has been normal practice for the chair 
country to direct proposals for the meeting and the communiqué to the US government first 
to get its own views on the matter. In October, a report from the G20 finance ministers’ 
meeting in South Korea stated that the ministers had had intense meetings built mostly 
around an agenda the United States brought with to the meeting (Wade 2011). It is important 
to note that the United States has dominated in an unconcealed manner, or rather its 
representatives, fellow leading capitalist states, have often played the sturdy, quiet types, 
satisfied to let US take the lead. In effect this refers to Panitch and Gindin’s (2012) “Empire 
by invitation”, where states take America’s agenda, replicate it and let it manage global 
capitalism. In this instance, the key animators and organizers have been the Canadians and 
the Australians,  
They repeatedly got the G20 working groups and ministers’ meetings to endorse the 
formula that “globalization works,” where globalization policies amount to 
privatization, liberalization, and stabilization, plus social safety nets (Wade 2011, 
357). 
Parenthetically, the World Bank provided support for this agenda, sending reliable staff to 
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b. Mexico: Bringing Forwards the Question of Multipolarity 
Mexico was the first nation to bring forward climate change issues to the G20 table. Thanks 
to its presidential round of the G20 in 2012, Mexico was able to reaffirm climate change as a 
variable which should be on all members’ agendas. It is clear that this initiative demonstrates 
Mexico’s growing leadership skills and its rise in shaping global conversations. However, it 
needs to be established whether this initiative clearly places Mexico outside of its client state 
relationship with the United States on a political and policy level.  Climate change is not a 
traditional topic on the neoliberal agenda. Yet, one could argue that the United States has put 
on a front of climate change strategies and condones the promotion of the latter. In this sense, 
Mexico is not taking a clear non-neoliberal stance. It can be said that Mexico does not exit 
the realm of Empire, as its main agent, the United States, has not condemned this policy 
strategy and have appeared to encourage it. Yet, this paper seeks to look at the issue at a 
different angle, focusing on the intricacies of the process. 
The researcher believes that to a relative extent Mexico is stepping further outside its 
neoliberal boundaries than South Korea has. While South Korea clearly associates the drive 
for development with financial institutions, Mexico presents a different conversation. 
Although the green neoliberalism discourse has emerged in recent years, many critics have 
investigated and demonstrated how neoliberal policies and their consequences have been all 
but considerate of climate change. While it cannot be denied that Mexico formulated its 
climate change agenda within a neoliberal institution and with the consent of US Empire, the 
statement in itself does not traditionally fit in the American neoliberal discourse. 
In this sense, while Mexico could have pioneered issues of emerging nations working 
towards increasing growth or the reform of financial institutions as examples, the South 
American state championed a route less taken, the route towards the fight against climate 
change, a definitive result of neoliberalism and the constant strive for greater global capital 
accumulation. It was acknowledged that while National Strategic Plans have been established 
by the Mexican government and resources have been attributed towards the project 
domestically, Mexico still requires much effort to be envisioned as a true leader behind the 
cause. However, this initiative helps the client state to distinguish itself among others in its 
strive for political and economic independence from Empire. As a conclusion, or rather a 
prospect for this paper, the researcher seeks to elaborate on this very notion of rising middle-
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income states, such as Mexico, and multipolarity which, although engulfed in the neoliberal 
paradigm, demonstrate rising political voices which could in time offer a counter movement 
to the US led world system. 
Empire theory does provide a theoretically accurate interpretation of US relations with its 
client states. It emphasises that the agendas launched and proposed new dialogues still very 
much take place within the neoliberal imperial network, and in this sense clearly answers the 
research question of the researcher. However, the theory fails to take into account the existing 
possibility for states such as South Korea and Mexico to gradually increase their room to 
manoeuvre in the system, to a possible point of break away. It is acknowledged that issues 
such as development and climate change are not close to alternative methods of governance, 
as their agenda-setters are nothing more than neoliberal states. Nevertheless, states such as 
Mexico have increasingly shown an aversion to US dominance, through movements such as 
the Zapatistas, farmers and peasants uniting to fight against NAFTA and its imperial stretch. 
In this sense, as a middle-income country, Mexico may very well use the neoliberal forums to 
which it has access in order to recurrently bring forward non-American led issues. 
Multipolarity as a contemporary concept is not catered for in Empire theory. The politico-
economic context today is US-dominated, yet Panitch and Gindin do not provide for the 
emergence of other leading powers. This gap is here demonstrated by the rising voices of 
states such as Mexico. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusions and Prospects 
This research has demonstrated a thorough understanding of Panitch and Gindin’s Empire 
theory and has applied in the context of the United States and relations with its client states, 
Mexico and South Korea. The paper sought to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the 
theory through the impact of neoliberal institutions and agreements on client states, as well as 
the latter’s ability to shape and formulate policy within a neoliberal context however, out of 
US meddling. This conclusion chapter will now summarise the main findings uncovered from 
each case study to consequently provide answers to the research questions outlines in Chapter 
1. This section will conclude by raising new questions on the prospects this research offers. 
Theories of old and new imperialism were defined at length in order to provide an in-depth 
knowledge on the paradigm. This research focused specifically on the modern understanding 
of imperialism, in other words, the theory of Empire. While other writers have provided 
valuable contributions to the field, this study necessitated a theoretical approach focused on 
the same subject matter as the research, namely the United States of America. Panitch and 
Gindin explain at length how the American power got to its current role and offer 
perspectives as to its rise. Instead of the preceding fragmentation of international capitalism, 
the post-war rise of the American Empire characterised a political project focused on the goal 
of an inclusivist liberal world of continuous accumulation. 
It was the first Empire completely focused on the making of a global capitalism. The creation 
of new international institutions did not signify the advent of a proto-international state. 
Instead, these institutions were and are still constituted by national states and embedded in 
the new American Empire. The Keynesian forms of social rule and international economic 
management adopted in 1945 came into crisis in the 1970s, but no essential challenge to the 
American informal Empire arose from the other leading capitalist states. The neoliberal turn 
in the American state, and its ensuing universalisation, involved the rearrangement of the 
world’s states to become more compliant to economic competitiveness, the free movement of 
capital and the extending of capitalist social relations. Both financial markets and 
international financial institutions played a vital role in enabling this and in strengthening 
American imperial power. At the head of a global Empire, the American state is more than 
just an agent of the particular interests of American capital, it also takes responsibility for the 
creation and running of global capitalism. American multinational corporations and 
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international financial institutions underpin the capabilities of the American state, and hence 
American imperial power is diffused through them. At the same time, the interpenetration of 
capital internationally weakens the autonomy of national bourgeoisies and makes them 
hostile to strategies that might ultimately challenge the American informal Empire. 
The research then focused on applying and testing the theory within case studies. The first 
two case studies sought to identify and investigate the relations existing between US client 
states and US-led institutions and agreements, first the impact and significance of NAFTA in 
Mexico and second, the consequence of the IMF intervention in South Korea following the 
1997 Asian crisis. The findings of these investigations are unequivocal. Mexico and South 
Korea form a definitive part of Empire following the implementation of such programmes. 
Both NAFTA provisions and IMF bail-out plan recommendations prompted for domestic 
political and economic changes in each state. However, it is important to note that these 
changes were not in any way coercive, and here lies the importance of Panitch and Gindin’s 
‘Empire by invitation”. These alterations were taken on by the client states as they were 
presented to them as solutions for greater growth, increased economic participation and 
deeper integration. Following this, the researcher felt the need to highlight some of the 
negative consequences these neoliberal turns have had within the respective states. This was 
done with the objective of demonstrating the perpetual conflict with neoliberalism and its 
crisis-prone nature. While these shifts might have solved occurring crises at the time, there is 
no telling when the next crisis will hit, within the same neoliberal context. It was concluded 
that in this instance, Empire theory accurately depicts inter-capitalist relations via the means 
of institutions. This was deemed as necessary to demonstrate so as to first understand the 
importance Empire theory has in this respect. 
The third case study sought to provide a contrasting approach to assessing Empire theory. 
Both client states studied were then investigated in the G20 context. The G20 was chosen as a 
framework, as both Mexico and South Korea are members of this neoliberal forum and have 
both had the opportunity to chair the group. The researcher attempted to uncover whether 
both states have been able to form a political voice and furthermore define agendas outside of 
the neoliberal imperial perimeter. The findings were of mixed results which will be further 
explained here. It was uncovered that both client states demonstrated a rising voice within 
political affairs. In effect, South Korea took leadership at the G20 2010 Seoul Summit by re-
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introducing the concept of development to a previous Western-focused approach of issues. 
As the first non-leading capitalist state chairing the group, South Korea took it upon itself to 
showcase its leadership skills and its ability to shape discussions, as the Development 
Working Group set up then is still very much active. During the G20 2012 Los Cabos 
Summit, Mexico brought to the discussion table the notion of inclusive green growth and 
climate change. The South American state became a champion of the cause and was the first 
state to introduce the topic as an issue of global governance. Here again, a leading political 
momentum was visible. 
However, the researcher stayed pragmatic in approaching the subject matter. While rising 
political voices are empirically verifiable and undeniably observable, the context in which 
they operate does not provide a clear alternative. It was conceded that these agenda-setting 
moments did not fully challenge the US-led neoliberal imperial project. The United States did 
not condemn these policies, and at times it has even supported them. It was concluded that 
South Korea does not in the least break away from the imperial pattern as its development 
discourse is intertwined with the international financial institutions. Yet, while the United 
States supported the climate change agenda, it was established that this issue does not 
necessarily fit into the neoliberal paradigm itself, therefore it could be seen that Mexico did 
go the extra-length in formulating a non-neoliberal agenda. Nevertheless, Empire theory in 
itself was not completely challenged by these case studies thus demonstrating its accuracy in 
describing US relations with its client states. 
The research questions set in Chapter 1 of this paper were all answered throughout this 
research. Empire theory does adequately explain the United States’ relationship with states 
within its own sphere of influence. The latter are not passive instruments as they are 
intertwined within the neoliberal system of ‘hubs and spokes’. Mexico and South Korea do 
not seem to deviate from the US standard as although new political agendas are formed, these 
are not contested by the imperial power. Empire theory, as understood by Panitch and Gindin, 
explains the rise of the United States as informal Empire, manifesting itself as the only agent 
for global neoliberalism and diffusing its influence in a non-coercive manner via political and 
economic solutions, institutions and programs. Empire by invitation as a concept justified the 
non-violent (physically observable) approach, by providing an insight into states willingly 
integrating the neoliberal paradigm. Finally, it was established that neoliberal institutions and 
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processes are instruments of US Empire and confirm Empire theory’s analysis and the 
position of the US as Empire. 
However, some prospects were outlined following these conclusions. In effect, while it has 
been demonstrated that Empire theory still provides an accurate depiction of current imperial 
relations, there is still room for improvement. Empire theory does not take into account the 
rising political voices of states internal and external to Empire. Mexico and South Korea 
formulated their agendas in a neoliberal consensus, yet they were still able to do so. This 
opportunity and the current rise of distinct political blocs challenging the US-led neoliberal 
discourse do present opportunities. These contestations in the future could again pose a 
challenge to the US world order and consequently to Empire theory. In conclusion, the 
subject matter of this research leads to many more openings and possibilities in the academic 
study of American power and its theoretical background. 
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Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth 
 
1. Our unprecedented and highly coordinated fiscal and monetary stimulus worked to bring 
back the global economy from the edge of a depression. This has highlighted that the 
world would benefit from more effective international cooperation. In Pittsburgh, we 
launched the Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth and committed to 
work together to assess the collective implications of our national policies on global 
growth and development, identify potential risks to the global economy, and take 
additional actions to achieve our shared objectives. 
 
2.   Since then, we  have made important progress through our country-led, consultative 
Mutual Assessment Process (MAP) of the Framework: 
 
Ÿ Supportive economic policies have been put in place to promote ongoing recovery 
and job creation; 
Ÿ       Explicit commitments have been made to put public finances on a sustainable track; 
Ÿ Strong measures have been adopted and are being implemented to safeguard the 
stability of our financial system; 
Ÿ Important structural reforms have been launched and/or planned to boost global 
demand and potential growth; and 
Ÿ Significant steps have been taken to strengthen the capacity of international financial 
institutions (IFIs) in support of development. 
 
3.   Since we last met, the global recovery continues to advance, but downside risks remain. 
We are resolved to do more. Our strengthened collaborative and collective policy actions 
can further safeguard the recovery and lay a solid foundation for our shared objectives of 
strong, sustainable and balanced growth. 
 
The Seoul Action Plan 
 
4. Today we are launching the Seoul Action Plan. We shaped the Plan with unity of purpose 
to: 
 
Ÿ       ensure an unwavering commitment to cooperation; 
Ÿ       outline an action-oriented plan with each member’s concrete policy commitments; 
and 
Ÿ       deliver on all three objectives of strong, sustainable and balanced growth. 
 
5. Specifically,  we  commit  to  actions  in  five  policy  areas  with  details  of  specific 
commitments by G20 members set out in the Supporting Document. 
 
6. Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies: We reaffirm the importance of central banks’ 
commitment to  price  stability,  thereby contributing to  the  recovery and  sustainable 
growth.  We  will  move  toward  more  market-determined exchange  rate  systems  and 
enhance  exchange  rate  flexibility to  reflect  underlying  economic  fundamentals  and 
refrain from competitive devaluation of currencies. Advanced economies, including those 




movements in  exchange rates. Together these actions will help mitigate the risk of 
excessive volatility in capital flows facing some emerging market economies. 
Nonetheless, in circumstances where countries are facing undue burden of adjustment, 
policy responses in emerging market economies with adequate reserves and increasingly 
overvalued flexible exchange rates may also include carefully designed macro-prudential 
measures. We will reinvigorate our efforts to promote a stable and well functioning 
international monetary system and call on the IMF to deepen its work in these areas. 
 
7. Trade  and  Development  Policies:  We  reaffirm  our  commitment  to  free  trade  and 
investment recognizing its central importance for the global recovery. We will refrain 
from introducing, and oppose protectionist trade actions in all forms and recognize the 
importance  of  a  prompt  conclusion  of  the  Doha  negotiations.  We  reaffirm  our 
commitment to avoid financial protectionism and are mindful of the risks of proliferation 
of measures that would damage investment and harm prospects for the global recovery. 
With developing countries’ rising share in world output and trade, the goals of global 
growth, rebalancing and development are increasingly interlinked. We will focus efforts 
to resolve the most significant bottlenecks to inclusive, sustainable and resilient growth 
in developing countries, low-income countries (LICs) in particular: infrastructure, human 
resources development, trade, private investment and job creation, food security, growth 
with resilience, financial inclusion, domestic resource mobilization and knowledge 
sharing. In addition, we will take concrete actions to increase our financial and technical 
support, including fulfilling the Official Development Assistance (ODA) commitments 
by advanced countries. 
 
8. Fiscal  Policies:  Advanced  economies will  formulate and  implement clear,  credible, 
ambitious and growth-friendly medium-term fiscal consolidation plans in line with the 
Toronto commitment, differentiated according to national circumstances. We are mindful 
of the risk of synchronized adjustment on the global recovery and of the risk that failure 
to implement consolidation, where immediately necessary, would undermine confidence 
and growth. 
 
9. Financial Reforms: We are committed to take action at the national and international 
level to raise standards, and ensure that our national authorities implement global 
standards developed to date, consistently, in a way that ensures a level playing field, a 
race  to  the  top  and  avoids  fragmentation of  markets,  protectionism and  regulatory 
arbitrage. In particular, we will implement fully the new bank capital and liquidity 
standards and address too-big-to-fail problems. We agreed to further work on financial 
regulatory reforms. 
 
10. Structural Reforms: We will implement a range of structural reforms to boost and sustain 
global demand, foster job creation, contribute to global rebalancing, and increase our 
growth potential, and where needed undertake: 
 
Ÿ Product market reforms to simplify regulation and reduce regulatory barriers in order 
to promote competition and enhance productivity in key sectors. 
 
Ÿ Labor market and human resource development reforms, including better targeted 
benefits schemes to increase participation; education and training to increase 




Ÿ Tax  reform  to  enhance productivity by removing distortions and  improving the 
incentives to work, invest and innovate. 
 
Ÿ Green growth and innovation oriented policy measures to find new sources of growth 
and promote sustainable development. 
 
Ÿ Reforms to reduce the reliance on external demand and focus more on domestic 
sources of growth in surplus countries while promoting higher national savings and 
enhancing export competitiveness in deficit countries. 
 
Ÿ Reforms to strengthen social safety nets such as public health care and pension plans, 
corporate governance and financial market development to help reduce precautionary 
savings in emerging surplus countries. 
 
Ÿ       Investment in infrastructure to address bottlenecks and enhance growth potential. 
 
In pursuing these reforms, we will draw on the expertise of the OECD, IMF, World Bank, 
ILO and other international organizations. 
 
11.  MAP beyond the Seoul Summit: In addition, we will enhance the MAP to promote 
external sustainability. We will strengthen multilateral cooperation to promote external 
sustainability and pursue the full range of policies conducive to reducing excessive 
imbalances and maintaining current account imbalances at sustainable levels. Persistently 
large imbalances, assessed against indicative guidelines to be agreed by our Finance 
Ministers and Central Bank Governors, warrant an assessment of their nature and the 
root causes of impediments to adjustment as part of the MAP, recognizing the need to 
take into account national or regional circumstances, including large commodity 
producers. These indicative guidelines composed of a range of indicators would serve as 
a mechanism to facilitate timely identification of large imbalances that require preventive 
and corrective actions to be taken. To support our efforts toward meeting these 
commitments, we call on our Framework Working Group, with technical support from 
the IMF and other international organizations, to develop these indicative guidelines, 
with progress to be discussed by our Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors in 
the  first  half  of  2011;  and,  in  Gyeongju, our  Finance Ministers  and  Central  Bank 
Governors called on the IMF to provide an assessment as part of the MAP on the 
progress toward external sustainability and the consistency of fiscal, monetary, financial 
sector, structural, exchange rate  and  other policies.    In  light  of  this, the  first  such 
assessment, to be based on the above mentioned indicative guidelines, will be initiated 
and undertaken in due course under the French Presidency. 
 
12.  We have a shared responsibility. Members with sustained, significant external deficits 
pledge to undertake policies to support private savings and where appropriate undertake 
fiscal consolidation while maintaining open markets and strengthening export sectors. 
Members with sustained, significant external surpluses pledge to strengthen domestic 
sources of growth. 
 
13. Recognizing the benefits of the Framework, we agreed to expand and refine the country- 
led, consultative MAP by including monitoring of the implementation of our 
commitments and assessment of our progress toward achieving our shared objectives. 





International Financial Institution Reforms 
 
14. When the world was in the middle of the global financial crisis, we met and agreed to 
provide the IFIs with the resources they needed to support the global economy. With our 
agreements to increase their resources substantially and endorse new lending instruments, 
the IFIs mobilized critical financing, including more than $750 billion by the IMF and 
$235  billion  by  the  Multilateral  Development  Banks  (MDBs).  Financial  markets 
stabilized and the global economy started to recover. Even in the midst of the crisis, we 
knew that further reforms of the IFIs were required. 
 
15. We committed to modernize the institutions fundamentally so that they better reflect 
changes in the world economy and can more effectively play their roles in promoting 
global financial stability, fostering development and improving the lives of the poorest. 
In June 2010, we welcomed the reforms to increase the voting power of developing and 
transition countries at the World Bank. We also remained committed to strengthening the 
legitimacy, credibility and effectiveness of the IMF through quota and governance 
reforms. 
 
Modernized IMF governance 
 
16. Today, we welcomed the ambitious achievements by the Finance Ministers and Central 
Bank Governors at the Gyeongju meeting, and subsequent decision by the IMF, on a 
comprehensive package of IMF quota and  governance reforms. The  reforms are an 
important step toward a more legitimate, credible and effective IMF, by ensuring that 
quotas and Executive Board composition are more reflective of new global economic 
realities, and  securing the  IMF’s  status  as  a  quota-based institution, with  sufficient 
resources to support members’ needs. Consistent with our commitments at the Pittsburgh 
and Toronto Summits, and going even further in a number of areas, the reforms include: 
 
Ÿ Shifts in quota shares to dynamic emerging market and developing countries and to 
under-represented countries of over 6%, while protecting the voting share of the 
poorest, which we commit to work to complete by the Annual Meetings in 2012. 
 
Ÿ A doubling of quotas, with a corresponding rollback of the New Arrangements to 
Borrow (NAB) preserving relative shares, when the quota increase becomes 
effective. 
 
Ÿ Continuing the dynamic process aimed at enhancing the voice and representation of 
emerging market and developing countries, including the poorest, through a 
comprehensive review of the quota formula by January 2013 to better reflect the 
economic weights; and through completion of the next general review of quotas by 
January 2014. 
 
Ÿ Greater  representation  for  emerging  market  and  developing  countries  at  the 
Executive Board through two fewer advanced European chairs, and the possibility 




Ÿ Moving to an all-elected Board, along with a commitment by the IMF’s membership 
to maintain the Board size at 24 chairs, and following the completion of the 14th 
General Review, a review of the Board’s composition every eight years. 
 
17. We reiterate the urgency of promptly concluding the 2008 IMF Quota and Voice Reforms. 
We urge all G20 members participating in the expanded NAB to accelerate their 
procedures in completing the acceptance process. We ask the IMF to report on the 
progress, in accordance with agreed timelines, toward effective implementation of the 
2010  quota  and  governance  reforms  to  our  Finance  Ministers  and  Central  Bank 
Governors at their periodic G20 meetings. 
 
18. When combined with the already agreed voice reform of the World Bank, these represent 
significant achievements in modernizing our key IFIs. They will be even stronger players 
in promoting global financial stability and growth. We asked our Finance Ministers and 
Central Bank Governors to continue to pursue all outstanding governance reform issues 




19. We recognize the importance of continuing the work on reforming the IMF’s mission and 
mandate, including strengthening surveillance. 
 
20. IMF surveillance should be enhanced to focus on systemic risks and vulnerabilities 
wherever they may lie. To this extent, we welcome the decision made by the IMF to 
make financial stability assessments under the Financial Sector Assessment Program 
(FSAP) a  regular and  mandatory part  of  Article IV consultation for  members with 
systemically important financial sectors. We call on the IMF to make further progress in 
modernizing the IMF’s surveillance mandate and modalities. These should involve, in 
particular:  strengthening  bilateral  and  multilateral  work  on  surveillance  covering 
financial stability, macroeconomic, structural and exchange rate policies, with increased 
focus on systemic issues; enhancing synergies between surveillance tools; helping 
members to strengthen their surveillance capacity; and ensuring even-handedness, candor, 
and independence of surveillance. We welcome the IMF’s work to conduct spillover 
assessments of the wider impact of systemic economies’ policies. 
 
Multilateral Development Banks 
 
21. We  reiterate  our  commitment  to  completing  an  ambitious  replenishment  for  the 
concessional lending facilities of the MDBs, especially the International Development 
Association, to help ensure that LICs have access to sufficient concessional resources. 
 
Strengthened global financial safety nets 
 
22. As  the  global  economy  became  more  interconnected  and  integrated,  the  size  and 
volatility of capital flows increased significantly. The increased volatility was a source of 
instability during the financial crisis.   It even adversely affected countries with solid 
fundamentals and the effects were greater on those with more open economies. These 
problems persist. Current volatility of capital flows is reflecting the differing speed of 
recovery between advanced and emerging market economies. National, regional and 




countries to cope with financial volatility, reducing the economic disruption from sudden 
swings in capital flows and the perceived need for excessive reserve accumulation. 
 
23. Therefore, we asked our Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors to prepare policy 
options to strengthen global financial safety nets for our consideration at this Summit. 
 
24. We welcome the following achievements from our mandate: 
 
Ÿ The enhancement of the Flexible Credit Line (FCL) including the extension of its 
duration and removal of the access cap. Countries with strong fundamentals and 
policies will have access to a refined FCL with enhanced predictability and 
effectiveness. 
 
Ÿ The creation of the Precautionary Credit Line (PCL) as a new preventative tool. The 
PCL allows countries with sound fundamentals and policies, but moderate 
vulnerabilities, to benefit from the IMF’s precautionary liquidity provision. 
 
Ÿ The recent decision by the IMF to continue its work to further improve the global 
capacity to cope with shocks of a systemic nature, as well as the recent clarification 
of the procedures for synchronized approval of the FCLs for multiple countries, by 
which a number of countries affected by a common shock could concurrently seek 
access to FCL. 
 
Ÿ       The dialogue to enhance collaboration between Regional Financing Arrangements 
(RFAs) and the IMF, acknowledging the potential synergies from such collaboration. 
 
25. Building on the achievements made to date on strengthening global financial safety nets, 
we need to do further work to improve our capacity to cope with future crises. Therefore, 
we asked our Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors to explore, with input from 
the IMF: 
 
Ÿ       A structured approach to cope with shocks of a systemic nature. 
 
Ÿ Ways to improve collaboration between RFAs and the IMF across all possible areas 
and enhance the capability of RFAs for crisis prevention, while recognizing region- 
specific circumstances and characteristics of each RFA. 
 
26. Our goal is to build a more stable and resilient international monetary system. While the 
international  monetary  system  has  proved  resilient,  tensions  and  vulnerabilities  are 
clearly apparent.   We agreed to explore ways to further improve the international 
monetary system to ensure systemic stability in the global economy. We asked the IMF to 
deepen its work on all aspects of the international monetary system, including capital 
flow volatility.  We look forward to reviewing further analysis and proposals over the 
next year. 
 
Financial Sector Reforms 
 
27. The global financial system came to a sudden halt in 2008 as a result of reckless and 
irresponsible risk taking by banks and other financial institutions, combined with major 




stabilize financial markets and restore the global flow of capital, we never lost sight of 
the need to address the root causes of the crisis. We took our first step at the Washington 
Summit, where we developed the Action Plan to Implement Principles for Reform. Since 
then, we built on the progress made in London, Pittsburgh, and Toronto, and together, 
took major strides toward fixing the financial system with the support from the 
international organizations, particularly the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). 
 
Transformed financial system to address the root causes of the crisis 
 
28. Today, we have delivered core elements of the new financial regulatory framework to 
transform the global financial system. 
 
29. We endorsed the landmark agreement reached by the BCBS on the new bank capital and 
liquidity framework, which increases the resilience of the global banking system by 
raising the quality, quantity and international consistency of bank capital and liquidity, 
constrains the build-up of leverage and maturity mismatches, and introduces capital 
buffers above the minimum requirements that can be drawn upon in bad times. The 
framework includes an internationally harmonized leverage ratio to serve as a backstop to 
the risk-based capital measures. With this, we have achieved far-reaching reform of the 
global banking system. The new standards will markedly reduce banks’ incentive to take 
excessive risks, lower the likelihood and severity of future crises, and enable banks to 
withstand – without extraordinary government support – stresses of a magnitude 
associated with the recent financial crisis. This will result in a banking system that can 
better support stable economic growth. We are committed to adopt and implement fully 
these standards within the agreed timeframe that is consistent with economic recovery 
and financial stability. The new framework will be translated into our national laws and 
regulations, and will be implemented starting on January 1, 2013 and fully phased in by 
January 1, 2019. 
 
30. We reaffirmed our view that no firm should be too big or too complicated to fail and that 
taxpayers should not bear the costs of resolution.  We endorsed the policy framework, 
work processes, and timelines proposed by the FSB to reduce the moral hazard risks 
posed by systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) and address the too-big-to- 
fail  problem.  This  requires  a  multi-pronged  framework  combining:  a  resolution 
framework and other measures to ensure that all financial institutions can be resolved 
safely, quickly and without destabilizing the financial system and exposing the taxpayers 
to the risk of loss; a requirement that SIFIs and initially in particular financial institutions 
that are globally systemic (G-SIFIs) should have higher loss absorbency capacity to 
reflect the greater risk that the failure of these firms poses to the global financial system; 
more  intensive  supervisory oversight;  robust  core  financial  market  infrastructure to 
reduce contagion risk from individual failures; and other supplementary prudential and 
other requirements as determined by the national authorities which may include, in some 
circumstances, liquidity surcharges, tighter large exposure restrictions, levies and 
structural measures.  In the context of loss absorbency, we encourage further progress on 
the feasibility of contingent capital and other instruments. We encouraged the FSB, 
BCBS and other relevant bodies to complete their remaining work in accordance with the 
endorsed work processes and timelines in 2011 and 2012. 
 




international  recovery and  resolution  planning.  We  agreed  to  conduct  rigorous  risk 
assessment on these firms through international supervisory colleges and negotiate 
institution-specific crisis cooperation agreements within crisis management groups. 
Regular peer reviews will be conducted by the FSB on the effectiveness and consistency 
of national policy measures for these firms. 
 
32. We reaffirmed our Toronto commitment to national-level implementation of the BCBS’s 
cross-border resolution recommendations. To  support implementation at  the national 
level, we welcomed the BCBS’s planned stock taking exercise of these recommendations. 
We called on the FSB to build on this work and develop attributes of effective resolution 
regimes by 2011. 
 
33. Delivering on our commitment in Toronto, we endorsed the policy recommendations 
prepared by the FSB in consultation with the IMF, on increasing supervisory intensity 
and effectiveness. We reaffirmed that the new financial regulatory framework must be 
complemented with more effective oversight and supervision. We agreed that supervisors 
should have strong and unambiguous mandates, sufficient independence to act, 
appropriate resources, and a full suite of tools and powers to proactively identify and 
address risks, including regular stress testing and early intervention. 
 
Implementation and international assessment, including peer review 
 
34. But our reform efforts are an ongoing process. It is essential that we fully implement the 
new standards and principles, in a way that ensures a level playing field, a race to the top 
and avoids fragmentation of markets, protectionism and regulatory arbitrage. We 
recognized different national starting points. 
 
35. We reaffirmed today our full commitment to action and implementation. 
 
36. At the national level, we will incorporate the new standards and principles into relevant 
legislation and policies. At the global level, international assessment and peer review 
processes should be substantially enhanced in order to ensure consistency in 
implementation across countries and identify areas for further improvement in standards 
and principles. In this regard, we recognized the value of the FSAP jointly undertaken by 
the IMF and the World Bank, and the FSB’s peer review as means of fostering consistent 
cross-country implementation of international standards. 
 
37. We  also  firmly  recommitted  to  work  in  an  internationally  consistent  and  non- 
discriminatory manner to strengthen regulation and supervision on hedge funds, OTC 
derivatives and credit rating agencies. We reaffirmed the importance of fully 
implementing the FSB’s standards for sound compensation. We endorsed the FSB’s 
recommendations for implementing OTC derivatives market reforms, designed to fully 
implement   our   previous   commitments   in   an   internationally   consistent   manner, 
recognizing the importance of a level playing field. We asked the FSB to monitor the 
progress regularly. We welcomed ongoing work by the Committee on Payment and 
Settlement Systems and the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO) on central counterparty standards. We also endorsed the FSB’s principles on 
reducing reliance on external credit ratings. Standard setters, market participants, 




38. We re-emphasized the importance we place on achieving a single set of improved high 
quality global accounting standards and called on the International Accounting Standards 
Board and the Financial Accounting Standards Board to complete their convergence 
project by the end of 2011. We also encouraged the International Accounting Standards 
Board to further improve the involvement of stakeholders, including outreach to, and 
membership  of,  emerging  market  economies,  in  the  process  of  setting  the  global 
standards, within the framework of independent accounting standard setting process. 
 
39. In addition, we reiterated our commitment to preventing non-cooperative jurisdictions 
from posing risks to the global financial system and welcomed the ongoing efforts by the 
FSB, Global Forum on Tax Transparency and Exchange of Information (Global Forum), 
and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), based on comprehensive, consistent and 
transparent assessment. We reached agreement on: 
 
Ÿ The FSB to determine by spring 2011 those jurisdictions that are not cooperating 
fully with the evaluation process or that show insufficient progress to address weak 
compliance with internationally agreed information exchange and cooperation 
standards, based on the recommended actions by the agreed timetable. 
 
Ÿ The Global Forum to swiftly progress its Phase 1 and 2 reviews to achieve the 
objective agreed by Leaders in Toronto and report progress by November 2011. 
Reviewed jurisdictions identified as not having the elements in place to achieve an 
effective exchange of information should promptly address the weaknesses. We urge 
all jurisdictions to stand ready to conclude Tax Information Exchange Agreements 
where requested by a relevant partner. 
 
Ÿ The FATF to pursue its successful work in identifying non-cooperative jurisdictions 
as well as regularly updating a public list on jurisdictions with strategic deficiencies, 
with next update being in February 2011. 
 
40. We reaffirmed the FSB’s role in coordinating at the international level the work of 
national financial authorities and international standard setting bodies in developing and 
promoting the implementation of effective regulatory, supervisory and other financial 
sector policies in the interest of global financial stability.  We asked the FSB to bring 
forward for review by Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors well before our 
next meeting in 2011 proposals to strengthen its capacity, resources and governance to 
keep pace with growing demands. We welcomed the FSB’s outreach.  We endorsed the 
establishment of regional consultative groups. We welcomed the FSB report on progress 
in the implementation of G20 recommendations for strengthening financial stability and 
look forward to another progress report at our next meeting. 
 
Future work: Issues that warrant more attention 
 
41. While we have made significant progress in a number of areas, there still remain some 
issues that warrant more attention: 
 
Ÿ Further work on macro-prudential policy frameworks: In order to deal with systemic 
risks in the financial sector in a comprehensive manner and on an ongoing basis, we 
called on the FSB, IMF and BIS to do further work on macro-prudential policy 




update our Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors at their next meeting. 
These frameworks should take into account national and regional arrangements. We 
look forward to a joint report which should elaborate on the progress achieved in 
identification of best practices, which will be the basis for establishing in the future 
international principles or guidelines on the design and implementation of the 
frameworks. 
 
Ÿ Addressing regulatory reform issues pertaining specifically to emerging market and 
developing economies: We agreed to work on financial stability issues that are of 
particular interest to emerging market and developing economies, and called on the 
FSB, IMF and World Bank to develop and report before the next Summit. These 
issues could include: the management of foreign exchange risks by financial 
institutions, corporations and households; emerging market and developing 
economies’ regulatory and  supervisory capacity where necessary, including with 
regard to local branches of foreign financial institutions which are systemic in their 
host country and development of deposit insurance schemes; financial inclusion; 
information sharing between home and host supervisory authorities on cross border 
financial institutions; and trade finance. 
 
Ÿ Strengthening regulation and supervision of shadow banking: With the completion of 
the new standards for banks, there is a potential that regulatory gaps may emerge in 
the  shadow  banking  system.  Therefore,  we  called  on  the  FSB  to  work  in 
collaboration with other international standard setting bodies to develop 
recommendations to strengthen the regulation and oversight of the shadow banking 
system by mid-2011. 
 
Ÿ Further work on regulation and supervision of commodity derivative markets: We 
called especially on IOSCO’s taskforce on commodity futures markets to report to 
the FSB for consideration of next steps in April 2011 on its important work. 
 
Ÿ       Improving market integrity and efficiency: We called on IOSCO to develop by June 
2011 and report to the FSB recommendations to promote markets’ integrity and 
efficiency to mitigate the risks posed to the financial system by the latest 
technological developments. 
 
Ÿ Enhancing consumer protection: We asked the FSB to work in collaboration with the 
OECD and other international organizations to explore, and report back by the next 
summit, on options to advance consumer finance protection through informed choice 
that includes disclosure, transparency and education; protection from fraud, abuse 
and errors; and recourse and advocacy. 
 
Fighting Protectionism and Promoting Trade and Investment 
 
42. Recognizing the importance of free trade and investment for global recovery, we are 
committed to keeping markets open and liberalizing trade and investment as a means to 
promote economic progress for all and narrow the development gap. The importance of 
free trade and open markets is illustrated by the joint report of the OECD, ILO, World 
Bank and WTO on the benefits of trade liberalization for employment and growth. These 
trade  and  investment liberalization measures will  help  achieve the  G20  Framework 




our  unwavering  commitment  to  resist  protectionism  in  all  its  forms.  We  therefore 
reaffirm the extension of our standstill commitments until the end of 2013 as agreed in 
Toronto, commit to rollback any new protectionist measures that may have risen, 
including export restrictions and WTO-inconsistent measures to stimulate exports, and 
ask the WTO, OECD, and UNCTAD to continue monitoring the situation and to report 
publicly on a semi-annual basis. 
 
43. With respect to the WTO Doha Development Round, we welcome the broader and more 
substantive engagement of the past four months among our representatives in Geneva. 
Bearing in  mind  that  2011  is  a  critical  window  of  opportunity, albeit  narrow,  this 
engagement must intensify and expand.  We now need to complete the end game.  We 
direct our negotiators to engage in across-the-board negotiations to promptly bring the 
Doha Development Round to  a  successful, ambitious, comprehensive, and  balanced 
conclusion consistent with the mandate of the Doha Development Round and built on the 
progress achieved.  Once such an outcome is reached, we commit to seek ratification, 
where necessary, in our respective systems. 
 
44. We  strongly  believe  that  trade  can  be  an  effective  tool  for  reducing  poverty  and 
enhancing economic growth in developing countries, LICs in particular. To support LIC 
capacity to trade, we welcome the adoption of the Multi-Year Action Plan on 
Development. We note our commitment to at least maintain, beyond 2011, Aid for Trade 
levels that reflect the average of the last three years (2006 to 2008); to make progress 
toward duty-free quota-free market access for least developed country (LDC) products in 
line  with  our  Hong  Kong  commitments,  without  prejudice  to  other  negotiations, 
including as regards preferential rules of origin; to call on relevant international agencies 
to  coordinate a  collective multilateral response  to  support  trade  facilitation; and  to 
support measures to increase the availability of trade finance in developing countries, 
particularly LICs.   In this respect, we also agree to monitor and assess trade finance 
programs in support of developing countries, in particular their coverage and impact on 
LICs, and to evaluate the impact of regulatory regimes on trade finance. 
 
45. We recognize the potential for faster growth in Africa, which could be unlocked by 
African plans for deeper regional economic integration. We therefore commit to support 
the regional integration efforts of African leaders, including by helping to realize their 
vision of a  free  trade  area through the  promotion of trade facilitation and regional 
infrastructure.  We call on the MDBs and WTO to collaborate with us in supporting this 
endeavor. 
 
Seoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth 
 
46. The crisis disproportionately affected the most vulnerable in the poorest countries and 
slowed progress toward achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
As the premier economic forum, we recognize the need to strengthen and leverage our 
development efforts to address such challenges. 
 
47. At the same time, narrowing the development gap and reducing poverty are integral to 
achieving our broader Framework objectives of strong, sustainable and balanced growth 
by generating new poles of growth and contributing to global rebalancing.   We are 
therefore using our best efforts for a rapid increase in the share of global growth and 





48. We commit to work in partnership with other developing countries, LICs in particular, to 
help them build the capacity to achieve and maintain their maximum economic growth 
potential.   We have thus developed a consensus for the G20’s contribution to global 
development efforts in line with our Toronto mandate. 
 
49. We endorse today the Seoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth (Annex I) and 
its Multi-Year Action Plan on Development (Annex II). 
 
50. The Seoul Consensus and the Multi-Year Action Plan are based on six core principles: 
 
· First, an enduring and meaningful reduction in poverty cannot be achieved without 
inclusive, sustainable and resilient growth, while the provision of ODA, as well as 
the  mobilization  of  all  other  sources  of  financing,  remain  essential  to  the 
development of most LICs. 
 
· Second, we  recognize that  while  there  are  common factors, there  is  no  single 
formula for development success. We must therefore engage other developing 
countries as partners, respecting national ownership of a country’s policies as the 
most important determinant of its successful development, thereby helping to ensure 
strong, responsible, accountable and transparent development partnerships between 
the G20 and LICs. 
 
· Third, our actions must prioritize global or regional systemic issues that call for 
collective action and have the potential for transformative impact. 
 
· Fourth, we recognize the critical role of the private sector to create jobs and wealth, 
and the need for a policy environment that supports sustainable private sector-led 
investment and growth. 
 
· Fifth, we will maximize our value-added and complement the development efforts of 
other key players by focusing on areas where the G20 has a comparative advantage 
or could add momentum. 
 
· And finally, we will focus on tangible outcomes of significant impact that remove 
blockages to improving growth prospects in developing countries, especially LICs. 
 
51. The  Seoul Consensus also  identifies nine key pillars where we  believe actions are 
necessary  to  resolve  the  most  significant  bottlenecks  to  inclusive,  sustainable  and 
resilient  growth  in  developing  countries,  LICs  in  particular:  infrastructure,  human 
resource development, trade, private investment and job creation, food security, growth 
with resilience, financial inclusion, domestic resource mobilization and knowledge 
sharing.  The Multi-Year Action Plan then outlines the specific, detailed actions to which 
we commit in order to address these bottlenecks, including to: 
 
a)   Facilitate increased investment from  public, semi-public and  private sources and 
improve the implementation and maintenance of national and regional infrastructure 
projects in sectors where there are bottlenecks. We agree to establish a High-Level 
Panel (HLP) to recommend measures to mobilize infrastructure financing and review 






b)   Improve the development of employable skills matched to employer and labor market 
needs in order to enhance the ability to attract investment, create decent jobs and 
increase productivity. We will support the development of internationally comparable 
skills indicators and the enhancement of national strategies for skills development, 
building on the G20 Training Strategy; 
 
c)   Improve the access and availability to trade with advanced economies and between 
developing and LICs. Our action plans on trade are discussed in paragraphs 42 to 45 
above; 
 
d)   Identify, enhance and promote responsible private investment in value chains and 
develop key indicators for measuring and maximizing the economic and employment 
impact of private sector investment; 
 
e)   Enhance food security policy coherence and coordination and increase agricultural 
productivity and food availability, including by advancing innovative results-based 
mechanisms, promoting responsible agriculture investment, fostering smallholder 
agriculture, and inviting relevant international organizations to develop, for our 2011 
Summit  in  France,  proposals  to  better  manage  and  mitigate  risks  of  food  price 
volatility without distorting market behavior. We also welcome the progress of the 
Global Agriculture and Food Security Program, as well as that of other bilateral and 
multilateral channels, including the UN Committee on World Food Security, and 
invite further contributions; 
 
f)   Improve income security and resilience to adverse shocks by assisting developing 
countries enhance social protection programs, including through further 
implementation of the UN Global Pulse Initiative, and by facilitating implementation 
of initiatives aimed at  a  quantified reduction of the  average cost of  transferring 
remittances; 
 
g)  Increase access to finance for the poor and small and medium enterprises (SMEs). 
Our action plans for financial inclusion and associated implementation mechanisms 
are discussed in paragraphs 55 to 57 below; 
 
h)  Build sustainable revenue bases for inclusive growth and social equity by improving 
developing country tax  administration systems  and  policies  and  highlighting the 
relationship between non-cooperative jurisdictions and development; and 
 
i)   Scale up and mainstream sharing of knowledge and experience, especially between 
developing countries, in order to improve their capacity and ensure that the broadest 
range of experiences are used to help tailor national policies. 
 
52. We commit to and prioritize full, timely and effective implementation of the Multi-Year 
Action Plan, understanding its high potential to have a positive transformative impact on 
people’s lives, both through our individual and collective actions and in partnership with 
other global development stakeholders. We will continue to work closely with relevant 




53. We reaffirm our commitment to achievement of the MDGs and will align our work in 
accordance with globally agreed development principles for sustainable economic, social 
and environmental development, to complement the outcomes of the UN High-Level 
Plenary Meeting on the MDGs held in September 2010 in New York, as well as with 
processes such as the Fourth UN LDC Summit in Turkey and the Fourth High-Level 
Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Korea, both to be held in 2011.   We also reaffirm our 
respective ODA pledges and commitments to assist the poorest countries and mobilize 
domestic resources made following on from the Monterrey Consensus and other fora. 
 
54. We further mandate the Development Working Group to monitor implementation of the 
Multi-Year Action Plan, so that we may review progress and consider the need for any 
further steps at the 2011 Summit in France. Development based on the Seoul Consensus 





55. We reiterate our strong commitment to financial inclusion and recognize the benefits of 
improved access to finance to lift the lives of the poor and to support the contribution of 
SMEs to economic development. We welcome the stock taking report on successful and 
scalable models of SME financing in developing economies. We have developed the 
Financial  Inclusion  Action  Plan  based  on  our  Principles  for  Innovative  Financial 
Inclusion as the work program for the coming year. 
 
56. Working with the Alliance for Financial Inclusion, the Consultative Group to Assist the 
Poor and the International Finance Corporation, we commit to launch the Global 
Partnership for Financial Inclusion (GPFI) as an inclusive platform for all G20 countries, 
interested non-G20 countries and relevant stakeholders to carry forward our work on 
financial inclusion, including implementation of the Financial Inclusion Action Plan. The 
GPFI’s efforts over the next year will include helping countries put into practice the 
Principles for Innovative Financial Inclusion, strengthening data for measuring financial 
inclusion, and developing methodologies for countries wishing to set targets.  We agree 
that the GPFI should report to us on its progress at our 2011 Summit in France. 
 
57. Recognizing the vital role of SMEs in employment and income generation, we welcome 
the strong response to the G20 SME Finance Challenge and the innovative models for 
scaling up private SME finance that have emerged from the competition and congratulate 
the winners. We have constructed a flexible SME Finance Framework to mobilize grant, 
risk capital and private financing by using existing funding mechanisms and the new 
SME Finance Innovation Fund to finance the winning proposals and other successful 
SME financing models. We welcome the commitment of Canada, Korea, the United 
States and the Inter-American Development Bank of $528 million to the Framework 




Fossil Fuel Subsidies 
 
58. We  reaffirm  our  commitment  to  rationalize  and  phase-out  over  the  medium  term 




on national circumstances, while providing targeted support for the poorest. We direct our 
Finance and Energy Ministers to report back on the progress made in implementing 
country-specific strategies and in achieving the goals to which we agreed in Pittsburgh 
and Toronto at the 2011 Summit in France. 
 
59.  We note the preliminary report of the IEA, World Bank and OECD and ask these 
organizations, together with OPEC, to further assess and review the progress made in 
implementing the Pittsburgh and Toronto commitments and report back to the 2011 
Summit in France. 
 
60. We recognize the value of the sharing of knowledge, expertise and capacity with respect 
to programs and policies that phase out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies. 
 
Fossil Fuel Price Volatility 
 
61. We recognize the importance of a well-functioning and transparent market in oil for 
world economic growth. We strongly support the Joint Oil Data Initiative (JODI) and ask 
the IEF, IEA and OPEC for a report suggesting specific steps in order to improve the 
quality, timeliness and reliability of the JODI Database. The report should include a 
proposed  timeframe  and  implementation  strategy,  which  will  explore  the  ways  to 
improve data availability on oil production, consumption, refining and stock levels, as 
appropriate. An intermediate report should be submitted to the February 2011 Finance 
Ministers’ meeting, with the final report submitted to the April 2011 Finance Ministers’ 
meeting. We also request the IEF, IEA, OPEC and IOSCO to produce a joint report, by 
the April 2011 Finance Ministers’ meeting, on how the oil spot market prices are assessed 
by oil price reporting agencies and how this affects the transparency and functioning of 
oil markets. 
 
62. We support the establishment of the IEF charter to strengthen the producer-consumer 
dialogue, and welcome the IEF plan, developed in cooperation with the IEA and OPEC, 
to hold an annual symposium with major relevant institutions on energy market outlooks. 
We call on the IEF, IEA and OPEC to produce a joint report and common communiqué, 
highlighting their respective outlooks and their short, medium and long-term forecasts for 
oil market supply and demand. We welcome their ongoing work on the linkages between 
oil physical and financial markets. 
 
63. Welcoming the June and November 2010 IOSCO reports, we ask IOSCO to further 
monitor developments in the oil OTC markets and report to the FSB for consideration of 
next steps, for improved regulation and enhanced transparency of the oil financial market 
in April 2011 by Finance Ministers and other relevant Ministers, informed by the work of 
the Energy Experts Group. We ask the Energy Experts Group to extend its work on 
volatility to other fossil fuels as a second step. 
 
Global Marine Environment Protection 
 
64. We  welcome  the  progress  achieved  by  the  Global  Marine  Environment  Protection 
(GMEP) initiative toward the goal of sharing best practices to protect the marine 
environment, to prevent accidents related to offshore exploration and development, as 
well as marine transportation, and to deal with their consequences. We recognize the 




reviewing international regulation of offshore oil and gas exploration, production and 
transport with respect to marine environmental protection as a first step to implement the 
Toronto mandate. 
 
65. Future work on the GMEP initiative should benefit from relevant findings, as  they 
become available, from the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill 
in the United States and the Montara Commission of Inquiry in Australia. We ask the 
GMEP Experts Sub-Group to provide a further report, with the support of the IMO, 
OECD, IEA, OPEC, International Regulators Forum, and International Association of 
Drilling Contractors and, in consultation with relevant stakeholders, to continue work on 
the effective sharing of best practices at the 2011 Summit in France. 
 
Climate Change and Green Growth 
 
66. Addressing the threat of global climate change is an urgent priority for all nations. We 
reiterate our commitment to take strong and action-oriented measures and remain fully 
dedicated to UN climate change negotiations.  We reaffirm the objective, provisions, and 
the principles of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
including common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.   We 
thank Mexico for hosting the UNFCCC negotiations to be held in Cancun beginning at 
the end of November 2010.   Those of us who have associated with the Copenhagen 
Accord reaffirm our support for it and its implementation.   We all are committed to 
achieving a successful, balanced result that includes the core issues of mitigation, 
transparency, finance, technology, adaptation, and forest preservation.  In this regard, we 
welcome the work of the High-Level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing 
established by the UN Secretary-General and ask our Finance Ministers to consider its 
report. We also support and encourage the delivery of fast-start finance commitments. 
 
67. The ongoing loss of biodiversity is a global environmental and economic challenge. 
Both climate change and loss of biodiversity are inextricably linked.  We acknowledge 
the outcomes of the global study on the economics of ecosystems and biodiversity.  We 
welcome the successful conclusion of COP10 in Nagoya. 
 
68. We   are   committed  to   support   country-led  green   growth   policies   that   promote 
environmentally sustainable global growth along with employment creation while 
ensuring energy access for the poor. We recognize that sustainable green growth, as it is 
inherently a  part  of  sustainable development, is  a  strategy of  quality  development, 
enabling countries to leapfrog old technologies in many sectors, including through the 
use of energy efficiency and clean technology. To that end, we will take steps to create, as 
appropriate, the enabling environments that are conducive to the development and 
deployment of energy efficiency and clean energy technologies, including policies and 
practices in our countries and beyond, including technical transfer and capacity building. 
We support the ongoing initiatives under the Clean Energy Ministerial and encourage 
further  discussion  on  cooperation  in  R&D  and  regulatory  measures,  together  with 
business leaders, and ask our Energy Experts Group to monitor and report back to us on 
progress at the 2011 Summit in France. We also commit to stimulate investment in clean 
energy technology, energy and resource efficiency, green transportation, and green cities 
by mobilizing finance, establishing clear and consistent standards, developing long-term 
energy policies, supporting education, enterprise and R&D, and continuing to promote 







69. Recognizing  that  corruption  is  a  severe  impediment  to  economic  growth  and 
development, we endorse the G20 Anti-Corruption Action Plan (Annex III). Building 
on previous declarations, and cognizant of our role as leaders of major trading nations, 
we recognize a special responsibility to prevent and tackle corruption and commit to 
supporting a common approach to building an effective global anti-corruption regime. 
 
70. In this regard, we will lead by example in key areas as detailed in the Anti-Corruption 
Action Plan, including: to accede or ratify and effectively implement the UN 
Convention against Corruption and promote a transparent and inclusive review process; 
adopt and enforce laws against the bribery of foreign public officials; prevent access of 
corrupt officials to the global financial system; consider a cooperative framework for 
the denial of entry to corrupt officials, extradition, and asset recovery; protect 
whistleblowers; safeguard anticorruption bodies. We are also committed to undertake a 
dedicated effort to encourage public-private partnerships to tackle corruption and to 
engage the private sector in the fight against corruption, with a view to promoting 
propriety, integrity and transparency in the conduct of business affairs, as well as in the 
public sector. 
 
71. The G20 will hold itself accountable for its commitments. Beyond our participation in 
existing mechanisms of peer review for international anti-corruption standards, we 
mandate the Anti-Corruption Working Group to submit annual reports on the 
implementation of our commitments to future Summits for the duration of the Anti- 




72. Recognizing the importance of private sector-led growth and job creation, we welcome 
the Seoul G20 Business Summit held on November 10 and 11 that convened global 
business leaders under the theme “The Role of Business for Sustainable and Balanced 





73. We recognize, given the broad impact of our decisions, the necessity to consult with the 
wider  international  community.  We  will  increase  our  efforts  to  conduct  G20 
consultation activities in a more systematic way, building on constructive partnerships 
with international organizations, in particular the UN, regional bodies, civil society, 
trade unions and academia. 
 
74. Bearing in mind the importance of the G20 being both representative and effective as 
the premier forum for our international economic cooperation, we reached a broad 
consensus on a set of principles for non-member invitations to Summits, including that 
we will invite no more than five non-member invitees, of which at least two will be 
















G20 Leaders Declaration 
 
1.    We, the Leaders of the G20, convened in Los Cabos on 18-19 June 2012. 
 
2.    We are united in our resolve to promote growth and jobs. 
 
3. Since we last met, the global recovery has continued to face a number of challenges. Financial 
market tensions are high. External, fiscal and financial imbalances are still prevalent, having a 
major impact on growth and employment prospects and confidence. Clearly, the global economy 
remains vulnerable, with a negative impact on the everyday lives of people all over the world, 
affecting jobs, trade, development, and the environment. 
 
4.    We will act together to strengthen recovery and address financial market tensions. 
 
5. We will work collectively to strengthen demand and restore confidence with a view to support 
growth and foster financial stability in order to create high quality jobs and opportunities for all of 
our citizens. We have agreed today on a coordinated Los Cabos Growth and Jobs Action Plan to 
achieve those goals. 
 
6. Euro Area members of the G20 will take all necessary policy measures to safeguard the integrity 
and stability of the area, improve the functioning of financial markets and break the feedback loop 
between sovereigns and banks.  We look forward to the Euro Area working in partnership with the 
next Greek government to ensure they remain on the path to reform and sustainability within the 
Euro Area. 
 
7. We are implementing our structural and regulatory reform agenda to enhance medium-term 
growth prospects and build more resilient financial systems. We remain committed to reduce 
imbalances by strengthening deficit countries’ public finances with sound and sustainable policies 
that take into account evolving economic conditions and, in countries with large current account 
surpluses,  by  strengthening  domestic  demand  and  moving  toward  greater  exchange  rate 
flexibility. 
 
8. Despite the challenges we all face domestically, we have agreed that multilateralism is of even 





9. Recognizing the impact of the continuing crisis on developing countries, particularly low income 
countries, we will intensify our efforts to create a more conducive environment for development, 
including supporting infrastructure investment. Our policy actions will improve living conditions 
across the globe and protect the most vulnerable. In particular, by stabilizing global markets and 
promoting stronger growth, we will generate significant positive effects on development and 
poverty reduction across the globe.
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Supporting economic stabilization and the global recovery 
 
10.  Strong, sustainable and balanced growth remains the top priority of the G20, as it leads to higher job 
creation  and increases  the welfare  of people  across the world. We are committed  to adopting  all 
necessary  policy  measures  to strengthen  demand,  support  global  growth  and restore  confidence, 
address short and medium-term risks, enhance job creation and reduce unemployment, as reflected 
in the Los Cabos Growth and Jobs Action Plan (see Annex). We will implement all our commitments 
in a timely manner and rigorously monitor their implementation. 
 
11.  Against the background  of renewed market tensions, Euro Area members  of the G20 will take all 
necessary measures to safeguard the integrity and stability of the area, improve the functioning of 
financial  markets  and break  the feedback  loop  between  sovereigns  and banks.  We welcome  the 
significant actions taken since the last summit by the Euro Area to support growth, ensure financial 
stability  and  promote  fiscal  responsibility  as  a  contribution  to  the  G20  framework  for  strong, 
sustainable and balanced growth. In this context, we welcome Spain’s plan to recapitalize its banking 
system and the Eurogroup’s  announcement  of support for Spain’s financial restructuring  authority. 
The adoption of the Fiscal Compact and its ongoing implementation, together with growth-enhancing 
policies and structural reform and financial stability measures, are important steps towards greater 
fiscal and economic integration that lead to sustainable borrowing costs. The imminent establishment 
of the European Stability Mechanism is a substantial strengthening of the European firewalls. We fully 
support the actions of the Euro Area in moving forward with the completion  of the Economic  and 
Monetary Union. Towards that end, we support the intention to consider concrete steps towards a 
more integrated  financial  architecture,  encompassing  banking  supervision,  resolution  and 
recapitalization,  and deposit insurance.  Euro Area members  will foster intra Euro Area adjustment 
through structural reforms to strengthen competitiveness in deficit countries and to promote demand 
and growth in surplus countries. The European Union members of the G20 are determined to move 
forward  expeditiously  on measures  to support  growth  including  through  completing  the  European 
Single Market and making better use of European financial means, such as the European Investment 
Bank (EIB), pilot project bonds, and structural  and cohesion  funds, for more targeted  investment, 
employment, growth and competitiveness, while maintaining the firm commitment to implement fiscal 
consolidation  to be assessed  on a structural  basis. We look forward  to the Euro Area working  in 
partnership  with  the  next  Greek  government  to  ensure  they  remain  on  the  path  to  reform  and 
sustainability within the Euro Area. 
 
12.  All G20 members will take the necessary actions to strengthen global growth and restore confidence. 
Advanced economies will ensure that the pace of fiscal consolidation  is appropriate to support the 
recovery,   taking   country-specific   circumstances   into   account   and,   in   line   with   the   Toronto 
commitments,  address  concerns  about  medium  term  fiscal  sustainability.  Those  advanced  and 
emerging economies which have fiscal space will let the automatic fiscal stabilizers to operate taking 
into account national circumstances and current demand conditions. Should economic conditions 
deteriorate significantly further, those countries with sufficient fiscal space stand ready to coordinate 
and  implement  discretionary  fiscal  actions  to support  domestic  demand,  as appropriate.  In many 
countries, higher investment in education, innovation and infrastructure  can support the creation of 
jobs  now  while  raising  productivity  and future  growth  prospects.  Recognizing  the need  to pursue 
growth-oriented policies that support demand and recovery, the United States will calibrate the pace 
of its fiscal consolidation by ensuring that its public finances are placed on a sustainable long-run path 
so that a sharp fiscal contraction in 2013 is avoided. 
 
13.  Monetary  policy will maintain  price stability  over the medium  term while continuing  to support the 
economic  recovery.  We  will  strengthen  confidence  in  our  banks,  maintaining  momentum  on  the 
financial sector reforms needed to safeguard our financial systems over the medium term while taking 
appropriate actions to protect credit channels and the integrity of the global payment and settlement 
systems. Healthy banks, with an ability to lend, are critical to the global recovery.
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14.  G20 members will remain vigilant of the evolution of oil prices and will stand ready to carry out 
additional actions as needed, including the commitment by producing countries to continue to 
ensure an appropriate level of supply consistent with demand. We welcome Saudi Arabia’s 
readiness to mobilize, as necessary, existing spare capacity to ensure adequate supply. We will 
also remain vigilant of other commodity prices. 
 
15.  A number of emerging markets are now also experiencing a slowdown in growth. In response, 
these countries are appropriately directing monetary and fiscal policies to support growth while 
ensuring stability and, in some cases, introducing new measures to boost their economies, in 
particular through strengthening domestic demand in a context of weaker external demand. 
 
16.  We welcome progress by countries with large current account surpluses to increase domestic 
demand and actions by countries with large current account deficits to increase national savings. 
Emerging surplus economies will carry out further actions to increase domestic consumption, 
including by removing price and tax distortions and strengthening social safety nets, while 
advanced surplus economies or those with relatively weak private demand will promote domestic 
demand, notably through the liberalization of service sectors and the promotion of investment, 
including through the removal of inefficiencies. Higher national savings in countries with current 
account deficits will contribute to a lasting reduction in global imbalances. We recognize the 
special circumstances of large commodity exporters with regard to current account surpluses. We 
reaffirm our commitment to move more rapidly toward market-determined exchange rate systems 
and exchange rate flexibility to reflect underlying fundamentals, avoid persistent exchange rate 
misalignments, and refrain from competitive devaluation of currencies. We also welcome the 
commitment by China to allow market forces to play a larger role in determining movements in 
the Remnimbi (RMB), continue to reform its exchange rate regime, and to increase the 
transparency of its exchange rate policy. 
 
17.  All G20 members have put forward structural reform commitments to strengthen and sustain 
global demand, foster job creation, contribute to global rebalancing and increase growth potential. 
These include product market reforms to increase competition, measures to stabilize the housing 
sector, labor market reforms to boost competitiveness and employment, as well as steps to 
strengthen social safety nets in a way that is fiscally responsible, advance tax reform to raise 
productivity, increase investment in infrastructure, and promote inclusive green growth and 
sustainable development as appropriate to country circumstances. We ask Finance Ministers and 
Central Bank Governors to consider ways in which the G20 can foster investment in infrastructure 
and ensure the availability of sufficient funding for infrastructure projects, including Multilateral 
Development Banks’ (MDBs) financing and technical support. 
 
18.  In all policy areas, we commit to minimize the negative spillovers on other countries of policies 
implemented for domestic purposes. We reaffirm our shared interest in a strong and stable 
international financial system. While capital flows can be beneficial to recipient economies, we 
reiterate that excess volatility of financial flows and disorderly movements in exchange rates have 
adverse implications for economic and financial stability. 
 
19. Recognizing the importance of transparency and accountability in reinforcing credibility and 
confidence, we have agreed on the Los Cabos Accountability Assessment Framework that 
accompanies the Growth and Jobs Action Plan. This Framework establishes the procedures we 
will follow to report on progress in implementing our policy commitments. We welcome the first 
Accountability Report under this new framework. We task our Finance Ministers and Central Bank 




Employment and Social Protection 
 
20.  Quality employment is at the heart of our macroeconomic policies. Jobs with labor rights, social 
security coverage and decent income contribute to more stable growth, enhance social inclusion 
and reduce poverty. We therefore endorse the recommendations of our Labor and Employment 
Ministers to urgently combat unemployment through appropriate labor market measures and 
fostering the creation of decent work and quality jobs, particularly for youth and other vulnerable 
groups, who have been severely hit by the economic crisis. We reaffirm our commitment to youth 
to facilitate their access to quality jobs, which will boost their life prospects. We welcome the work 
of the G20 Task Force on Employment and extend its mandate for an additional year in the terms 
proposed by our Ministers. Consistent with the Los Cabos Growth and Jobs Action Plan, we 
consider that structural reforms, in full respect of the fundamental principles and rights at work, 
can play an important role in lifting economic growth to generate labor market opportunities, 
mobility and jobs. We also commit to intensify our efforts to strengthen cooperation in education, 
skills  development  and  training  policies,  including  internship  and  on-the-job  training,  which 
support a successful school-to-work transition. 
 
21.  Creating jobs and reducing unemployment, particularly among our youth and those most affected 
by the crisis, is central to all our countries. We welcome the report by the International Labour 
Organization (ILO), Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank on boosting jobs and living standards in G20 
countries. We will continue to focus on measures to accelerate the pace of the recovery in jobs 
and the reduction in unemployment. 
 
22.  We recognize the importance of establishing nationally determined social protection floors. We 
will continue to foster inter-agency and international policy coherence, coordination, cooperation 
and knowledge sharing to assist low-income countries in capacity building for implementing 
nationally determined social protection floors. We ask international organizations to identify policy 
options with low-income countries on how to develop effective sustainable protection floors. 
 
23.  We commit to take concrete actions to overcome the barriers hindering women's full economic 
and social participation and to expand economic opportunities for women in G20 economies. We 
also express our firm commitment to advance gender equality in all areas, including skills training, 
wages and salaries, treatment in the workplace, and responsibilities in care-giving. 
 
24. We ask our Labor Ministers to review progress made on this agenda and we welcome 
consultations with social partners. In this regard, we appreciate the contribution of the Business- 
20 (B20) and Labor-20 (L20) to the process of the G20 under the Mexican Presidency. 
 
25.  We recognize the role of travel and tourism as a vehicle for job creation, economic growth and 
development, and, while recognizing the sovereign right of States to control the entry of foreign 
nationals, we will work towards developing travel facilitation initiatives in support of job creation, 




26. We are firmly committed to open trade and investment, expanding markets and resisting 
protectionism in all its forms, which are necessary conditions for sustained global economic 
recovery, jobs and development. We underline the importance of an open, predictable, rules- 
based, transparent multilateral trading system and are committed to ensure the centrality of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). 
 
27.  Recognizing  the  importance  of  investment  for  boosting  economic  growth,  we  commit  to 
maintaining a supportive business environment for investors.
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28.  We are deeply concerned about rising instances of protectionism around the world. Following up 
our commitment made in Cannes, we reaffirm our standstill commitment until the end of 2014 
with regard to measures affecting trade and investment, and our pledge to roll back any new 
protectionist measure that may have arisen, including new export restrictions and WTO- 
inconsistent measures to stimulate exports. We also undertake to notify in a timely manner trade 
and investment restrictive measures. We uphold the inventory and monitoring work of the WTO, 
OECD and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) on trade and 
investment measures and encourage them to reinforce and deepen the work in these areas, 
consistent with their respective mandates. 
 
29.  We value the discussion held by our Trade Ministers in Puerto Vallarta on the relevance of 
regional and global value chains to world trade, recognizing their role in fostering economic 
growth, employment and development and emphasizing the need to enhance the participation of 
developing countries in such value chains. We encourage a deepening of these discussions in 
the WTO, UNCTAD and OECD within their respective mandates, and we call on them to 
accelerate their work on analyzing the functioning of global value chains and their relationship 
with trade and investment flows, development and jobs, as well as on how to measure trade 
flows, to better understand how our actions affect our countries and others, and to report on 
progress under Russia's Presidency. 
 
30.  In line with the Cannes Communiqué, we stand by the Doha Development Agenda mandate and 
reaffirm our commitment to pursue fresh, credible approaches to furthering trade negotiations 
across the board. We will continue to work towards concluding the Doha Round negotiations, 
including outcomes in specific areas where progress is possible, such as trade facilitation, and 
other issues of concern for least developed countries. We urge progress in streamlining WTO 
accession procedures for the world’s poorest countries. 
 
31.  We support strengthening the WTO through improving the way it conducts its regular business, 
and its dispute settlement system. We also direct our representatives to further discussions on 
challenges and opportunities for the multilateral trading system in a globalized economy. 
 
Strengthening the international financial architecture 
 
32.  We recognize the importance of effective global and regional safety nets. We welcome the firm 
commitments to increase  the  resources  available  to  the  IMF.  This  is  the  result  of  a  broad 
international cooperative effort that includes a significant number of countries. The commitments 
exceed $450 billion and are in addition to the quota increase under the 2010 Reform. These 
resources will be available for the whole membership of the IMF, and not earmarked for any 
particular region. These resources, which qualify as reserve assets, would be channeled through 
bilateral loans and investments such as note purchase agreements to the IMF’s General 
Resources Account under the modalities which have been approved by the IMF Executive Board. 
This effort shows the G20 and the international community’s commitment to take the steps 
needed to safeguard global financial stability and enhance the IMF’s role in crisis prevention and 
resolution. 
 
33.  We reaffirm our commitment to implement in full the 2010 Quota and Governance Reform by the 
agreed  date  of  the  2012  IMF/World  Bank  Annual  Meetings.  These  reforms  are  crucial  to 
enhancing the IMF’s legitimacy, relevance and effectiveness, and will support efforts to further 
strengthen Fund surveillance and to ensure that the IMF is adequately resourced to play its 
systemic role. As part of these reforms, we are committed to completing the comprehensive 
review  of  the  quota  formula,  to  address  deficiencies  and  weaknesses  in  the  current  quota 
formula, by January 2013 and to complete the next general review of quotas by January 2014. 
We agree that the formula should be simple and transparent, consistent with the multiple roles of
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quotas, result in calculated  shares  that  are  broadly  acceptable  to  the  membership,  and  be 
feasible to implement based on timely, high quality and widely available data. We reaffirm that the 
distribution of quotas based on the formula should better reflect the relative weights of IMF 
members in the world economy, which have changed substantially in view of strong GDP growth 
in dynamic emerging markets and developing countries. We reaffirm the importance of continuing 
to protect the voice and representation of the poorest members of the IMF. We ask our Finance 
Ministers and Central Bank Governors to review progress on this issue when they meet in 
November. 
 
34.  We agreed that the current surveillance framework should be significantly enhanced, including 
through a better integration of bilateral and multilateral surveillance with a focus on global, 
domestic and financial stability, including spillovers from countries’ policies. We welcome the 
work of the IMF to advance considerations for a proposed integrated surveillance decision and 
commit to support the decision process. We underscore the importance of rigorous surveillance 
on exchange rate policies and support a more ample coverage of surveillance activities, where 
relevant, including global liquidity, capital flows, capital account measures, reserve and fiscal, 
monetary  and  financial  sector  policies  that  could  have  an  impact  on  external  stability.  We 
welcome the IMF’s ongoing work to produce an external sector report, which would strengthen 
multilateral  analysis  and  enhance  the  transparency  of  surveillance.  We  also  recognize  that 
political ownership and traction is critical to effective surveillance, and that the International 
Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC) has a role in facilitating the active involvement of all 
IMF members. We look forward to substantial progress by the next IMF/World Bank Annual 
Meetings. 
 
35.  We welcome the interim progress report and look forward to the joint annual progress report to 
support the development of local currency bond markets to be prepared by the World Bank, 
Regional Development Banks, IMF, OECD and the Bank of International Settlements (BIS). The 
full report will be presented at the November meeting of G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank 
Governors. This issue is of great importance to emerging markets and developing countries, 
recognizing that the liquidity, efficiency and operation of these markets are being challenged by 
the current global financial situation. 
 
Reforming the financial sector and fostering financial inclusion 
 
36.  We welcome the progress report by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) on taking forward the G20 
commitments for strengthening financial stability and the FSB’s enhanced monitoring of 
implementation at the national level. We are committed to the timely, full and consistent 
implementation of agreed policies in order to support a stable and integrated global financial 
system and to prevent future crises. 
 
37.  We  welcome  the  publication  of  the  traffic  lights  scoreboard  to  track  progress  in  the 
implementation of all our financial reform recommendations and pledge to take all necessary 
actions to make progress in the areas where difficulties in policy development or implementation 
have been identified. 
 
38.  In particular, we recognize the substantial progress to date in the priority reform areas identified 
by the FSB’s Coordination Framework for Implementation Monitoring (CFIM): the Basel capital 
and liquidity framework; the framework for global systemically important financial institutions (G- 
SIFIs), resolution regimes, over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives reforms, shadow banking, and 
compensation practices. We commit to complete work in these important areas to achieve full 
implementation of reforms. 
 
39.  We reaffirm our commitment that all standardized OTC derivative contracts should be traded on 
exchanges  or  electronic  trading  platforms,  where  appropriate,  and  cleared  through  central
7 
 
counterparties by end-2012, OTC derivative contracts should be reported to trade repositories 
and  non-centrally  cleared  contracts  should  be  subject  to  higher  capital  requirements.  We 
welcome the FSB progress report on implementation. Now that substantial progress has been 
achieved in the four safeguards for a resilient and efficient global framework for central clearing, 
jurisdictions should rapidly finalize their decision-making and put in place the needed legislation 
and regulations to meet the G20 commitment for central clearing. We acknowledge the progress 
made to develop the key principles to promote internationally consistent minimum standards for 
the margining of non-centrally cleared derivatives and encourage international standard setters to 
finalize  the  proposed  global  margin  standards  by  the  end  of  this  year,  to  match  the 
implementation deadline for other OTC derivatives reforms and for the Basel capital framework. 
 
40.  We  welcome  progress  in  implementing  Basel  II,  2.5  and  III  and  urge  jurisdictions  to  fully 
implement the standards according to the agreed timelines. We welcome the Basel Committee’s 
consultative proposals for a fundamental review of the market risk framework. We welcome the 
FSB’s progress report on the implementation of the principles and standards for sound 
compensation practices, reaffirm our commitment to ensure that these are followed and ask the 
FSB to continue its ongoing monitoring. 
 
41.  We reiterate our commitment to make our national resolution regimes consistent with the FSB 
Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes so that no bank or other financial institution is “too 
big to fail”. To this end, we also support the ongoing elaboration of recovery and resolution plans 
and institution-specific cross-border cooperation agreements for all G-SIFIs. We reiterate our 
commitment to strengthen the intensity and effectiveness of the supervision of SIFIs and ask the 
FSB to report on further progress in this area to the November 2012 G20 Finance Ministers and 
Central Bank Governors’ meeting. 
 
42. We welcome progress on developing a set of principles as a common framework for the 
identification of, and policy measures relating to, domestic systemically important banks (D-SIBs) 
and ask our Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors to review recommendations in these 
areas at their meeting in November. We support continuing work for the strengthening of the 
oversight  and  regulation  of  the  shadow  banking  system,  and  look  forward  to  our  Finance 
Ministers  and  Central  Bank  Governors  reviewing  recommendations  in  these  areas  at  their 
meeting in November. We ask the FSB in consultation with the International Association of 
Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) to complete their work on identification and policy measures for 
global systemically important insurers by April 2013. Towards reducing systemic risk, we look 
forward to the preparation by the FSB in consultation with International Organization of Securities 
Commissions  (IOSCO)  of  methodologies  to  identify  other  systemically  important  non-bank 
financial entities by end-2012  and  call  on  Committee  on  Payment  and  Settlement  Systems 
(CPSS) and IOSCO to continue their work on systemically important market infrastructures. We 
also ask the IAIS to continue its work to develop a common framework for the supervision of 
internationally active insurance groups by end-2013. 
 
43.  We call for accelerated progress by national authorities and standard setting bodies in ending the 
mechanistic reliance on credit ratings and encourage steps that would enhance transparency of 
and competition among credit rating agencies. We support continuing work to achieve 
convergence to a single set of high-quality accounting standards. We welcome IOSCO’s report 
on the functioning of the credit default swap markets and ask IOSCO to report on next steps by 
the November 2012 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors’ meeting. 
 
44.  We endorse the FSB recommendations regarding the framework for development of a global 
legal entity identifier (LEI) system for parties to financial transactions, with a global governance 
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framework representing the public interest. The LEI system will be launched by March 2013 and 
we ask the FSB to report on implementation progress by the November 2012 Finance Ministers
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and Central Bank Governors’ meeting. We encourage global adoption of the LEI to support 
authorities and market participants in identifying and managing financial risks. 
 
45.  We welcome the FSB study, prepared in coordination with the IMF and the World Bank, to 
identify  potential  unintended  consequences  of  the  agreed  financial  regulatory  reforms  for 
Emerging Markets and Developing Economies (EMDEs). We encourage continued monitoring 
analysis and reporting by the FSB and dialogue among the FSB, standard-setters, international 
financial institutions and national authorities of EMDEs, to address material unintended 
consequences as appropriate without prejudice to our commitment to implement the agreed 
reforms. 
 
46.  We endorse the recommendations and the revised FSB Charter for placing the FSB on an 
enduring organizational footing, with legal personality, strengthened governance, greater financial 
autonomy and enhanced capacity to coordinate the development and implementation of financial 
regulatory policies, while maintaining strong links with the BIS. We call for a full implementation of 
the recommendations by our next meeting and substantial progress by the November 2012 
Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors’ meeting. We call on the FSB to continue to keep 
under review the structure of its representation. 
 
47.  We  welcome  the  ongoing  work  by  the  FSB  on  adherence  to  supervisory  and  regulatory 
information exchange and cooperation standards and look forward to a further public statement 
on progress under the initiative ahead of the Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors’ 
meeting in November 2012. 
 
48.  In the tax area, we reiterate our commitment to strengthen transparency and comprehensive 
exchange of information. We commend the progress made as reported by the Global Forum and 
urge all countries to fully comply with the standard and implement the recommendations identified 
in the course of the reviews, in particular the 13 jurisdictions whose framework does not allow 
them to qualify to phase 2 at this stage. We expect the Global Forum to quickly start examining 
the effectiveness of information exchange practices and to report to us and our finance ministers. 
We welcome the OECD report on the practice of automatic information exchange, where we will 
continue to lead by example in implementing this practice. We call on countries to join this 
growing practice as appropriate and strongly encourage all jurisdictions to sign the Multilateral 
Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance. We also welcome the efforts to enhance 
interagency cooperation to tackle illicit flows including the outcomes of the Rome meeting of the 
Oslo Dialogue. We reiterate the need to prevent base erosion and profit shifting and we will follow 
with attention the ongoing work of the OECD in this area. 
 
49.  We support the renewal of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) mandate, thereby sustaining 
global efforts to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism and proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction. G20 members also welcome the adoption of the revised FATF 
standards and look forward to their implementation. We welcome the progress made by FATF in 
identifying and monitoring high-risk jurisdictions with strategic Anti-Money Laundering/Counter- 
Terrorist Financing (AML/CFT) deficiencies, using AML/CFT tools in the fight against corruption, 
improving transparency of corporate vehicles and increasing cooperation against tax crimes, 
addressing  the  risks  posed  by  tax  havens,  as  well  as  in  increasing  the  reach  and  the 
effectiveness of AML/CFT measures by also considering financial inclusion efforts. We look 
forward to the completion in 2013 of the update of the FATF assessment process for the next 
round of mutual evaluations. 
 
50.  We welcome the progress made by the Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion (GPFI) on 
implementing the five recommendations set out in its 2011 report and call on the GPFI to 
continue working towards their full implementation. We endorse the G20 Basic Set of financial
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inclusion indicators developed by the GPFI. Recognizing the key role that SMEs play in economic 
development, and poverty reduction, we welcome the launch of the SME Finance Compact that 
will support developing innovative models and approaches to address the specific access to 
finance challenges and constraints faced by developing countries with regards to SME finance. 
We welcome the forthcoming GPFI conference on standard setting bodies and financial inclusion 
as a means of helping to create an enabling regulatory environment, and we call on the GPFI to 
report progress to our Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors in November. Finally, we 
support  the  ongoing  effort  to  create  a  fourth  GPFI  subgroup  that  will  focus  on  consumer 
protection and financial literacy issues. 
 
51. We acknowledge the efforts of those G20 and non-G20 countries committed to national 
coordination platforms and strategies for financial inclusion under the “G20 Financial Inclusion 
Peer Learning Program” and encourage similar efforts to advance effective implementation of the 
G20 Principles for Innovative Financial Inclusion such as the commitments to concrete actions to 
promote financial inclusion made by developing and emerging countries under the Maya 
Declaration, recognizing the ongoing efforts and the support by the World Bank Group and the 
Alliance for Financial Inclusion, and other stakeholders including the United Nations (UN), and 
bilateral donors to foster financial inclusion. 
 
52.  On financial education, we endorse the OECD/International Network on Financial Education 
(INFE) High Level Principles on National Strategies for Financial Education, and call on the 
OECD/INFE and the World Bank in cooperation with the GPFI to deliver further tools to promote 
financial education, with  a  progress  report  to the  next  Summit.  For  advancing  the  financial 
consumer protection agenda, we take note of the discussion on the Statutes of the International 
Financial Consumer Protection Network (FinCoNet) and on the issues of formal structure and 
financial support to ensure the exchange of best practices. We also endorse the Action Plan 
presented by the G20/OECD Task Force on Financial Consumer Protection to develop effective 
approaches to support the implementation of the High Level Principles on Financial Consumer 
Protection, and look forward to an update report by the Leaders’ Summit in St. Petersburg in 
2013. 
 
53.  We recognize the need for women and youth to gain access to financial services and financial 
education, ask the GPFI, the OECD/INFE, and the World Bank to identify barriers they may face 
and call for a progress report to be delivered by the next Summit. 
 
54.  We welcome the launch of the Mexico Financial Inclusion Challenge: Innovative Solutions for 
Unlocking Access, a call for innovations that address barriers to financial inclusion through the 
creation of valuable, affordable, secure, and comprehensive financial services. 
 
Enhancing food security and addressing commodity price volatility 
 
55.  The Action Plan on Food Price Volatility and Agriculture adopted by the Ministers of Agriculture in 
2011 underlined that to feed a world population expected to exceed 9.3 billion by 2050, 
agricultural production will have to increase between 50 and 70 percent, and by almost 100 
percent in developing countries. We recognize that increasing production and productivity on a 
sustainable basis while considering the diversity of agricultural conditions is one of the most 
important challenges that the world faces today. The crisis in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa 
also  underscores  that strengthening  emergency  and  long-term  responses  to  food  insecurity 
remains a pressing challenge. We also note that chronic malnutrition is an enormous drain on a 
country’s human resources, and we therefore support the Scaling Up Nutrition movement and 
encourage wider involvement of G20 members. 
 
56.  We welcome the considerable progress made in implementing the Action Plan and the food 
security  pillar  of  the  Seoul  Multi-Year  Action  Plan  on  Development.  We  support  the  G20
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Agriculture Vice-Ministers’ Report annexed to this Declaration, on the progress made on previous 
commitments and key recommendations on sustainably increasing agricultural productivity, 
containing  inputs  from  several  international  organizations  coordinated  by  the  Food  and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the OECD, in addition to other recommendations from B20 
and civil society. 
 
57.  To fight hunger, we commit to continue our efforts on our initiatives, including the Tropical 
Agriculture Platform, the Platform for Agricultural Risk Management, the GEO Global Agriculture 
Monitoring, research initiatives for wheat, rice and corn, the Rapid Response Forum, regional 
emergency food reserves, the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program and support for the 
Principles of Responsible Agriculture Investment. Recognizing the important contribution of 
greater transparency to reducing food price volatility, we welcome the progress made in the 
implementation of the Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS). We recognize that a more 
stable, predictable, distortion-free, open and transparent trading system, including as regards 
agriculture, has a critical role to play to promote food security. 
 
58. We reaffirm our commitment to remove export restrictions and extraordinary taxes on food 
purchased for non-commercial humanitarian purposes by the World Food Programme (WFP). 
We encourage the implementation of the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance 
of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security. 
 
59.  We strongly welcome the launch of the “AgResults” Initiative, aimed at improving food security for 
the poor and vulnerable by encouraging private sector innovation of new agricultural products 
and systems constrained by market failures in agriculture. We look forward to the launch of the 
pilot projects focused on innovations in nutrient-fortified crops, post-harvest waste-reducing 
storage solutions and crop quality technologies in Sub-Saharan Africa. We commend those who 
have already committed or signaled their intention to commit funding to this initiative and 
encourage broader participation. 
 
60.  We recognize the need to adapt agriculture to climate change and we recognize the importance 
of improving the efficiency of water and soil use in a sustainable manner. To this end, we support 
the development of and a greater use of available technologies, well-known practices and 
techniques such as soil fertility enhancement, minimum tillage and agroforestry, and call upon 
international organizations to provide a report on science-based options to improve the efficiency 
of water use in agriculture including in ways particularly suitable for small farms. 
 
61. We recognize the importance to the global economic recovery of maintaining stability in 
international commodity markets. We stress the importance of well-functioning and transparent 
physical and financial commodities’ markets and reduced excessive price volatility to achieve 
food security and strong growth that is both sustainable and inclusive. We recognize that 
excessive commodity price volatility has significant implications for all countries, increasing 
uncertainty for actors in the economy and potentially hampering stability of the budgets, and 
predictability of economic planning. We recognize that mitigating the negative effects of 
commodity price volatility on the most vulnerable is an important component of reducing poverty 
and boosting economic growth. We therefore endorse the conclusions of the G20 report on the 
macroeconomic impacts of excessive commodity price volatility on growth and its identification of 
policy options that countries could consider, taking account of national circumstances to mitigate 
any such effect. We also acknowledge and appreciate the participation and valuable inputs of the 
IMF, World Bank and UNCTAD. We ask our Finance Ministers to report in 2013 on progress on 
the G20’s contribution to facilitate better functioning of these physical markets, taking note of 
possible areas of further work outlined in the report. We reaffirm our commitment to enhance 
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transparency and avoid abuse in financial commodity markets, including OTC, with effective 
intervention powers for market regulators and authorities and an appropriate regulation and
13 
 
supervisory framework. In this regard we look forward to IOSCO’s report on the implementation 
of its recommendations on commodity derivatives markets by November 2012. 
 
62.  We recognize that excessive price volatility in energy commodities is also an important source of 
economic instability. We remain committed to well-functioning and transparent energy markets. 
We will continue to work to improve the timeliness, completeness and reliability of JODI-Oil and 
look forward to a progress report next year. We will work on the JODI-Gas database on the same 
principles. We expect the International Energy Forum (IEF) report on improving the reliability of 
the JODI-Oil database and the report on transparency in international gas and coal markets 
submitted by the International Energy Agency (IEA), IEF, and Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) to be discussed by our Finance Ministers in November. We also 
look forward to IOSCO’s recommendations to improve the functioning and oversight of Price 
Reporting Agencies in November 2012, which will be produced in collaboration with other 
mandated organizations (IEF, IEA and OPEC), and task Finance Ministers to take concrete 
measures in this area as necessary. 
 
Meeting the Challenges of Development 
 
63.  Eradicating poverty and achieving strong, inclusive, sustainable and balanced growth remain core 
objectives of the G20 development agenda. We reaffirm our commitment to work with developing 
countries, particularly low income countries, and to support them in implementing the nationally 
driven policies and priorities which are needed to fulfill internationally agreed development goals, 
particularly the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and beyond. 
 
64.  We welcome the initiative of the Development Working Group to build upon the work of previous 
G20 presidencies, and its focus on three priorities during the Mexican Presidency - food security, 
infrastructure and inclusive green growth. We commend the progress achieved against our 
commitments in the Seoul Multi-Year Action Plan, and support the 2012 Development Working 
Group progress report annexed to this Declaration. We invite the Development Working Group to 
explore putting in place a process for ensuring assessment and accountability for G20 
development actions by the next Summit. 
 
65.  Investment in infrastructure is critical for sustained economic growth, poverty reduction, and job 
creation. We therefore welcome the strong progress made under the Multi-Year Action Plan, 
including in implementing the recommendations of the Multilateral Development Banks’ (MDBs) 
Action Plan and the High Level Panel on Infrastructure. 
 
66. While recognizing that public financing of infrastructure development projects in developing 
countries  remains  essential,  we  consider  it  should  be  complemented  by  private  sector 
investment. We encourage MDBs to continue progress under the Action Plan, and welcome the 
report on addressing Misperception of Risk and Return in Low Income Countries. This contains 
important messages about properly perceiving the risks posed, as well as the opportunities 
offered,  by  long-term  infrastructure  investment  in  low  income  countries.  Recognizing  the 
challenge that rapid urbanization  poses  and  the  need  to  make  cities  more  sustainable,  we 
welcome the report on Best Practices for Urban Mass Transport Infrastructure Projects in Medium 
and Large Cities in Developing Countries, and support the follow-up actions as set out in the 
Development Working Group report. 
 
67.  We reaffirm our commitments to the global partnership for development, as set out in the MDGs, 
and welcome efforts to contribute to this end, including the Global Partnership for Effective 
Development Cooperation to be launched with voluntary participation under the auspices of the 




68.  We recognize the value of Disaster Risk Management (DRM) tools and strategies to better 
prevent  disasters,  protect  populations  and  assets,  and  financially  manage  their  economic 
impacts. We appreciate World Bank and OECD combined efforts, with the UN’s support, to 
provide inputs and broaden participation in the discussion on DRM. We welcome the World 
Bank’s and Mexico’s joint publication on country experiences in this area with the support of G20 
members, and look forward to the OECD voluntary framework to facilitate implementation of DRM 
strategies, to be completed by November. 
 
Promoting longer-term prosperity through inclusive green growth 
 
69.  The long-term development and prosperity of current and future generations requires us to look 
beyond the immediate economic crisis. We acknowledge the importance of finding ways in which 
economic growth, environmental protection and social inclusion can complement and reinforce 
each other. Inclusive green growth in the context of sustainable development and poverty 
eradication can help achieve our development and economic goals, while protecting our 
environment,  and  improving  social  well-being  on  which  our  future  depends.  Inclusive  green 
growth should not be used to introduce protectionist measures. 
 
70.  We commit to continue to help developing countries sustain and strengthen their development 
through appropriate measures, including those that encourage inclusive green growth. We will 
reaffirm our commitment to sustainable development at the 2012 United Nations Conference on 
Sustainable Development (Rio+20). We commit to maintaining a focus on inclusive green growth 
as part of our G20 agenda and in the light of agreements reached at Rio+20 and the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
 
71.  Climate change will continue to have a significant impact on the world economy, and costs will be 
higher to the extent we delay additional action. We reiterate our commitment to fight climate 
change and welcome the outcome of the 17th Conference of the Parties to the UN climate 
change conferences. We are committed to the full implementation of the outcomes of Cancun 
and Durban and will work with Qatar as the incoming Presidency towards achieving a successful 
and balanced outcome at COP-18. We emphasize the need to structurally transform economies 
towards a climate-friendly path over the medium term. We welcome the creation of the G20 study 
group on climate finance, in order to consider ways to effectively mobilize resources taking into 
account the objectives, provisions and principles of the UNFCCC in line with the Cancun 
Agreement and ask to provide a progress report to Finance Ministers in November. We support 
the operationalization of the Green Climate Fund. 
 
72.  The Development Working Group discussed a broad set of practical, voluntary measures and 
actions that have the potential to help countries define their paths towards sustainable 
development based on their own circumstances and priorities. We believe that developing 
countries should have access to institutions and mechanisms that can facilitate knowledge 
sharing, resource mobilization and building technical and institutional capacity to design and 
implement inclusive green growth strategies and policies. We welcome international efforts in 
launching the Green Growth Knowledge Platform and will continue exploring options to provide 
appropriate support to interested developing countries. We welcome the delivery of a non- 
prescriptive, voluntary toolkit of policy options for inclusive green growth and encourage efforts to 
promote  its  implementation.  We  encourage  further  exploration  of  effective  mechanisms  to 
mobilize public and private funds for inclusive green growth investment in developing countries, 
including through the public-private Dialogue Platform on Inclusive Green Investments. We 
welcome the B20’s Green Growth Action Alliance. 
 
73.  We highlight that green growth and sustainable development have strong potential to stimulate 
long term prosperity and well being. We welcome the report prepared by the OECD, the World
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Bank and the UN on incorporating green growth and sustainable development policies into 
structural reform agendas, tailored to specific country conditions and level of development. We 
also acknowledge the G20 efforts to voluntarily self-report on current actions taken to integrate 
green growth and sustainable development into structural reform agendas. We will self-report 
again in 2013, on a voluntary basis, and ask appropriate officials to report back on countries’ 
efforts and progress on incorporating green growth policies in structural reform agendas and in 
relevant national plans to promote sustainable development. 
 
74.  We welcome the progress report on fossil fuel subsidies, and we reaffirm our commitment to 
rationalize and phase out inefficient fossil fuel subsides that encourage wasteful consumption 
over the medium term while providing targeted support for the poorest. We ask Finance Ministers 
to report back by the next Summit on progress made, and acknowledging the relevance of 
accountability and transparency, to explore options for a voluntary peer review process for G20 
members by their next meeting. We also welcome a dialogue on fossil fuel subsidies with other 
groups already engaged in this work. 
 
75.  In Cannes we committed to promote low-carbon development strategies in order to optimize the 
potential for green growth and ensure sustainable development in our countries and beyond. We 
therefore welcome the report on clean energy and energy efficiency technologies and 
acknowledge the G20 countries’ efforts to foster investment in these technologies through the 
sharing of national experiences regarding challenges for technology deployment. 
 
76.  We  welcome  the  establishment  of  a  Global  Marine  Environment  Protection  Best  Practices 
Sharing Mechanism website, and look forward to its launch in accordance with the Cannes 
mandate. 
 
Intensifying the fight against corruption 
 
77. Corruption impedes economic growth, threatens the integrity of markets, undermines fair 
competition, distorts resource allocation, destroys public trust and undermines the rule of law. We 
call on all relevant stakeholders to play an active role in fighting corruption. 
 
78.  Closing the implementation and enforcement gap remains an important priority, and we continue 
to make significant progress towards the full implementation of the Seoul G20 Anti-Corruption 
Action Plan, and the commitments made in the Cannes Monitoring Report. We reiterate our 
commitment to the ratification and full implementation of the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption (UNCAC), and to more active engagement with the OECD working group on bribery 
on a voluntary basis. We welcome continuing engagement from the B20 in the fight against 
corruption and, in accordance with the Terms of Reference of the review mechanism, will involve 
the private sector and civil society in the UNCAC review process on a voluntary basis. We 
endorse today the G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group principles for denial of entry to our 
countries  of  corrupt  officials,  and  those  who  corrupt  them,  and  will  continue  to  develop 
frameworks for cooperation. We also endorse the Working Group’s principles for financial and 
asset disclosure systems for relevant officials to prevent, identify and appropriately manage 
conflicts of interest. 
 
79.  We commit to enforcing anti-corruption legislation, and we will pursue those who receive and 
solicit bribes as well as those who pay them in line with our countries’ legislation. To help facilitate 
international cooperation among G20 and non-G20 governments in their investigation and 
prosecution of corruption, we will publish a guide on Mutual Legal Assistance from G20 countries, 
as well as information on tracing assets in G20 jurisdictions. We renew our commitment to deny 
safe haven to the proceeds of corruption and to the recovery and restitution of stolen assets.
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80.  We extend the mandate of the Anti-Corruption Working Group for two years to the end of 2014 
and request the Working Group to prepare a comprehensive action plan, as well as a second 
Working Group Monitoring Report, both to be presented for consideration and adoption by 




81.  In light of the interconnectedness of the world economy, the G20 has led to a new paradigm of 
multilateral co-operation that is necessary in order to tackle current and future challenges 
effectively. The informal and flexible character of the G20 enables it to facilitate international 
economic and financial cooperation, and address the challenges confronting the global economy. 
It is important that we continue to further improve the transparency and effectiveness of the G20, 
and ensure that it is able to respond to pressing needs. As a contribution to this, in line with the 
commitment made in Cannes, Sherpas have developed a set of evolving G20 working practices. 
 
82.  An informal meeting of G20 Ministers of Foreign Affairs was held in Los Cabos in February, which 
explored the ways in which G20 member countries could contribute more effectively to address 
key challenges in global governance. 
 
83.  Recognizing the far-reaching impact of G20 decisions, we welcome the extensive outreach efforts 
undertaken by the Mexican Presidency, including the meetings of Business-20, Labor-20, Youth- 
20,  and  Think-20.  We  will  continue  developing  efforts  with  non-members,  regional  and 
international organizations, including the UN and other actors. In line with the Cannes mandate, 
in order to ensure our outreach remains consistent and effective, we welcome a set of principles 
in this area, developed by Sherpas. 
 
84.  We thank international organizations, including the UN, IMF, World Bank, WTO, FSB, ILO, FAO, 
and OECD, as well as civil society, for their input into the G20 process. Their reports and 
recommendations have  provided  valuable  inputs  to  G20  discussions,  in  areas  ranging  from 




85.  We look forward to the rest of the work that will take place during Mexico’s Presidency until 
November 30. On 1 December, 2012, Russia will start chairing the G20. We will convene in St. 
Petersburg, under the Chairmanship of Russia. We thank Mexico for hosting a successful Los 
Cabos Summit. 
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